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This thesis examines whether the performance of a mineral industry in a 
developing country changed after its nationalization. The criteria for 
evaluating the performance of a mineral industry were set out at the beginning 
of the thesis, drawing on the economic theory of the exhaustion of. mineral 
resources and on the considerations of how to determine efficiency that have 
been at the forefront of the recent debate about the efficiency of the private 
as opposed to the public sector. 
The industry to be examined, the copper industry in Zambia, was then 
placed in its historical and economic context. 
After compiling and describing the relevant data series for the entire 
period to be examined, 1960-1981., the performance of the industry before its 
nationalization in 1969 was examined. The reasons given at the time for 
nationalization and for the subsequent cancellation of the management 
contracts that the former private owners had been awarded were then analyzed, 
and, in the light of this analysis, the post-nationalization experience of the 
industry was examined. 
Two important factors the war in neighbouring Rhodesia and the collapse 
Of the copper market - could be expected to have affected the industry's 
Performance after nationalization and these were dealt with in a separate 
chapter. 
-Econometric work on production functions and cost equations produced 
results that were consistent with the earlier findings that the industry's 
Performance did deteriorate after nationalization and especially after the 
cancellation of the management contracts. 
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Chapter 1i 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis looks at the performance of a state-owned natural resource 
industry in Africa - the Zambian copper mining industry - before and af ter 
nationalization. 
At the present time, much of the world's attention is being directed 
towards Africa. The famine in the Horn of Africa and widespread hunger and 
malnutrition in almost all parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have touched the 
conscience of mankind and have brought forth enormous resources for emergency 
relief At the same time as efforts are being made to solve the continent's 
-immediate 
problems, thought is being given to the solution of its longer-term 
problems, for it is increasingly being realized that Africa's problems are 
deep-rooted and that considerable domestic adjustment is required 4s well as 
external support. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World 
Bank) has taken a lead in organizing aid efforts for Africa and -in proposing 
solutions to its longer term problems. Its report, Accelerated Development in 
Sub Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, first published in 1981, attracted 
considerable comment and criticism. It offered no general prescriptions, but- 
as the Bank's President wrote in the Foreword, the report did suggest that 
"African governments should not only examine ways in which the public sector 
organizations can be operated more efficiently, but should also examine the 
possibility of placing greater reliance on the private sector. " The President 
stated that this recommendation did not derive from "any preconceived 
philosophy of ownership. It derives from considerations of efficiency, which 
suggest that governments can more effectively achieve their social and 
development goals by reducing the widespread administrative overcommitment to 
the public sector.... " 
l/ World Bank Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda 
for action, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1981, page v. 
- 
The World Bank's criticism of publicly owned enterprises in Africa is 
reflected by much academic work which is being pursued at the moment into the 
rationale for and operations of publicly-owned enterprises. It is seen that 
these enterprises are an important fact of economic life, that their 
operations can make a difference to the national economy, and that it is not a 
matter of indifference whether enterprises are under private or public support. 
Some work has been done on analysing the performance of publicl y-owned 
enterprises in both developed and developing countries. In Great Britain, for 
instance, Dr. Richard Pryke tried to cover the field in his book Public 
Enterprise in Practice (London, Mac Gibbon & Kee, 1971). This work" was quite 
sympathetic to the nationalized industries and found that in many respects 
their early performance was not unfavourable. However, his later study 
concluded that "A substantial waste of resources is obvious within the public 
enterprise sector due both to technical inefficiency and to misallocation.... 
even by British standards their performance appears to be poor" One of 
the reasons for the relatively poor performance of the nationalized industries 
was, according to Pryke, "the growing power of environmentalists and the 
growth of the belief, to which economists have greatly contributed, that the 
social and private interests of the nationalized industries frequently 
diverge. " 
3/ 
In probably no industry is the possible divergence between social and 
private interests, which are a matter of great concern to environmentalists, 
greater than in the mining industry. Irrespective of whether they are 
nationalized or not, mining industries do have an environmental impact which 
most governments feel that they must take into account. Also, the mining 
2/ PRYKE R. "Public Enterprise in Practice: The British Experience of 
Nationalisation during the Past Decade" in BAUMOL W. (ed. ) Public and Private 
Enterprise in a mixed Economy St. Martin's Press, New York, 1980, pg. 226. 
ibid. pg. 229. 
- 
industry is one in which society's interests - as represented by a steady 
income over a long period of time from the finite mineral resource - can prima 
facie be seen to differ from those of the private, and especially foreign, 
owner who is perhaps only interested in making the greatest profit in the 
shortest period of time. 
In a mining industry in Africa such as we will be examining, all the 
concerns we have set out coalesce. Many of these industries have been 
nationalized, partly because of the belief that was set out in the United 
Naýionsl Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States -i/ that states* 
had a permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and could therefore 
assume control over them from private, and especially foreign owners. The 
reasons given for the nationalizations that have taken place were not often 
environmental ones, in so far as few were criticized for polluting the 
environment, but rather socio-economic ones - that, once under government 
control, the enterprises would advance the interests of the worker and of the 
national economy better than in the time of private ownership. Finally, the 
economic performance of these industries after nationalization has often not 
been entirely satisfactory, as the World Bank suggested, and so questions are 
being raised about the relative efficiency of private as opposed to public 
sector enterprises. 
Our thesis will compare the performance of the Zambian copper mining 
industry after as opposed to before nationalization as a contribution to the 
growing literature on private and publicly owned enterprises in the natural 
resource industry. We mill have to take into account in our analysis all the 
different strands we have just mentioned. 
4/ United Nations General Assembly Charter of Economic rights and 
duties of States A/RES/3281 (XXIX) December 12,1974. ' 
- 
In the next and second chapter, we will set out more formally the 
economic issues briefly touched on above. We will look at the theory of the 
exploitation of a natural resource (and we use the word exploitation without 
any pejorative sense when talking of natural resources) with a view to seeing 
how the industry differs from other industries and how social and private 
interests might diverge. We will also see how the efficiency of the industry 
can be measured, as we would want to know whether in fact the industry was 
operated as efficiently, however this is defined, after nationalization as 
before. 
Next, in chapter 3, we will set the particular industry we will examine, 
the Zambian copper mining industry, in its historical context. We will show 
how the industry was established and how it came to occupy the position which 
it occupied at the time of Independence, in 1964, and nationalization, in 1969. 
Subsequently, in chapter 4, we will provide the economic context for the 
industry, by looking at 'its present importance for the world copper industry 
and the Zambian economy. 
Having provided the background in these chapters, we will set out, in 
Chapter 5, the data which we will be using to analyze the performance of the 
industry in the period after 1960. This has merited a separate chapter, we 
felt, because of the numerous problems-with the data. 
In our next chapterf chapter 6f we use these data to help us analyze the 
performance of the industry in the period of private ownership from 
1960-1969. We do this in the light, particularly, of the considerations that 
Chapter 2 had shown to be important. 
I 
-5- 
Chapter 7 sets out the reasons given for the nationalization of the 
industry in 1969 and the cancellation, in 1973, of the management contracts 
that the Government had signed with the private owners at the time of 
nationalization. It is important to find out what, if anything, the 
Government expected from nationalization so ýhat we will know which of the 
m any possible objectives it did in fact set itself before we go on to examine 
its record in attempting to achieve. these ends. 
Chapter 8 analyzes the performance of the industry after nationalization. 
It is almost a mirror image of chapter 6, although it does take into account 
the discussion of chapter 7. 
In the next chapter, we will look at some exogenous explanati ons for why 
the performance of the industry after nationalization was not as- had been 
expected. Some of the major factors were the disruptions in the world copper 
market and the escalation of the troubles in neighbouring Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) into a full-scale civil-war that inevitably dragged in Zambia. 
In Chapter 10, we will perform some econometric woýk on the data ýo 
assess whether the performance of the industry was different before as opposed 
to after nationalization. This will be done by looking at production 
functions and cost equations for the entire period 1960-1981 and. seeing 
wh6ther a dummy variable for the period of public ownership was significant 
and whether its sign indicated an improvement or deterioration in the 
industry's performance. 
This was the last chapter in our analysis and, in Chapter 11, we try to 




CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN INDUSTRY 
UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis will examine the economic justification for and the results 
of the nationalization of a natural resource industry in a developing country, 
that of the Zambian copper mining industry that took place in 1969. 
. 
In a 
broad sense, we will be asking whether the country advanced its overall 
development objectives by taking control of its mining industry. Some , of 
these objectives are outside the scope of our analysis, for it could always be 
argued that, irrespective of the cost, the country had to nationalize the 
industry as a. matter of morality. Indeed, in 1980, the President of the- 
country, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, claimed that the ruling party had "domestically 
fought successfully against one of the two basic enemies of man hamely 
Exploitative International Capital and ts offshoots of Imperialism, 
Colonialism, Neo-colonialism, Zionism, Fascism, Racism' a'nd Apartheid. " 
Cl4arly the nationalization -of the country's major industry which was owned by 
foreign, including South African, capital was seen, in 1980, as part of a 
larger struggle. However, at the time of the nationalization of the industry 
it was argued by economists 
Va 
nd also by the Government that it would 
I/ Republic of Zambia Project: "Operation Food Production" 1980-1990 
State House, Lusaka, 23rd May 1980, page 2. 
. 
Z/ cf FABER M. L. O. "A future for Zambia's Copper Industry", in Towards 
Economic independence by FABER and POTTER J. G. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1971. The paper was written in 1968, before nationalization. 
-7- 
benefit the industry and the country. Indeed, very few nationalizations are 
advocated as being likely to lead to an immediate or even long-term economic 
loss, but as being justified because of a broader objective such as advancing 
towards a more just and socialist society. It is, t hen, fair to concentrate 
simply on the economic benefits and losses of nationalization and to ask 
whether, on balance, the country gýined by the measures it took. The time 
that has elapsed since the nationalization, over fifteen years, is probably 
sufficiently long to a llow for a fair analysis. Such an analysis must, of 
necessity, be counter-f actual, for it is impossible to know how well the 
industry would have performed . 
if the Government had not changed the 
environment in which it operated. 
In this chapter, we will set out the criteria by which we will judge the 
performance of, the industry. We will first describe the motives for past 
nationalizations, so as to set the justification for the nationalization of a 
foreign owned mineral industry in its context. We will then outline the 
relevant parts of the theory* of the exploitation of a mineral deposit by a 
private firm, so -that we can see how the objectives a private company sets 
itself might differ from those that a government, determined to protect and. 
advance the best interests of its citizens, would establish. The case made by 
opýonents of nationalizations of foreign enterprises are usually the same: 
that any conflicts between private and state interests are likely to be small, 
and could certainly be resolved without nationalization and that, in any case, 
bureaucratic mismanagement, poor planning and inefficiency and the flight of 
foreign capftal would very soon prove that the gains of nationalization were a 
6 
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mere chimera. The previous analysis will enable us to set up the criteria to 
judge the performance and efficiency of the industry which we will 
subsequently'ý use to see, in the first place, whether there was any economic 
rationale for\ nationalization at the time it took place and, secondly, 
whethei, if there was, any subsequent deterioration in the industry's 
performance removed them. 
2.2 Reasons for Nationalization 
Befoz; e the present c entury, goverrunents acquired and operated industries 
for national security reasons, such as in the case of armaments industries, or 
to enable them to discharge their specific duties as governments, as in the 
case of the acquisition of a building. which has to be demolished to make way 
f or a road. There was little question but that adequate compensation had to 
be -paid. 
In the present century, nationalization has been justified for broader 
reasons. The achievement of 'greater social and economic equality was an 
objective of many of the nationalizations that took place after the Second 
World War in both Western and, of course, Eastern Europe. Also, 
nationalization Jn market economies has been justified on economic grounds: 
in cases of a natural monopoly, such as the postal service, or of industries 
where externalities make private profit and loss calculations a misleading 
guide to the benefits conferred on society. An example*of the latter would be 
a railway line that opened up the possibilities of commercial exploitation of 
previously neglected agricultural land. 
Later, governments in developing countries took over industries that were 
owned by foreigners not only for economic and social reasons, but, also for ones 
- 
of national pride. This was especially the case with industries that had been 
set up during the colonial period and whose continued ownership by foreign 
capital was felt incompatible with national aspirations and dignity-. Because 
of the very strong resentment towards foreign control, governments have often 
been reluctant to pay the sort of compensation that the private owners felt 
they were entitled to. Moreover, the governments of the developing countries 
tend to argue that their own courts should decide on any disputes over the 
terms of compensation, whereas international corporations and most of the 
governments of the developed market economies argue that these disputes should 
be settled by international tribunals. 
Almost certainly the industry that has- generated the most emotion and 
litigation has been the mining industry. The concept that the developing 
countries have long been pressing is that of the state's "full permanent 
sovereignty over its natural resources". The New International Economic 
Order, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, and 
reflecting the views of the developing countries, ý; tates that "in order to 
safeguard these (natural) resources, each State is entitled to exercise 
effective control over them and Eheir exploitation with means suitable to its 
own situation, including the right to nationalization ... No State may be 
subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to- prevent the 
free and full use of this inalienable right. "-! 
/ 
3/ United Nations General AssdmblY Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic order A/RES/3201 (S-VI), paragraph 4(e). 
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2.3 The Economic Rationale of the 
Nationalization of Foreign-owned Mining Enterprises 
2.3.1 Economic rent 
Developing countries tend to feel especially strongly about their. right 
to national. ize resource iftdustries because the foreign operator is seen to be 
enjoying the economic rent coming from the exploitation of a mineral deposit 
which is the patrimony of the nation. As Ricardo defined it, this rent is the 
difference between the rqturns to capital coming from the poorest mine, which 
is only able to provide its owner with the usual or "normal" profits, and 
those coming from a more fertile mine. For instance, if a mine of one 
million tons of ore at 0.5% were the poorest mine worked and yielded its owner 
normal profits of $100,000 per year, this being the minimum that he would 
accept for the expense and trouble of using his resources to exploit it, and 
an otherwise identical mine with ore of 4% yielded its owners $5 million per 
year, then the rent of the second property would b, 6 $4.9 million. The 
government could recover all this economic rent by nationalizing the property, 
thereby becoming the sole owner. This would result in A net gain if the costs 
of this exercise, primarily the payments, if any, it makes to the former 
owners for compensation. and, perhaps, for managing the property, are less than 
the extra revenue it will receive from the property, with both payments and. 
benefits being suitably discounted. -2/ The company would normally only sell 
RICARDO, D. The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation Third 
Edition, *1821, and Everyman Edition, 1974, page 46. 
j/ cf MIKE6ELL R. The World Copper Industry Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press for Resources for the Future, 1979, pages 299-301. 
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its property if the selling price were greater than the revenue it expected to 
receive, but in very few cases does nationalization result from an agreement 
freely negotiated by'both parties. The private owner knows that his property, 
the mine, cannot be moved and so can easily be confiscated. He can raise the 
costs to the government of this action by threatening to withdraw the skilled 
personnel required to operate the property efficiently. or to involve his home 
government or to make it so clear that he felt that the nationalization was 
confiscation that prospective foreign investors would be frightened away. All 
these factors give him a stronger bargaining hand and would help to strengthen 
his inherently weaker position. 
However, the government could, in theory, recover all the economic rent 
from the property simply by taxation and so the most that could be gained from 
nationalization, as distinct from taxation, would, in our example, be the 
$100,000. This $100,000, rathet than being sent to foreign shareholders 
abroad, would be available for the country's development programmes. 
2.3.2 Mininq operations under private ownership 
Nationalization is, though, hot usually undertaken solely to recover 
normal prof its, I but to allow the state to "exercise effective control" over 
the country's natural resources so that they can be exploited in a different 
way from that in which private, and especially foreign, industry would exploit 
them. 
We will first show how private industry is expected to exploit a mineral 
deposit by looking at a development of the theory of economic rent - the 
economics of exhaustible resources. This very broad branch of economics blends 
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the theory of stock management with elements of mining engineering,, geology, 
the theory of cartels and risk analysis. - 
i/ 
We will only attempt to bring 
out those strands which will be of use for our subsequent analysis, and 
particularly in deciding which criteria to use when judging the industry's 
performance before and after nationalization. 
Ricardo had treated proddction from mines on a level with that from land, 
with the implication that it should be increased up to a point where, assuming 
diminishing returns, marginal costs of production equalled marginal returns. 
7/ . This was corrected, about a hundred years later, - in 1914, in a 
seminal article by Lewis C. Gray who showed that: 
Ricardo was not justified in extending his theory of rent to 
exhaustible natural agents without modification, especially 
when the rent-bearer is exhaustible and non-restorable. 
Two fairly recent surveys of the literature were FISHER, Anthony C. 
and PETERSON Frederick M. "the Exploitation of Extractive Resources: A 
Survey", The Economic Journal, vol. 87 (December 1977), pages 681-721; and 
ANDERS, G. et al The Economics of Mineral Extraction New York, Praeger, 1980, 
Chapter 2. 
It is understandable why it took such a long time for economics to 
approach the problem of the exhaustibility of mineral resources. At the time 
Ricardo wrote, vast areas of the present civilized world, such' as America, 
were *not even explored and mineral production itself was hardly at a point of 
exhausting world supplies: Britain, hard as it might be- to believe now, was 
the- world's largest producer of copper at the beginning of the 19th cientury. 
During the course of the century, the frontier was everywhere closed 
and by the end there no 'longer remained vast areas of land that were 
uncolonized or totally unexplored. Furthermore, man's dependence on 
exhaustible minerals grew rapidly. In these circumstances, interest was bound 
to be re-awakened *in mineral economics when it was felt that a particular 
country was in the process of exhausting its stock of a mineral of primary 
importance to it. In 1925, John Ise ("The Theory of Value as Applied to 
Natural Resources" American Economic Review Vol. XV 1925, pages 284-291) 
argued that the price of petroleum should be raised so as to reduce demand for 
it and encourage substitution. 
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For the location of the internal margin of utilization is determined by 
the competition of present and future uses rather than by 'the coincidence 
between product and expense" B/ 
By the competition of present and fi4ture uses, Gray was referring to the 
fact that, even after allowing for inflation, future income is discounted 
relative to present income, and that the mine owner will try to arrange his 
production so that he could not increase his total welfare by shifting 
production from one period to another. In other words, he should not maximize 
his profits in any given period but rather the net present value of the stream 
of net income resulting from the deposit's exploitation. 
In the case of a mineral deposit where the net income (i. e., receipts 
less costs) from production during the period t-is V and the capital cost, t 
incurred once and for all in the first period, after which production begins, 
is K,, then, with a discount rate of Irl, the net present value of total 
production, B, is: 
T 
B -Ko +fvt e-rt dt, 
1 
the deposit would. be exhausted. 
when summed continuously. In the period T, 
Assuming for the moment that the production rate cannot change over time, 
there is likely to be a rate at which the net present value would be maximized 
because of decreasing returns to scale, and because capital costs should, 
after a point, rise exponentially since, to reach higher annual outputs, lower 
V GRAY L. C. "Rent under the Assumption of Exhaustibilitym Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Harvard University Press, May 1914. Re-printed in 
Gaffney, M. (Ed. ) Extractive Resources and Taxation Madison, . University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1967, page 445. 
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, grade ores would have to be treated. -2/ Generally, the larger the ore 
reserves and the higher their grade, the higher the rate of metal production 
should be. 
Once the initial capacity had been installed, the operator could dec0e 
to obtain the maximum total profit over the life-time of the mine and so woulcl 
produce where average costs were at a minimum, assuming, of course, that the 
cost-curve is U-shaped, thereby obtaining the greatest profit per unit of 
output. However, because of the discounting. principle it would benefit him to 
increase production and therefore total profits per period, although this 
would mean producing at a higher unit cost and, because of the exhaustibility 
0f the reserves, shortening the life of the mine. The mine would, then, 
produce at a rate between that at which average costs were at a minimum (the. 
rate which would be chosen if future profits were not discounted) and that at 
which marginal cost equalled marginal revenue which, under conditions of 
perfect competition, would be equal to the price. The higher the discount 
rate, the greater the incentive. to produce near to the latter rate, but, 
contrary to the implications of Ricardo's theory, this rate is not necessarily 
the optimum rate as it would be with a non-exhaustible resource like land. 
When the assumption that the rate of production will be constant over 
time is removed the same considerations apply as before: - the operator would, 
because of the discounting principle, tend to increase the rate of production 
in the present even if this meant decreasing the rate in the future. 
ýroduction- should not, though, be increased when the increase in profits per 
unit of output was less than the "user costs" of production. These user costs 
per unit of output were defined by Anthony Scott as "the discounted value of 
9/ For instance, to produce 50,000 tons of metal a year might mean 
treating I mn tons of ore, but to produce 100,000 tons treating 4 mn tons - 
thereby increasing substantially the surface plant needed. 
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the future profits foregone by a decision to produce a unit of output today" 
10Y 
and should increase with increases in present output as the mine would 
eventually have to be operated at a lower rate than that for which the plant 
was designed - i. e. at a position to the left of the minimum of the average 
cost curve - after which profits would progressively decline. On the other 
hand, the rate of increase in pr. ofits should decline with increases in output 
because of diminishing returns and so, at some rate of present productionj, 
there should be a maximum difference between profits and user costs and 
therefore an equality between their marginal increments. 
User costs would further increase and so render less attractive increases 
in present production if the cost curves in the future were shifted upwards by 
these increases. This would happen if increasing production meant removing 
richer ore or ore nearer the shafts, leaving lower grade or less accessible 
ore for future extraction. The effect of an upward shift in the cost-curve, 
with price remaining 
ýonstant, 
would be to reduce profits at every level of 
output and limit the range over which profitable production could be 
maintained (i. e. the levels of output where average costs were. below price), 
and to lower the rate of production at which total profit's per period were 
maximized (i. e. where marginal costs equalled price). The position. of least 
cost production, though, would not be altered unless the shape of the average 
cost curve itself changed. 
It is not only rapid increases in production that can raise future cost 
curves, for future increases in the costs of labour or of supplies, to the 
10/ SCOTT A. "The Mine under Conditions of Certainty" in GAFFNEY M. 
cit. Pg. 34. Gray had a similar concept "It might he considered that the 
; ýalue of all coal extracted beyond the (point of maximum net returns per unit 
of output) is subject to an opportunity cost measured by the pre 
, 
sent value of 
the net return which would be - derived from the coal if extraction were 
postponed until the future" (Lbid. Pg 442). 
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extent that they were not off-set by future increases in the price of the 
metal, would have a-similar" effect. However, these increases, if unrelated 
. to 
increases in present7 prodution would lower the user cost schedule, as 
they -would make future less profitable than present production, even before- 
discounting, and so would encourage the firm to increase its production. 
Another reason for present metal production exceeding future would be if 
the orebody contained richer ores near the surface which would be extracted 
before lower grade deeper ores. With a constant rate of ore production, metal 
production would in this case tend to decline over time. However, a company 
could be expected to try to avoid operating parts of its surface plant at 
under capacity in future periods and, therefore, would try to produce metal at 
12/ 
a more uniform rate over the life-time of the mine. - 
Whilst the average grade of an ore stratum might decrease with depth, 
these strata are in many cases not of uniform grade but, starting from higher 
grade material in the centre, blend into waste rock. Present metal production 
could, then, be increased by pulling out only the richer ore (known as 
"high-grading"), but this would reduce the ultimate recovery of copper from 
the deposit as, in the case of an underground mine, it is impossible, because 
ll/ They would be- related if, for instance, increasing present 
production meant paying higher bonus payments which became part of the normal 
wage structure, subsequently, or if an increase in demand for supplies led to a 
permaiýent rise in their price. 
12/ cf GRAY cit. Pg. 433. 
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of subsequent caving, to extract ore previously left behind. . 
13/ Not only, 
then, should the rate of production be considered as a variable when the 
enterprise sets up and operates its mining plant but also the ultimate 
recovery from the deposit (what will be called the level of recovery) and it 
should try to choose the combination of the two that maximized the net present 
value. If the rate of extraction were to be increased after that point, the 
positive effect on the net present value of shifting income towards the 
present would-be more than off-set by the negative effect of losing sections 
of the orebody, and, similarly, if the level of recovery were to be increased, 
the net present value would fall. 
1: 4/ 
The last point can be amplified by examining what the costs of production 
. would 
be at a fixed rate of metal production when the level of recovery 
changes. The average of the costs that varied only with the rate of 
production and of fixed costs, such as plant maintenance, ventilation in the 
mines and administrative expenses, *that can be a very high proportion of total 
15/ 
costs in the mining industry, would fall as the level of recovery 
increased as they would be spread over a greater level. The average of the 
costs that varied with the level of recovery . 
16/ 
such as expenditure on 
, 13/ Decreasing the cut-off grade can have- a very substantial effect on 
reserves - increasing them by 18% for each 0.1% fall in the grade according to 
LASKY S. G. "How tonnage and grade relations help predict ore reserves" 
Engineering and Mining Journal 1950, cited by Sir R. L. PRAIN Copper : the 
Anatomy of an Industry Mining Journal Books, London 1975 Pg. 272. 
], 4/ cf MCDONALD S. L. & McKIE J. W. "Petroleum Conservation in Theory and 
Practice" Quarterly Journal of Economic-s Vol LXXXVI 1962, pgs. 98-121. 
. 
15/ cf Mining Journal Mining Annual Review 1975 Pg 45. 
. 
16/ The concept of costs varying with the level of recovery was set out 
in detail by CARLISLE D. "The Economics of a Fund Resource with particular 
Reference to Mining" American Economic Review Vol. XLIV. 1954, Pgs 595-616. 
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underground surveying and sampling, would probably fall initially with an 
increase in the level of recovery because, by mining and treating lower grades 
of ore to obtain the same metal output per period, the firm could operate at a 
larger and more efficient scale of operations. Later, these costs are likely 
to rise as these economies of scale would be offset by mining lower grade and 
less accessible ores and by attempting to increase the recovery rate at the 
treatment plant of the metal contained in the ore so as to offset the fall in 
grade. 
If there were no time discount, then there would be no incentive not to 
remove all the ore whose treatment increased profits and so the operator would 
plan to increase the level of recovery until the marginal: costs equalled the 
price (a result dissimilar to the one where the rate of production was the- 
variable) With a positive time discount, the firm would wish to push income 
towards the present, towards the point where average costs were at a minimum 
and so would tend to ignore lower grade blocks of ore, thereby decreasing the 
eventual level of recovery. The lower the rate of extraction, the greater 
-this tendency. would be as it would take longer to extract these lower grade 
ores and so the value of their production, again given a positive time 
discount, would be smaller. 
It is likely that less would be known about the costs associated with 
different levels of recovery than about the costs of extraction for given 
grades of ore and given sizes and locations of ore-bodies, and, therefore, 
when calculating an optimum strategy for developing a new deposit, the 
enterprise would compare several alternative levels of recovery each at its 
optimum rate of extraction and decide which yielded the greatest net present 
value. 
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Starting with the distinguished contribution of Harold Hotelling iri 1931, 
17/ 
attention has been increasingly concentrated on expressing 
mathematically the various factors described above. Formulae have been 
developed to express how present production should be increased so that the 
marginal increase in profits connected with a marginal increase in production 
L8 / 
equalled the marginal user costs, how investment should be increased until 
17/ HOTELLING H. "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources" Journal of 
Political Economy Vol XXXIX April 1931 Pgs. 137-175. 
18/ This is given by BURT O. R. & CUMMINGS R. G. "Production and 
Investment in Natural Resource Industries" American Economic Review Vol 59 
1969 Pgs 985-989) as 
i=T T 








Where Vt = profits from time t to time t+1 
r = rate of discount 
Qt = reserves extracted from time t to time t+l in tons of contained 
metal 
Kt = capital stock at b eginning of time t 
Rt = reserves at time t (in tons of contained metal) 
T = time whe n reserves are exhausted. 
As larger reserves and capital stocks allow larger rates of. production, 
the authors introduced the inequality 
(4) Qth (R 
t, 
Kt 
This inequality has to be taken into account when 
optimizing present production and so a Lagrange multiplier, t' 
giving the marginal cost in time t of the profits foregone because of this 
constraint, is included in the right hand side of the equation which gives the 
marginal user costs of present production. If the constraint were not 
operating during time t, then this expression would be zero. The third 
expression of the right hand side shows the discounted value of an incremental 
relaxation of the constraint in future periods (t+1 to T) when the relaxation 
is effected through an increment to reserves in each period. Finally, the 
first expression on the right hand side gives the discounted sum of an 
increment in profits associated with increasing reserves in each period after 
t and reflects the cost of using up reserves in current production, i. e. the 
cost arising from decreased levels of reserves in future periods and the 
associated higher costs of production as the resources is depleted. 
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its marginal cost in the present equals the discounted value of its marginal 
rewards in future periods 
19/ 
and how both considerations should be combined 
when calculating the correct pattern of current inve*stment and production. 
1-0/ 
19/ The authors gave this expression for this marginal equality 





(dK K r) K 
i-t 
t i=t+l i=t+l 
where dKt = additions to capital stock from time t to time t+l 
The left hand side of the equation shows the marginal cost of capital 
investment and the right hand side its rewards, discounted to the present. 
The direct rewards are shown in the first expression as the marginal value of 
the capital stock in all future periods and the indirect rewards in the second 
expression as its effect in relaxing in future periods the constraint (4). 
20/ The authors (BURT O. R. & CUMMINGS R. G. uProduction and Investment 
in Natural Resource Industries" American Economic Review Vol LX 1970 Pgs 




dKt býl +bý, (, 'D-dK t') Zý 
Qt Qt Qt 
Where b discount function: 
b6l discounted value of increments in reserves in all future 
periods associated with an increase in. reserves during time t, 
býl discounted value of the increments to capital in future 
periods associated with an addition to the capital stock 
duringperiod. t, 
dRt additions to reserves from time t to time t+l 
The left hand side of the expression gives the marginal value of 
current production and the right hand side the user cost - the first 
expression giving the discounted marginal value of a unit of reserves that is 
not extracted and devoted to current production and the second the marginal 
value of capital stocks that are consumed by an increment in current output. 
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However, their authors have found difficulty in applying them to explain the 
behaviour of enterprises, primarily because of the difficulty of fitting 




Another problem is\. that of attaching any clear meaning to the concepts of 
marginal costs and returns in mining, especially when we are dealing with an 
industry and not with a single mine. A mining industry is usually a complex 
of open pit * and underground mines, concentrators, smelters, refineries and 
numerous ancillary services ranging from creches for the children of mining 
families to hospitals and first-aid teams. It would be misleading to view any 
par t or investment decision in isolation. For instance, if the ore in one 
mine changed characteristics so that the treatment plant could not deal with 
it effectively, it could pay to open up another mine. In this case the 
investment in this second mine is justified by the decrease in what would have 
been the costs of only using ore from the first mine. However, it is really 
impossible to assess what these would have been. Moreover, investment in this 
mine is not so much determined by the equation of its marginal costs with its 
marginal returns, as by its overall effects upon the whole mining system. 
12/ 
Because of indivisibilities that the decision is not whether to 
increase production slightly from the second mine, but whether to spend 
several million dollars on opening it up - and because of complementarities in 
the production process, it is, then, very difficult to use such marginal 
analyses. 
21/ 00. cit. (Note 18) Pg 989. 
22 
'/ 
For an excellent discussion of an enterprise as a system, see 
NOVE A. Efficiency Criteria in Nationalized Industries, London, George Allen 
and Unwin, 1973. 
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2.3.3 Differences between private and public developoment of mineral deposits 
In any event, the debate over nationalization is not so much over thos6 
aspects of the theory of mineral exploitation but rather over whether a 
private company maximizing its own objective function, normally taken, as we 
have seen, to be the discounted flow of net profits over time, and subject to 
the constraints outlined above, conforms to the national interest. The 
arguments that it does not come under two headings - the first, that the 
private owner does not take into account all the factors that the government 
must - that in other words their objective functions contain different 
variables - and the second that it p-laces different -values on the variables 
mentioned above from those that a government would. 
With regard to not taking into account all relevant considerations, it 
can be argued that a private company does not think of the normal 
externalities or of the industry's importance to the country as a whole. By 
externalities, we can think of such things as the pollution of'nearby streams, 
or the benefits that farmers obtain from having a railway line to a mine built 
near their farms. By the private company's not considering the general 
economy, we can think of its not including in its calculations such factors as 
the education- imparted to mine workers, - or the need of the government to 
conserve its foreign exchange reserves by not buying from foreign suppliers 
when domestic suppliers could provide a similar good or service. In 
particular, the social and private valuations of labour costs can diverge 
substantially when there is substantial unemployment, or when the opportunity 
cost of the labour, perhaps due to low marginal productivity in agriculture, 
is below the private wage. A strictly profit and loss calculation could 
demand that a company employ foreign workers for skilled positions, keeping 
unskilled jobs for local employees, that it obtain its supplies from overseas 
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when a domestic industry, struggling to provide these services was only 
slightly less competitive, or that it close a mine which employed many 
thousands of people simply because the rate of return was not high enough. In 
all cases, we can see that the long run interests of the country could 
conflict with short run commercial interests. 
In the case of a company controlled by a foreign monopoly or oligopoly, 
the case could be even stronger. Because of, for instance, a production 
reduction scheme, designed to boost the company's overall profits, its 1-ess 
profitable operations could be closed down. It could also decide not to 
exploit a mine in the country as this might cause a fall in the price of the 
mineral and, therefore, in the profitability of its other branches. On the 
other hand, it might be in the company's interests to encourage consumption of 
the mineral and so it could be prepared to accept a lower price for the 
mineral than the government would. 
Many circumstances can be envisaged in which an international 
corporation's strategy dictated a policy towards the mining -industry of a 
country which was different from that which the government would have 
pursued. Depending upon the product-mix of its overall output and the 'costs 
of production in the host country as against those of its other operations, 
týe company could -seek too small or too large a production from the mine 
compared to what national interests would appear to dictate. 
In the case of many developing countries, an additional argument for the 
country's seeking effective control of the industry is that international 
corporations frequently see investment there as a very risky undertaking and 
so demand a very high rate of return on any new investment they are to make 
there; only pull out the high grade ore, leaving perfectly viable ore behind; 
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do not undertake prospecting even though - the geological formations are very 
promising and repatriate profits rather than use them to expand capacity. 
There is a danger of circularity in this argument, because a government can 
create so hostile an atmosphere by its rhetoric and action towards other 
industries that the foreign owners of the mining industry will be very 
reluctant to risk their funds by further investment in that particular 
country, which will in turn justify nationalization as a way to force them to 
expand production. 
Whilst a foreign company could be risk-averse because of political 
considerations, primarily the possibility of nationalization, any private 
company could be under a management which, perhaps, simply because of the 
passage of time, had become lethargic, sitting on mineral properties and not 
undertaking prospecting or mineral development. In this connection, it should 
be mentioned that several or today's famous mineral deposits, such as the 
prophyry deposits in North and South America, went through many different 
hands until they came into those of a skilled or bold entrepreneur who decided 
to go ahead and open them up. If a government felt that 'a risk-averse or 
lethargic company was sitting on possibly viable mineral deposits, or was not 
suffic iently bold in exploiting 
-those 
known - to exist, there would be a clear 
case for its reassigning them to other hands, including its own. Whereas a 
private company might be risk-averse, a g9vernmept could argue that the 
national interest demanded that it take the risks involved in prospecting and 
mineral development. 
The second economic argument for nationalization that we mentioned above 
is that the private owners would put a different value on some of the 
important variables than would the government of a country. Such is the case 
with externalities which would alter the value of Vt given in formula 1. 
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Al so, it can be argued that the implicit rate of discount used would be 
different in the case of a private than of a nationalized industry. The 
government has to take a very long term view, it could be argued, so that 
future generations will benefit from a finite resource. In that case, the 
rate of discount to be used should be smaller than the one a company would 
use. On the other hand, it could be argued, especially in the case of a 
developing country, that its needs for capital now are so urgent because it 
has so many projects that it must finance in order to assure today; s citizens 
a reasonable level of living, that a very high rate of discount should be 
used. It should then push income towards the present, even if this reduces 
the level of recovery from the mines. 
2.4 Counter Arguments against those for Nationalization 
Some of the above arguments in favour of nationalization have less 
validity in the case of the mining industry than in that. of other industries. 
The mining industry is not one where the externalities are notably important 
such as in the case of transport, postal services or even education. Its 
output is pot a public good but a good which is traded to foreigners on world 
markets and so normally has a clearly defined price and value. The industry 
can cause external diseconomies such as pollution, but it is possible to deal 
with these by legislation and compensation payments. It does bring benefits 
to a country, such as 'the education it provides. to workers and the 
infrastructure that it has to construct, but so do other industries and, in 
any case, the government can pass le gislation forcing the mining industry to 
employ certain numbers of local workers at specific levels of expertise and, 
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by granting tax coincessions or other economic incentives, can encourage it to 
build infrastructure and to open up new mines. In sum, then, the mining 
industry is normally a large and important industry in a country but is not an 
obvious candidate for national. ization because of externalities peculiar to it. 
Moreover, a proponent of the continued private control of the industry 
would argue that' a privately run company is more accountable than would be a 
nationalized concern when it came to taking into account externalities: that 
citizens' action groups can complain to and obtain a sympathetic hearing from 
governmental bodies about excessive pollution or the lack of employment 
opportunities for locals, in the case of privately run enterprises, but in the 
case of nationalized concerns, they are likely to be met by bureaucratic 
obstruction and delay. 
When it comes to possible conflicts of interest between a multinational 
corporation developing a country's mineral resources- and the country itself 
he would argue that the former's interests are most likely to conform with the 
latter's. Both would want an expanding mar. ket for the mineral at reasonable 
prices, whilst the multinational corporation can obtain greater access to 
international finance markets and to international expertise than could a 
nationalized enterprise. Given security of tenure, the company will invest in 
its properties and take a long term view of the industry. j, whereas a government 
is more likely to take a short term view of the industry, using revenues from 
the industry to bolster its own electoral or popular standing regardless of 
the long term interests of the country. 
Moreover, the advocate of continued private control would stress that a 
high risk business like mining is best left to private rather than government 
enterprise. Adam Smith's argument of two centuries ago could be cited: 
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"Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in 'them, 
together with the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital 
and profit. They are, therefore, the projects to which of all others a 
prudent law-giver, who desired to increase the capital of his nation 
would least choose to' give any extraordinary encouragement, or to turn 
towards them a greater share of that capital than what would go to them 
of its own account". 23/ 
Not only is it not the proper role of a government to be involved in high 
risk operations, especially when it involves the major industry of the 
country, but it has frequently been argued that most industries, and 
especially the mining industry, is one best left in private hands, because of 
its complexities and the need for efficiency in its operations. As one 
proponent of this view, Dr. F. Taylor Ostrander of Amax Inc., when discussing 
the Zambian situation before nationalization, put it: 
"The leaders of African states should understand that private foreign 
capital can serve their interests better than any . nationalized 
enterprise. The essential economic rationale of private investment is 
its superior efficiency. As a test of profits in considering 
feasibility, as a means 'o-F organizing money, men, technology, and 
physical resources to achieve stated goals with a minimum of waste, as a 
means of recruiting technical skills and managerial talents, as a means 
of avoiding the overloading of limited numbers of indigenous 
administrative personnel, or, finally, but by no means least important, 
as a means of creating a larger stream of gross profits than bureaucratic 
enterprise ever could, and thus automatically of providing a broader 
basis for transfer of a fair ' share of profits 
directly. into national 
budgets as freely disposable tax revenues - in all these ways, the 
superior efficiency of direct foreign rivate investment can bring many 
unique benefits to developing countries. 
ý 
24/ 
Dr. Ostrander brought out-- the essential aspects of a mining enterprise 
that we outlined above - that it involves organizing resources to achieve 
specific goals. To produce copper in Zambia and to sell it to the outside 
world requires the talents of geologists, economists, caterers, physicists, 
- 23/ SMITH, Adam. The Wealth of Nations London 1776/77 Book IV Chapter 
VII Part 1. 
24/ OSTRANDER F. T. "The Role of Foreign Private Capital" in DAVIS John 
A. and BAKER James K. Southern Africa in Transition New York, Praeger 1966, 
page 351. 
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metal marketers, and hundreds of other traders. There have to be laboratories 
for testing the cores of ore drilled, libraries, first aid teams, garage and 
vehicle repair facilities as well, of course, as mines, smelters and 
refineries. In Africa, many of the facilities that would sometimes be 
provided by the local authority in a developed economy, such as recreational 
facilities or hospitals, also have to be provided by the mining enterprise. 
The specific goal of constructing and operating this vast organization is 
to make profits for the owners by selling copper on the world market. What 
this clearly demands is not that each division make a profit or that all parts 
work continuously (one would hope, for instance, that the rescue teams did 
not) but that the system as a whole make a profit. 
Obviously, it could be possible to increase profits for any period by, 
for instance, imposing longer work hours or high-grading, as described 
earlier. However, a proponent of private enterprise would argue that, given 
the initial resources available, and under comparable conditions, over time 
the benefits generated by a privately run enterprise would be greater than 
those-generated by a government-run concern.. 
2.5 Growing Emphasis on "Market Forces" at the international level 
2.5.1 The interest of World-Bank 
These views are gaining increasing importance because they are inspiring 
the lending decisions and the project proposals of the two most important 
internationai financial agencies, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (The World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund. 
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In its 1983 World Development Report, the World Bank devoted its special 
analytical section to "Management in Development". It stated that the: 
"The main criterion for judging economic management is "efficiency" -a 
concept that has meaning only in the context of an agreed set of 
objectives. In every country efficiency has two distinct but related 
aspects that are critical to economic performancez. efficient resource 
allocation ... and operational efficiency - to maximize the use of labour 
and capital through the sound management of enterprises ... in both the 
public and private sectors. " L5-/ 
"The key factor for determining the efficiency of an enterprise" was not, 
the Report argued, Nwhether it is publicly or privately owned but how it 
is managed. In theory it is possible to create the kind of incentives 
that will maximize efficiency under any type of ownership. But there is 
a great di 
- 
fference between what is theoretically feasible and -what 
typically happens. " 26/ 
After discussing the evidence, the Report concluded that: 
"Government interventi6ns can result in large losses in efficiency and 
should therefore be selective. In the face of compelling political and 
social pressures, governments will always be tempted to do more than can 
be accomplished efficiently. Yet today's widespread re-examination of 
the role of the state is evidence of a new realism. " 2-7/ 
Much "of this re-examination, was caused by the effects of the performance 
of state-owned enterpris es on the national economy, in particular by their 
large and growing claims on the budget, 
2-8/ 
and by their role as foreign 
borrowers. Indeed, on the page opposite to that on which this statement was 
made, a chart was given showing, for many developing countries, the net claims 
on the budget of non-financial state-owned enterprises, and in this chart, 
Zambia's net claims, as a percentage of GDP at market prices, were, in the 
years 197 8- 1980, considerably above those of all the other countries except 
Sri Lanka29/ 
25/ World Bank World Development Report 1983, New York; Oxford 
University Press, pages 41-42. 
26/ ibid. page 50. 
27/ bid. page 56. 
. 
L_ 
28/ ibid. page 74. 
29/ vide ibid, Figure 8.1 page 75. 
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Generally, the Bank argues for abolishing price distortions, caused by 
subsidies or by unrealistic exchange rates, for restoring autonomy to the 
management of public enterprises and for opening them up to the challenges of 
competition, so that they would be on an equal footing in domestic and 
international markets with any other company. The rationale for this 
viewpoint is that: 
"Efficiency is highest when an enterprise strives to maximize profits in 
a conipetitive market under managers with the autonomy, motivation and 
capability to respond to the challenge of competition. " LO/ 
2.5.2' The interest of the International Monetary Fund 
The International Monetary Fund's attitude towards public ownership is 
similar to that of the World Bank. In a recent collection of three papers on 
public enterprise published by the Fund, the Kanaging Director, Jacques de 
Larosiýre argued in the Foreword that the Fund had taken an interest in the 
problem when: 
"The aggregate impact of inefficiency in the public enterprise sector as 
a whole, or in a number of major producing units has resulted in budgetary 
deficits too large to be financed under conditions of monetary 
stability. In 'a number of countries the public enterprise deficit has 
been identified as a proximate cause of excessive credit creation, 
leading to monetary expansion, price inflation and, ultimately to balance 
of payments pressures. " 31/ 
As we will later see, the performance of the Zambian public enterprise 
sector, and particularly its copper industry, has received attention in the 
International Monetary Fund's adjustment programmes and targets have been set 
for the industry. 
30/ ibid. page 74. 
T1/ FLOYD R. H. et al Public Enterprise in Mixed Econ(xnies: some 
mac-oeconomic aspects, International Monetary Fund, Washington,, D. C. 1984, 
page V. 
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The Managing Director pointed to the paucity of data that developing 
countries publish on the public enterprise sector and its effect on the 
economy. The paper by R. P. Short in this volume did assemble some data at a 
very aggregate level. It is perhaps interesting that, of the sample of 78 
countries examined, 
-the 
public enterprise sector in Zambia accounted for the 
highest share of GDP at factor cost, 37.8 per cent in 1972, and the highest 
share of gross fixed capital formation, 61.2 per cent in 1979-80.121 For 
many countries data were not available and even the data that were available 
were not necessarily comparable, - but the figures quoted do illustrate the 
relatively large size of the public enterprise sector in Zambia. 
2.6 Comparative studies on efficiency 
These international organizations are being helped in their assessment of 
the performance of the public sector by many academic studies of the 
efficiency of public as opposed to private enterprises. . 
23/ 
Generally, these 
studies have tried to see whether productivity in a publicly owned firm is 
different from that in a privately owned firm in a comparable situation. This 
can be done by estimating the production functions and seeing whether the 
returns to labour and capital are different, or the rates of technical 
progress are different, by looking at the cost'functions to see whether their 
coefficients were appreciatively different, 
. -or 
simply by looking at indices 
-such as output per head, or, in the case of railways, for instance, passenger 
miles or freight miles per input of labour, fuel, equipment. 
In general, these studies can be useful in comparing industries in 
developed countries where there are public and private companies producing the 
same goods - such as public and private utilities, airlines and railways. 
32/ ibid. pages 116-22. 
33/ A recent survey of the literature is given in MILLWARD, R. et al 
Public Sector Economics, Longmans, London 1983, especially Chapter 5. 
32 
Data are often not a significant problem as these companies are usually 
compelled by law to publish voluminous statistics. The real problems here are 
to specify correctly the production and cost functions and to take into 
account any important exogenous factors that could affect comparisons. 
This type of analysis is particularly suited for examining the operations 
of many small firms or enterprises in the same industry. For instance, 
garbage collection in the United States is undertaken by municipalities 
directly, by private firms that bid for an exclusive contract from the 
municipality or simply by private firms that come to an agreement with the 
individual householder. By comparing the costs to households of these 
services in many different cities, an idea of comparative efficiency can be 
reached. Such studies were examined by Professor E. S. Savas who found that 
14/ 
private contract work was more efficient than municipal collection 
In our study, we will not be oomparing the industry to be studied with 
another comparable industry, if there were one which, given differences in the 
grades, metallurgical properties and the shape of the ore bodies being mined, 
would be highly unlikely. Rather we will be comparing the performance of the 
industry before nationalization as opposed to after nationalization. Analysis 
of the production and cost performance of the industry is supplemented by' 
econometric work which employs dummy variables to account for the diffe-rence 
between the pre- and post-nationalization periods. The study is not based 
entirely around this econometric work, *because the whole environment in which 
34/ SAVAS E. S., "Comparative Costs of Public and Private Enterprise in 
a Municipal Service" in BAUMOL W. (ed. ) Public and Private Enterprise in a 
Mixed Economy, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1980, pages 253-264. 
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the industry operated changed very quickly after nationalization. Much of our 
study will be concerned with examining what effect these changes could have 
been expected to have had on the industry 
Another reason why econometric work will only form part of our analysis 
is that it is dif f icult to assume, in the. case of the mining industry, that 
production functions and cost relationships do not change over time. As we 
argued earlier in this chapter, lower grades of ore, greater mining depths and 
problems of reserve depletion can all be expected to affect these functions, 
and although some attempts are made to allow for these effects, lack of data 
prevents more comprehensive work. 
2.7 Summary: Criteria for Evaluating the Performance of the 
Mininq Industry under Private and Government Control 
In the light of . 
the above discussion, a first criterion that suggests 
itself for measuring the relative performance of the industry under private 
and Government control is the surpluses it generated and the tax revenues that 
it provided the Government. -We will also have to see whether these surpluses 
came from producing a steadily larger volume of copper and whether the funds 
for expansion came from internally generated funds or,. less optimally, from 
overseas loans. If the foi-mer were unavailable, the ability of the different 
companies to attract loans must. also be considered as important when assessing 
relative'performance. 
Looking more closely at the industry's performance, we must ask whether 
the companies lengthened the life-time of the industry and, therefore, total 
profits by treating a declining grade of ore over time, whether -they improved 
the efficiency of their treatment processes so that they obtained a steadily 
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greater recovery of metal from each ton of ore hoisted and whether they were 
energetic and enterprising in undertaking exploration pr ogrammes. We must ask 
whether increasing amounts of investment were needed to,:. produce additions to 
production and also whether the labour force expanded mor, e rapidly than did 
production. All the above indicators, except the first; should give us 
measures of efficiency. The ore grade is not so unambiguous a test of 
performance because for economic reasons, as discussed earlier, a government 
might want to push income towards the future and therefore might increase the 
cut-off grade. Other things being equal, though, being able to treat a 
declining grade of ore over time is_ a sign of increasing efficiency. As just 
stated, we will try to combine many of these variables in econometric tests on 
the production and cost functions, so as to come up with an overall picture. 
It cannot be too strongly stressed that mining is not primarily a 
questiop _9f 
technical efficiencies but rather of achieving a steady flow of 
net income from a mineral deposit under conditions of uncertainty. These 
uncertainties are manifold. Those connected with prospecting are clear: even 
the most vigorously conducted exploration campaign can reveal nothing, if 
there was nothing to find. Mining itself is an uncertain activity in that, as 
it progresses, new facts can be found about the ore body; that the seam thins 
out with depth, or that it buckles, that the mine is more liable to flooding 
or that the ores are more difficult to treat. Some of these factors, but not 
all, could have been determined by the preliminary drilling. Lastly, and 
perhaps most importantly, the final product, a metal, is subject to the 
vagaries of the international market, 
-to 
demand shifts caused by, amongst 
other things, the effects of oil price increases on the economies of the major 
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consuming countries, and the supply disruptions caused by strikes, floodings, 
and even wars. It is the function of a mining company to anticipate as best 
it can changes in the price of its product, but always to bear in mind that 
the eventual price could be very different from that which it had forecast. 
One of the most important tests of management is its ability to read the 
market and to act accordingly, adjusting its investment plans when the need 
arises. In looking at the performance of the Zambian copper industry, we must 
come to some assessment as to whether the private owners were more realistic 
than the nationalized industries' managers in acting in a very uncertain 
environment. 
_We 
must also take the changing environment into account 
throughout our discussion: it would, for instance, be unfair to argue that 
the Government's not expanding production as quickly as did the private owners 
was a clear sign of an inferior performance if several mines suddenly 
encountered severe drainage problems and other technical difficulties at the 
time of the take-over. 
Having examined these commercial and technical aspects of running the 
mining industry, we will address ourselves to the issues which the Government 
itself felt important. As we saw earlier, depending upon the circumstances, a 
mining compa ny can be seen to be expanding production too rapidly or too 
slowly. -Also to answer whether the performance of the industry improved from 
the Government's point of view after nationalization, we must first find out 
what its object. ives were at the time and what externalities it felt to be of 
particular importance. 
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Chapter 3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ZAMBIAN COPPER MINING INDUSTRY 
In this chapter we will briefly review the history of the industry up t0 
the time of Independence and nationalization. 
The Zambian mining industry did not rise slowly to the position of 
dominance it now enjoys in the economy and of importance it holds in the-world 
copper market because, once it had been firmly established in the late 1920s, 
the country's economic prosperity has been inextricably tied to it. 
3.1 The pre-1914 search for minerals in Central Africa 
However, before the First World War an effort had been made to set up a 
copper industry with disappointing results, since all the mines opened up were 
eventually closed down. One factor that justified' mineral exploration and 
exploitation in Central Africa at this time was the previous dramatic increase 
in the world's demand for coppe r to be used as a medium in the generation and 
transmission of electricity. world production, which had totalled 163,000 
tons between 1801 And 1810, rose to 3,707,000 between 1891 and 1900. 
Moreover, the period 1894 to 1907 was one of a generally rising copper price. 
In this period, Zambia's mineral rights were held by a private company, 
the British South Afriqa Company, founded in 1888 by Cecil Rhodes and which, 
until 1924 also administered the country under a Royal Charter granted by the 
British Government. The Company closed. the country to individual prospectors 
and granted exclusive prospecting rights over given areas to companies or 
J/ This chapter is largely drawn from a previous work by the present 
writer, The Copper Industry in Zambia, Praeger, New York, 1981. 
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individuals who had to be adequately backed and to spend a specified summon 
exploration. The various prospecting licenses issued totaled about 30 
and eventually found their way into the hands of seven companies. 
The explorers these companies financed found many deposits, including 
s9me of the largest of the present-day producing mines - Roan Antelope, Nkana 
and, possibly, Nchanga. Yet they failed to recognize that beneath their low 
grade oxide outcrops lay massive sulphide ore-bodies and so did not examine 
them by drilling. Instea. d the companies opened up Bwana Mkubwa and Kansanshi 
in the north and even smaller deposits at the Hook of the Kafue, in the middle 
of the western half of the country. All these deposits were soon seen to be 
of little value. Public interest then declined precipitately, especially 
after the fall in the price of copper in 1907. 
There are several partial explanations for the failure to recognize the 
true value of the really worthwhile deposits. One of them is that the 
3/ 
management of the companies was defective. Sir Edmund Davis- ,a senior 
director and later Chairman of two of the most important companies, the 
Northern Copper Company and the Rhodesia Copper Company, was unwilling "to 
2/ T. D. GUERNSEY, "Summary of Early Prospecting in Northern Rhodesia", 
Transactions of the Institution of Mining and Metallurgy 63 (1953-1954) 1-8 
cbntains an excellent summary-of the legal framework and course of pre-1914 
exploration. 
3/ DAVIS, Sir Edmund (Kt 1927) (1862-1939). Born in- Australia, 
e migrated to Cape Town at age of 17. Founded Bechuanaland Exploration Company 
in 1888. This company was oiiginally a rival of Rhodes' British South Africa 
Company but the two companies worked together in Northern Rhodesia, forming 
the Northern Territories (B. S. A. ) Company in 1895. Became a director of the 
Chartered Company in 1927 and of Anglo American Corporation in 1928. Avid art 
Collector. High Sheriff of Kent after 1930. 
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risk big money" 
±/, 
whereas, proper examination of the deposits would have 
entailed risking substantial sums, conducted his businesses inefficiently, 
trying to organize everything from his office in London, 7,000 miles away, and 
was technically inexperienced, more interested in the companies being formed 
as "business propositions on paper" than as enterprises mining copper in the 
heart of Africa 
S/ 
. 
Certainly it was not the limited availability of capital that prevented 
management from directing the exploration effort towards the deposits of most 
real interest, for capital was more readily available for speculative ventures 
before as opposed to after the First World War. Also, physical difficulties 
cannot be considered an important explanation since British explorers coming 
from Zambia discovered the mineral wealth of the Katanga in 1901. Moreover, 
the personnel employed in the field were not obviously unqualified. For 
instance, Dr. Davey, Consulting Engineer to most of the exploration companies, 
was a man of wide experience in the mining world. 
However, the early explorers failed to notice, or at least to take 
account of, the geological differences between the Katangan and Zambian 
ore-bodies. Katanga's high grade oxide ores occurred in dolomite rocks which 
4/ GREGORY, Sir T. Ernest Oppenfii4mer and the Economic Development of 
Southern Africa, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1962, pages 399-400,408. 
5/ MURRAY-HUGHES, J. "Sir Edmund Davis" Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 
Journal, Volume VII, 1965, pages 1-12, gives an account of Davis, financial 
manipulations. 
6/ GUERNSEY op. cit. 
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opposed the development of secondary copper sulphides. However, Zambia's low 
grade surface oxides - rarely over 7 per cent, a grade that would have been 
discarded in the Katanga where 15 per cent ores were being worked - occurred 
in siliceous rocks and under acid conditions which were ideal for their 
development. 
I/ 
Sulphides had, though, been found in Zambia - the Sable Antelope mine in 
the Hook of the Kafue, for instance, contained on the surface a lode of 
high-grade sulphide ore. Also, the fact that the Katangan ores occurred in 
dolomite rocks whilst those of Zambia occurred in siliceous rocks had been 
noticed. 
1/ 
Furthermore, Dr. Davey, when answering the question why the 
ancient mines had not been worked to greater depths, said that "at depths 
ranging. from only a few inches to over 100 feet" the oxidized copper ores gave 
way to sulphides and that: "We have invariably found that the depth of the 
old workings is limited by the appearance of sulphides of copper so that they 
form no criterion as to the depth to which the copper deposits might 
extend".! 
" 
Indeed, in the case of Roan Antelope, he had realized that the 
7/ Rhodesian Anglo American Ltd. Mining Developments in Northern 
Rhodesia, Broken Hill, 1929. This pamphlet was written by Dr. J. A. Bancroft. 
8/ Vide STUDT, F. E. "The Geology of- the Katanga and Northern Rhodesia" 
Proce'ýdinqs and Transactions of the Geological Society of South Africa, Volume 
XIV, 1913, pages 44-106. 
9/ DAVEY, T. G. in a Report to the Northern Copper Company, London, 31st 
December 1902 page 2 quoted in WALKER, G. L. Notes on the Copper History o 
Central Africa, RST archives W(2) HA Group (henceforth RST archives). Davey 
was not stating facts that were not available to interested parties. In the 
1907 Annual Report of the Rhodesia Museum at Bulawayo, F. P. Mennell, F. G. S. t 
tried to help the work of the prospector by writing on the "Mineral Wealth of 
Rhodesia"and made exactly these points, whilst stressing that the Museum would 
be only too willing to analyze samples that were sent for analysis. 
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deposit might be synclinal, i. e., that the ore extended in a continuous band 
beneath the surface between the parallel Roan Antelope and Rietbok outcrops - 
and early prospecting shafts had actually been sunk deep enough to reveal the 
sulphide ores underneath the surface oxides. 
10/ 
3.2 The post-1918 discovery of the country's mineral wealth 
Sulphide ores became considerably more attractive than oxide ores with 
the development of the froth flotation method of concentration. This was 
first introduced on a commercial scale in 1912 at El Teniente mine in Chile by 
Minerals Separation Ltd. of London. The recovery of copper from the mine's 
ores improved from 50 to 90 per cent. Minerals Separation Ltd. was to play a 
decisive role in the development of the Northern Rhodesian copper industry 
-after the 
First World War. 
The story began in 1918 when P. K. Horner and C. Gordon James 
Il/ 
were 
made redundant by the Union Miniýre du Haut Katanga, the company founded in 
10/ FORD, S. H. Letter to D. C. D'Eath, 10 January 1950, in RST archives 
op. cit., Document 476, and PARKER, R. J. in Reply to the Discussion on 
"Prospecting and Geological Survey of the Nkana Conces sion, Northern Rhodesia 
1927-1929" Transactions of the Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, Volume XLV, 
page 353: "the or-iginal (1902-1907) prospectors discovered the sulphides at 
Roan. They undoubtedly sampled their development work and they could not have 
explained the copper content at the bottom of the shafts without knowing that 
sulphide ore was present. " Parker discovered the true value of the Roan mine 
in 1925-1926. 
ll/ Cf. PARKER, R. and GRAY, A. "Prospecting and the Geological Survey 
of the Nkana Concession" Transactions of the Institution of Mining and 
Metallurgy, Volume XLV, 1936, page 319: "It was entirely through the 
activities of P. K. Horner and C. Gordon James that Copper Ventures was formed 
(under the aegis of Minerals Separation Ltd. ) to investigate some of the old 
copper discoveries and to test the possibility of finding new deposits through 
intensive and scientific prospecting". Parker had no time for Horner and 
would only have given him credit where it was due. 
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1906 to exploit Katangals mineral wealth. It had sufficient capital to set up 
treatment plant and to attract skilled American and British engineers like 
these two. Horner had been Directeur G4n6ral of the company and James had 
worked there as a metallurgist. In the latter part of 1920, they met in 
London, W. G. Perkins . 
12/ 
who had developed a process to treat low grade 
oxide ores with ammonia. He too had been in the Katanga and also knew Horner 
from his days in America and discussed with him the possibilities of using his 
new process on deposits in the Katanga. As a result, Horner approached Union 
Miniýre for a concession but, when this plan fell through, thought instead of 
an exploration syndicate. 
The idea of a syndicate was brought to reality by Captain William 
Broadbridge, the Chief Engineer of Minerals Separation Ltd. This company had 
tried between 1919 and 1920 to apply the froth flotation method of 
concentration to Bwana Mkubwals oxide ores, but without success. When Perkins 
discussed with Broadbridge his own process and Horner's ideas for a syndicate, 
he became enthusiastic and suggested that they look into the possibilities of 
using Perkins' process on Bwana Mkubwa's ores. 
Another person who joined the exploration syndicate was Alfred Chester 
Beatty. Beatty, who had played a major role in helping the Guggenheims 
ýevelop the porphyry copper deposits of North and South America, was probably 
the world's foremost authority on the mining and treatment of copper ores. In 
12/ We follow the account of the formation of Copper Ventures Ltd. given 
by Horner and James in the RST Archives 22- cit- Bancroft (Mining in 
Northern Rhodesia, London and Salisbury, British South Africa Company, 1961, 
pages 147-148) gives a different story of James overhearing a conversation on 
the Nkana claims when in hospital in Broken Hill and returning to London to 
interest his friend Horner in them. - 
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1913 he had left his U. S. mining interests to settle in England. Using his 
own capital he formed, in December 1914, his own mining house, Selection 
Trust, which initially was engaged in prospecting for diamonds in Ghana and 
Angola. Perkins had an office in Beatty's Selection Trust building and so was 
able to introduce Horner to him. Beatty's previous experience was with 
deposits very different from Bwana Mkubwa - with huge deposits of fairly low 
grade sulphides that were amenable to flotation - and, apparently, his 
interest in Zambia stemmed from the hope that such deposits might be found 
there. Copper Ventures and Bwana Mkubwa provided him with an entree into 
Zambia. Even so, knowing that there would be great difficulties in exploiting 
the low grade oxide ores known to exist there, he told Horner that he would 
only be interested in his plans if these ores could be successfully treated 
and subscribed E250, half the cost of the experimental treatment plant. The 
plant was very successful and so Beatty agreed to join the syndicate, when-, 
under the name of "Copper Ventures Ltd. ", it was formed in November 1921 to 
"carry on business as metallurgists". The original capital of the syndicate 
was E5,000, half of which was subscribed for by Minerals Separation Ltd. 
13/ 
As well as trying, in the end unsuccessfully, to apply Perkins' process 
to Bwana Mkubwa's ores, the Copper Ventures Syndicate undertook fresh 
exploration and examined more carefully known deposits, in particular, Nkana. 
There is some dispute as to what exactly it accomplished, and particularly 
whether it would have achieved more if it had had larger resources, but by the 
time that it was wound up, in March 1925, and its interests were distributed 
13/ The final participation in Copper Ventures Ltd. was - Minerals 
Separation Ltd. 43 1/3 per cent; Webster and Broadbridge of that company, 6 
2/3 per cent each; Horner 8 per cent-, Perkins and James 10 per cent each, 
Selection Trust 13 1/3 per cent-, Selection Trust directors 2 per cent (RST 
archives op. cit., Document 122). 
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pro rata to its shareholders, (the main interests of the Syndicate are given 
in Figure 3.1) a firm basis had been established for successful exploration. 
The Syndicate had obtained from the British South Africa Company 
exclusive prospecting areas and exploration in two of them - the 1,800 square 
mile Nkana Concession, which it obtained in 1924 and the much larger, 50,000 
square mile Rhodesia Congo Border Concession it obtained in 1922 - had 
revealed the Mufulira and Nchanga deposits. The Syndicate's drilling had 
shown the presence of clean sulphides at Nkana. Also, Sir Edmund Davis and 
Chester Beatty had been able to interest Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, Chairman of 
the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, in investing in the Bwana 
Mkubwa Company and Rhodesia Congo Border Concession Ltd. which had been formed 
to explore the concession of the same name. Sir Ernest's main interest was in 
diamonds, and he had agreed to invest in Zambia as a favour to Sir Edmund for 
acting as an intermediary in negotiations with Zairean_and Angolan diamond 
producers. 
It was Chester Beatty who was responsible for removing any doubt as to 
the importance of the Zambia copper fields. After the dissolution of the 
Syndicate, he obtained option on thirty properties, including Roan Antelope, 
and acceded to the requests of his subordinates, Russell Parker and 
Filliam Selkirk, to drill that property. Selkirk's method of drilling was to 
sink widely spaced holes 1,000 feet apart. This was new to copper mining but 
was decided upon because he believed that he would find a large and uniformly 
disseminated ore body. -14-1 The first hole that was sunk justified this 
procedure, for it reached the ore shale formation at 457.75 feet and passed 
14/ BRADLEY, Sir K. Copper Venture, London, Mufulira and Roan Antelope 
Mines, 1952, page 83. 
Figure 3.1 
The Corporate Structure at the Time of Copper Ventures 
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out at 497.50 feet, revealing an ore body of 3.87 per cent copper in clean 
sulphides, with a true width of 36.5 feet. There was no longer much question 
about the value of the Roan Antelope Mine: 3 per cent to 4 per cent sulphides 
in such a wide formation could be more easily treated than oxides. 
The success of the Roan drillings led Beatty to obtain from the Bwana 
Mkubwa company, which had earlier bought the Nkana Concession from Copper 
Ventures, an option on that property. The Bwana Mkubwa company insisted on 
retaining a 1/3 interest in any property found, which was a very wise decision 
as the Mufulira and, after the Second World War, Chibuluma, Chambishi and 
Baluba mines_were developed in that area. 
Chester Beatty did not have the finances to examine the Nkana deposit 
itself or even the Nchanga deposit, the most promising one in the Rhodesia 
Congo Border Concession, and it was the Anglo American group, assisted by 
engineers from the Newmont Corporation, which examined and developed these 
properties in the early days. 
3.3 The formation of the large copper companies 
The story of the battle for control of the emerging mines has been told 
elsewhere. It was feared that the whole of the Zambian copper industry would 
come under the control of the American copper companies who had the expertise 
and the capital to develop the mines. As it was, both American capital and 
expertise were used to bring the mines on stream but all the operating 
companies - Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd., formed in 1927, and Rhodesian 
Selection Trust formed in 1928, on the one side-, and, on the other side, 
Rhodesian Anglo American, also formed in 1928, and'Rhokana Corporation, formed 
in 1931 by the merger of Rhodesia Congo Border Concession Ltd., Nchanga Copper 
Mines Ltd. (itself formed in 1927), and the Bwana Mkubwa Company (which 
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controlled the Nkana mine) - were British companies with head offices in 
London. The first two companies were heavily supported by Chester Beatty's 
friends, the American Metal Company. Rhokana was controlled by Rio Tinto Zinc 
and the Anglo American Corporation and its friends, including the Newmont 
Corporation. South African, British and, through Newmont, American capital 
backed Rhodesian Anglo American. In 1930, Selection Trust exchanged all its 
shares in its Zambian properties for a direct interest in the American Metal 
Company and so its interest was henceforth only indirect. However, until 
1953, when the companies changed their domicile to Zambia, Selection Trust 
continued to operate the properties from its London office. The only direct 
connection between the two groups was the 1/3 interest that Rhokana 
Corporation held in the mines of Rhodesian Selection Trust. The main 
inter-company relationships at the time of the Second World War are given in 
figure 3.2. 
It was fortunate that the mines were backed by powerful interests because 
they were coming on stream at the very time that the Depression, which led to 
a collapse in the copper price, started (see Table 3.1). The American Metal 
Company almost went bankrupt in financing the development of the Roan Antelope 
]; 5/ 
and Mufulira properties. As it was, the Depression and the wartime 
controls on dividends and profits made the Zambian copper properties, in 
retrospect, very poor investments. In the case of the first mine opened up, 
Roan Antelope, it was only in 1948, after 17 years of production and 21 years 
after the company was first floated, that the total amount paid out in 
dividends, E5.8 million, approximately equalled the amount subscribed for its 
shares, E6 million. 
15/ For further details see CUNNINGHXM 2]2. cit., pages 101-102. 
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Table 3.1 London Price of Electrolytic Copper Wirebars 1920-1969 
(E per long ton) 

















































a/ January to August 
b/ September to December. 

























d/ August (re-opening of London Metal Exchange) to December 31. 
Source: MetallgeselIschaft Aktiengesellschaft Metal Statistics, Frankfurt and 
Main and World Bureau of Metal Statistics. 
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3.4 The post-war development of the industry 
In 1949, sterling was devalued, increasing the attractiveness of copper, 
and, late in 1952, the Government of Northern Rhodesia enacted a liberal 
taxation code to encourage new mines. The companies then came into their own 
and enjoyed years of unparalleled prosperity that enabled them to open up new 
mines - Bancroft (now Konkola) and Chibuluma which began production in 1956 
and 1957 respectively -, to conduct a vigorous campaign of exploration 
throughout the country, to contribute handsomely to Government revenues and to 
help finance major projects, in particular the Kariba dam. Table 3.2 shows 
how the industry's contribution to the country's development, in the form of 
the taxes it directly paid, rose sharply in the mid-1950s. 
In 1957 the copper price fell and- the companies again went through a 
difficult period. The Bancroft mine was closed down. However, by then the 
major problem facing the industry was increasingly seen to be a political one 
- how to face up to the eventual coming to power of a black majority 
government. 
The industry did not remain unaffected by the strikes and disturbances 
-which preceded 
independence in October 1964. However, it was -in a reasonably 
good position to accept the eventual coming to power of an African 
government. In 1955 it had begun to open the way for African advancement and, 
although there was still considerable bitterness at the time of Independence 
in the labour force about past African-European differentials, the industry 
was still flourishing with a high copper price and was able to afford, at 
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1959 11.6 1412/ 
1960 24.7 23 
1961 30.8 28 








a/ Income Taxation paid by the copper mining companies, customs duties 
on their imports, and mining, vehicle licences, etc. 
b/ Contribution of the copper mining industry to the revenue of the 
Government in Zambia. During the federal years, (until 1963) this included 
territorial government revenue and that part of federal government revenue 
spent in Zambia. Excluded from the table is Zambia copper industry revenue 
paid to federal dhd territorial governments in Malawi and Rhodesia (1961 K26 
million, 1962 K25 million, 1963 K24 million). 
Source: Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Year Book 1962 Kitwe 1963, 
Table 4, page 23 and Mindeco Mining Year Book of Zambia 1972, Kitwe 1973?, 
Table 2, page 20. 
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least at that time, the 22% increase in local wage rates decreed by the Brown 
Commission in 1966. -161 In 1969, the year of nationalization, the taxes it 
paid to the Government were at a record level of K237 million, compared to 
K163 million in 1966.1-7'1 Moreover, the years after the Brown award were 
ones of industrial peace in the copper mines. 
3.5 Summary 
A 
Fr(xn this brief survey of the history up to the time of nationalization, 
several facts stand out. -The 
first is that the copper industry did not slowly 
emerge in a vibrant economy - it was responsible for the development of the 
country. A good measure of this, especially for the early days, is the size 
of the European population. Between 1911 and 1918 this increased from 1,500 
-to 
2,400, and from then to 1931, when copper production started, to 
14,000. -1-81 In 1963, it stood at 76,000.2: -9/ 
L6/ Republic of Zambia. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
mining industry 1966 (under the Chairmanship of Mr. Roland Brown) Lusaka 1966, 
page 45-46. Whether the country could afford such an increase in the mining 
industry's wage scales, which would be used to justify wage increases 
elsewhere, is a separate matter. 
17/ In 1969, -however, the copper industry contributed 59% of Government 
revenue as against 71% in 1965 and 64% in 1966. This reflects the fact that 
other sources of government revenue grew more quickly than did those from the 
-mining industry. 
18/ Colonial Office Northern Rhodesia 1957 The Government Printer, 
Lusaka, 1958 Appendix I, Table II, page 109. 
19/ Republic of Zambia First National Development Plan, 1966-1970 Office 
of National Development and Planning, July 1966, page 184. The European 
population decreased sharply after Independence. 
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The second is that the copper industry of Zambia was, right from the 
beginning, run by large companies backed by multinational corporations. 
Without the intervention of the latter it is doubtful whether the industry 
would have been developed in the late 1920s and have survived the Depression. 
Moreover, without the backing of large corporations, it is also doubtful 
whether a mine like Bancroft that was not profitable in its early years would 
have remained in operation. 
These large corporations set up an industry which, again right from the 
beginning, played a very important role in the world copper industry. As 
Table 3.3 shows, in 1935 the industry already accounted for 10 per cent of 
total world primary copper production, about the same percentage as it was to 
have in 1970 and higher than it had in 1980 (or even in 1982). An early 
example of the industry's global importance is that the refusal of Zambian 
producers, and particularly Roan Antelope, to agree to the quotas that other 
world producers wanted to impose upon them led to the break-up in December 
1932 of the New York Conference of Copper Producers and the end of the cartel, 
Copper Exporters Inc., that had dominated the market since 1926.201 It was 
only in October 1931 that Roan Antelope's smelter had p roduced its first 
copper. 
Finally, the development of the copper industry in Zambia was very much 
the history of free enterprise. The Government did not supply the funds or 
the impetus to examine the country for minerals or the capital to develop the 
deposits found. The companies could not escape some involvement in the 
20/ The Economist December 17,1932, New York Times and ELLIOTT W. Y. et 
al International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals, New York, the Macmillan 
Company, 1937, pages 466-475. 
0, 
00,0: 11-1/1V 
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Table 3.3 Zambian Copper Production 1925-1980, Selected Years 
000 tonnes 




1925 1 1410 
1930 6 1596 0.4 
1935 146 1467 10.0 
1940 267 2397 11.1 
1945 197 2172 9.0 
1950 281 2525 11.1 
1955 359 311-2 11.5 
1960 576 4242 13.6 
1965 696 4963 14.0 
1970 684 6381 10.7 
1975 677 7317 9.3 
1980 596 7864 7.6 
Source: The Economist, November 2nd 1935, August 22nd 1942, August 2nd 
1947, Metallgesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft Metal Statistics. 
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political processes of the country but they were very much private enterprise 
organizations, with their own traditions and loyalties, and quite separate 
from the ruling party, UNIP (United National Independence Party) and without a 
close affinity with the Government bureaucracy. Part of this independence 
from government was, no doubt, due to the fact that they were companies owned 
by non-Zambians with their senior management and most of the skilled positions 
in the hands of Britons, Americans or South Africans. Nationalization was, 
then, not a natural progression for the industry but would represent a quite 
distinct break with the past. 
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Chapter 4 
COPPER AND THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY 
4.1 Zambia's PositiOn in the world copper_Lndustry 
Zambia is one of the world's leading producers of copper as shown in 
Table 4.1 which gives recent figures for the production of copper in terms of 
the recoverable copper content of the ores and concentrates produced by the 
major producers. It will be seen that whereas Zambia was the world's third 
largest producer of copper in 1969, surpassed only by the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union, in 1983 it was the fifth_ largest producer 
surpassed by these two countries as well as by Canada and Chile. 
Zambia has maintained its position as the world's second largest producer 
of cobalt after Zaire. World production in 1982 was 30,075 tonnes of which 
Zaire produced 15,400 tonnes- and Zambia 4,500 tonnes Cobalt is 
essentially a by-product of copper in Zambia and the value of its production 
much lower than that of copper - in 1979 and 1980 the gross value of cobalt 
sales came to K130 million and K69.5 million respectively as compared to K980 
million and K1068.5 million for copper. 
V 
The Zambian mining industry is, 
then, essentially, the copper industry. 
While Zambia is only the world's fifth largest producer of copper, 
accounting for 6.3 per cent of production in 1983, its real importance lies in 
its being a major exporter of copper as shown in Table 4.2. In 1983 its 
exports of refined copper totalled 571 thousand tonnes, equivalent to 19 per 
cent of the total world's exports of this form of copper. Zambia is different 
J/ Commodity Research Bureau Inc. 1983 Commodity Year Book New Jersey 
1983, page 87. Figures on cobalt production differ among sources. 
2/ Zambia Mining Year Book 1980, Kitwe 19817, pages 23 and 30. 
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Table 4.1 
World Mine Productim of Copl2er 
(000 tonnes) 
1969 1973 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
United States of 
America 1,401 1,558 1,282 1,444 1,181 1,538 1,140 1,038 
Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republic 875 1,060 1,100 1,130 1,130 1,140 1,150 1,180 
Zambia 720 707 677 588 596 587 530 515 
Chile 688 735 828 1,063 1,068 1,081 1,242 1,257 
Canada 520 824 734 636 716 691 613 625 
Zaire 365 489 495 400 460 505 503 502 
Peru 199 203 181 397 367 328 356 322 
Philippines 131 221 226 298 305 302 292 271 
Australia 131 220 219 238 244 231 245 265 
South Africa 127 176 179 203 212 211 207 212 
Japan 120 91 85 59 53 52 51 46 
China and other Asia 110 140 155 175 177 182 187 185 
Yugoslavia 91 112 115 ill 117 ill 119 130 
Poland 48 152 230 340 343 295 - 376 402 
Mexico -- 66 B-0 78 107 175 231 239 206 
Papua New Guinea -- 183 173 171 147 165 170 183 
Others 357 343 552 567 573 655 768 854 
Total 5,949 7,502 7,345 7,927 7,864 8,305 8,188 8,193 
Source% World Bureau of Metal Statistics World Metal Statistics. The figures show 
the recoverable copper content of the ores and concentrates produced. 
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Table 4.2 
Major World Exporters and Importers of Copper 
(000 tonnes) 
1971 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Net Exporters of Copper 
Zambia 629 635 576 647 617 556 603 571 
Ch ile 684 788 978 1,010 1,045 1,038 1,208 1,240 
Zaire 406 493 440 366 461 463 515 486 
Peru 188 623 509 477 352 322 340 296 
Canada 469 623 509 477 608 515 457 588 
Papua New Guinea - 170 195 172 142 168 173 183 
Philippines 197 210 258 292 301 295 280 212 
south Africa and Namibia 1-22 155 179 181 160 152 164 188 
Australia 91 150 102 124 124 117 116 160 
Others 125 176 167 163 263 334 331 ... 
Total 2,911 3,550 3,760 3,815 4,073 3,960 4,187 ... 
Net Importers 
Japan 719 916 1,047 1,146 922 1,184 1,309 915 
Germany, Federal Republic 471 555 535 526 547 505 564 505 
United Kingdom 371 436 394 355 313 258 306 268 
Prancie 308 371 282 344 415 387 381 329 
Italy 260 282 356 345 375 318 320 300 
Belgium 127 164 252 215 202 192 173 106 
United States of America 113 114 402 191 405 268 273 542 
Brazil 70 126 157 190 208 153 205 56 
Others 320 307 461 494 562 484 540 ... 
Total 2,579 3,271 3,886 3,806 3,949 3,749 4,071 .- 
Sourcez World Bureau of Metal Statistics World Metal Statistics. The figures give 
the net exports (i. e. total of exports of ores and concentrates, measured' 
by their copper content, blister and refined copper less. imports) or net 
imports of the net exporters or importers of copper, and so the totals are 
smaller than those for total world exports and imports. 
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from some other developing countries in that it exports nearly all of its 
copper as electrolytic or blister copper. There are advantages for a 
developing country in refining or smelting its copper, in the form of the 
value added it captures. However, world trade in ores concentrates has 
recently been increasing because of the demand of Japan and also of the 
Federal Republic of Germany for inputs for their smelters and refineries. 
Their two countries absorbed, in 1983,62 and 10 per cent respectively of 
world imports of this material. Japan had offered to finance the development 
of new mines in return for long-term contracts to supply its smelters. 
Y 
In 1983,53 per cent of Japan's supplies came from Canada, the Philippines and 
Papua New Guinea, the last two being unique in, until 1983, only exporting 
ores and concentrates and the last country being a new entrant whose 
development was assisted by Japanese finance. However, because of its 
position in the middle of Africa connected to the coast by railroads with a 
limited capacity, transport costs dictate that processing be taken in Zambia 
at least as far as the blister copper stage. Any new green-field mining 
development would have to include processing facilities. 
4.2 The contribution of the copper industry to the Zambian economy 
_4.2.1 
The overall contribution 
While the Zambian copper industry is very important for the world copper 
industry, it is absolutely essential to the Zambian economy. As Table 4.3 
shows, in the period 1960 to 1969, the contribution the industry made to gross 
domestic product was between 40 and 50 per cent and to Government revenue over 
50 per cent, if allowance is made for the diversion of revenue from the 
Zambian copper industry to the other countries of the Central African 
Federation in the early years. 
3/ United Nations Industrial Development Organization Cop2er Production 
in Developing Countries (Sales No. E. 72. II. B. 13), New York, 1972, page 11. 
4/ MIKESELL R., Foreign Investment in Copper Mining (Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1975), pages 17,89,90. 
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Table 4.3 
Contribution of the Copper Industry to Gross Domestic Product and 
Government Revenue 
(K million) 
Gross Contribution Contribution 
Domestic of Mining Percentage Government of Mining Percentage 
Product Industry (%) Revenue Industry % 
19 6 OýVh/ 390 196 50 63 (84) 23 (44) 37 (52) 
19612/-b/ 375 177 47 75 (101) 28 (54) 38 (54) 
1962A/-b/ 369 171 46 75 (100) 26 (51) 34 (51) 
1963A/. Y 387 173 45 72 (96) 25 (49) 34 (51) 
1964A/ 457 215 47 108 57 53 
1965-a/ 576 246 43 189 134 71 
1965 711 290 41 ; 
1966 848 379 45 2 5 163 64 
1967 957 379 40 276 146 53 
1968 1062 411 39 301 176 58 
1969 1316 637 48 400 235 59 
1970 1217 457 38 432 251 58 
1971 1188 268 23 309 114 37 
1972 1348 317 24 315 56 18 
1973 1591 506 32 385 108 28 
1974 1893 607 32 647 341 53 
1975 1583 204 13 448 59 13 
1976 1872 330 18 443 12 3 
1977 1951 223 11 499 -1 -0.2 
1978 2203 272 12 550 
1979 2597 456 18 595 -10 -1.5 
1980 2986 468 16 767 42 5 
1981 2990 210 7 812 11 1.4 
1982 3564 382 11 840 - - 
1983 4206 639 15 957 42 4 
Source-. Zambia Mining Year Book% Republic of Zambia, Monthly Digest of 
Stati; -tics, va"rious issues. 
Figures for net domestic product at factor cost, including 
subsistence output and mineral royalty. 
!? / From 1960 to 1963 the figures for Zambian revenue include 
territorial government revenue and that part of federal government revenue 
spent in Zambia. In brackets are given these figures plus the revenue from 
the Zambian copper industry paid to federal and territorial governments in 
Malawi and Rhodesia. 
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The contribution of the copper industry to domestic exports is normally 
in the region of over 90 per cent, and to paid employment about 15 per cent. 
These contributions have changed little over time, for Zambia has not 
developed any other substantial export lines, nor has the contribution of the 
mining industry to total employment varied substantially. However, as Table 
4.3 shows, the industry's contribution to gross domestic production has been 
on the decline since 1969, whilst its contribution to government revenue has 
shown large year to year swings since 1970 and, since 1974, has declined, 
substantially, being negative in 1977 and 1979. The table shows that these 
declines were caused by an actual decline in the nominal value of the mining 
industry's contribution. Whereas in 1974 the industry contributed K607 
million to gross domestic product and K341 million to government revenue, in 
1982 its contributions had declined to K382 million and nothing, 
respectively. In 1983, the preliminary figur-es. -indicate an improvement in the 
industry's performance. 
4.2.2 The fall in profitability and the increase in indebtedness 
The reason for the decline in the contribution to Government revenue was 
the erosion in the profit positions and therefore in the taxable income of the 
copper companies. Table 4.4 shows how the pre-tax profits of the two copper 
gFoups declined from nearly K500 million in 1973/74 to a defici-t of about 
K60 million in 1975/76 and how very substantial losses were incurred by Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines in 1981/82 and 1982/83. 
The drop in profitability and in Government revenue would have been 
serious enough but in the case of Zambia it was aggravated by the rising 
foreign indebtedness of the country. As Table 4.5 shows, foreign debt was at 
a low level at Independence, rose rapidly between 1969 and 1970 and after 1974 
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Table 4.4 
Trend in pre-tax profits for Roan Section Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines and 
Zaubian Anglo Amer ican/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
(K mnT_ 
Roan Selection Trust/l/ Nchanga Consolidated 
Roan Consolidated Mines Copper Mines. Ltd. t/ Total 
1960 35.5 81.2 116.7 
1961 25.0 74.7 99.7 
1962 24.7 74.3 99.0 
1963 26.6 60.9 87.5 
1964 34.8 63.1 97.9 
1965 42.4 66.0 108.4 
1966 51.0 69.7 120.7 
1967 48.5 59.3 107.8 
1968 80.4 83.0 163.4 
1969 105.6 94.7 200.3 
1970 108.7c/ 
1971 85.8 203.7.1/ 289.5 
1972 53.7 100.4 154.1 
1973 75.7 99.9 175.6 
1974 222.5 276.5 499.0 
1975 42.2 136.8 179.0 
1976 -9.4 -49.4 -58.8 
1977 21.3 83.6 104.9 
1978 -13.2 -37.1ý/ 50.3 
1979 63.9-f/ 26.0 89.9 
1980 101 . 7! i/- 131.2 232.9 1981 20.7 13.6 34.3 




Source-. Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report, Roan Selection 
Trust Ltd. Annual Report, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual 
Report, Bancroft Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report, Zanbia Consolidated Copper 
Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1982,1983,1984. 
a/ The results of R)an Antelope are included in the 1960 and 1961 
figures for Roan Selection Trust. Years ending June 30, except 1981 when year 
ended 31st March. 
b/ Rhokana, Nchanga -and Bancroft companies only before 1969. Years 
ending March 31st except Bancroft from 1960 to 1964 and Rhokana from 1960 to 
1969 when years ended June 30th. 
C/ Six months only. 
if/ 15 nonths ended March 31st. 
e/ Under a new accounting uethod. The comparable figure under the 
previous system was K-33.6 irn. 
f/ Under the new accounting metbod. The comparable figure under the 
previous system was K 74.5 mn. 
g/ Nine nontbs ended 31st March. 
h/ Under a new accounting method. The comparable figure under the 
previous system was -K 186 million. 
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Table 4.5 
External public debt position of Zambia 
T$ million) 
Debt outstanding 
at end, of year Official Private 
(disbursed only) creditors creditors Service payments 
Service payments as 
per cent of exports 
1965 156.0 93.4 62.6 14.0 2.6 
1966 154.6 93.4 61.2 13.9 2.0 
19 67i/ 157.0 93.4 63.6 15.9 2.4 
19672/ 195.2 98.8 96.4 15.8 2.4 
1968 209.8 97.6 112.2 20.7 2.7 
1969 246.6 104.5 142.1 27.0 3.5 
1970 547.9 119.0 428.9 54.4 5.1 
1971 534.6 147.9 386.8 71.8 7.2 
19722/ 559.6 180.1 379 .5 85.3 10.3 19 722/ 676.3 180.8 495.5 112 ,5 13.6 1973 703.7 275.6 428.1 3 68 . 6Y 30.6 1974 807.4 422.7 384.7 114.4 7.7 
1975 1155.7 555 . 5' 600.2 96.9 11.0 1976 1298.9 691.6 607.3 121.8 10.9 
1977 1406.5 791.4 615.1 196.3 20.2 
1978 1463.6 935.1 528.5 241.5 25.4 
1979 1823.1 1253.8 569.3 256.3 16.7 
1980 2187.9 1550.1 637.8 292.3 18.2 
1981 2244.5 1637.8 606.7 282.3 24.4 
1982 2394.0 1736.6 657 .3 177.2 16.3 
1983- 2638.0 2034.0 604.0 126.2 12.6 
Source*. World Bank World Debt Tables. international Monetary Fund 
International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
a/ Break in the series. 
b/ Because of the Government's decision to prepay the-Zimco bonds 
issued for 51 per cent of the former private mining companies assets, debt 
s-&rvice was unusually high in 1973. 
- 62 - 
as the Government incurred debts largely to make up for the short-fall in 
revenues from the mining sector. From Independence until 1969, service 
payments were never as much as 3 per cent of exports but by 1978 they had 
risen to a maximum of 25 per cent. 
4.2.3 Zambia's resort to the International Monetary Fund 
In 1978, t he foreign debt and repayments situation was so serious for 
Zambia that it had to come to a Standby Agreement for $390 million with the 
International Monetary Fund. At the time in April 1978, arrears on Zambia's 
payments for imports stood at $630 million and it was clear that unless a 
major rescue operation were mounted Zambia would have to default on its 
foreign debt. The Fund saw an intimate connection between the foreign 
debt position and the borrowing that the copper companies had had to undertake 
in order to maintain and even expand operations. Its reasoning is that even 
if the copper companies resorted to domestic rather than foreign borrowings, 
they would be pre-empting savings desired by other groups, including the 
Government, and thereby putting pressure on them to borrow from overseas. For 
these reasons, the Fund insisted that the Government agree to impose 
restrictions on the local borrowings of the mining industry as a condition for 
its obtaining ._ 
the $390 million Standby Agreement. Similarly, the 
International Monetary Fund imposed a ceiling on mining company borrowings 
from banks as one of the conditions for its coming to a further agreement - an 
external arrangement - with Zambia in May 1981. In addition, though, 
specific targets were set for mineral and agricultural production, reduction 
of budget deficits, balance of payments performance and reduction of payments 
arrears. 
7/ 
5/ Economist Intelligence Unit Zambia: Quarterly Economic Review (4th 
quarter 1978): 5. 
6/ Ibid., 1: 1982, page 5, IMF Survey, May 18,1981, page 157. 
7/ Mining Journal, October 7th 1983, page 254. 
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Another standby facility was negotiated with the International Monetary 
Fund in March 1983. One of the conditions was again that Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines had to observe a restriction on its direct borrowings from the 
Bank of Zambia. Another of the conditions was that the Kwacha be 
devalued by 20 per cent against the SDR. This was along the lines of the 1978 
package which also involved a devaluation of the Kwacha by 10 per cent as well 
as other measures. In July 1984, another standby agreement, for SDR 225 
million over the period to April 1986 was agreed to by the IMF. At that time, 
Zambia's obligations to the IMF, excluding Trust Fund, totalled SDR 664.5 
million. 
9/ 
The measures that the Government of Zambia has had to take to obtain the 
IMF's support have been painful. The 1978 package, for instance, involved the 
Government's undertaking to cut its budget deficit by cutting expenditures, 
including those on education and health projects, implementing a prices and 
incomes policy and taking steps to restore the financial viability of the 
copper companies. -LO/ The effectiveness of devaluation is limited in the 
Zambian context by the fact that Zambia is largely a price-taker for its major 
export, copper, and that, at least over the short period, many imports such as 
industrial raw materials and machinery spare parts have a very inelastic 
demand. 
B/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines 1983 Annual Report, page 5. 
9/ IMF Survey, August 6,1984, page 235. 
10/ New York Times, June 21st 1978, page 23 and IMF Survey, May 8th 
1978, page 142. 
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It would be over-optimistic to think that all Zambia's problems would 
disappear with a revival of the world copper market leading to higher earnings 
from copper and therefore greater profits and government revenue. For 
instance, the country still has to contend with an unsatisfactory agricultural 
performance which would almost certainly not be immediately corrected by the 
injection of sums of money. 
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen that Zambia's shares in world copper 
production and exports are important, but clearly not enough to give it 
control over the world copper price. 
The Zambian copper industry occupies a dominant position in the Zambian 
economy, accounting for nearly all of exports and at times as much as nearly 
50 per cent of gross domestic production and 70 per cent of government 
revenue. However, in recent years these percentage contributijons have fallen 
and the industry's contribution to Government revenues has in some years been 
negative. 
The principal reason for this was the sharp decline in the profitability 
of the industry since the mid-1970s. In some years, the industry was even 
running at a loss before texes became payable. To compensate for the short 
fall in revenue from the mines, the Government borrowed heavily from overseas, 
but the country did not earn sufficient foreign exchange to enable it to 
service its ddbts and to pay for imports. Arrears mounted and Zambia has had 
to seek financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund. The Fund 
has imposed conditions on its loans, some of which concerned the borrowing and 
production policies of the mines. 
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Chapter 5 
DATA ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ZAMBIAN COPPER MINING INDUSTRY 
In this chapter we will primarily be giving tables to illustrate the 
performance of the Zambian Copper Mining Industry in the periods before and 
after nationalization. Our figures will cover the period 1960 to 1981, when 
possible. They will include, then, 10 years before nationalization, 1960 to 
1969, and twelve years after. By choosing 1960 as the opening date we are 
allowing our data to cover a 22 year period which should be sufficient to make 
meaningful comparisons. The year 1981 was about the last one we could have 
used for our study. In the following year, the two mining companies were 
merged into one company, making comparisons more difficult. Although 1981 is 
really our cut-off point, we will sometimes extend the data to the latest 
available year, simply for the sake of comparison. 
We decided to set out the data in a full chapter so as to be able to 
explain fully in the text any discrepancies or breaks, and not just allow them 
to be relegated to footnotes. In this chapter, then, no attempt will be made 
to draw conclusions from the data. 
There are two problems with the data for the period 1960-1981. The first 
is that, until the end of 1963, Zambia was part of the Central African 
Federation. This makes it difficult to separate out many of the 
macro-economic statistics such as trade, and government revenues. The second 
problem is that the nationalization of the industry involved a re-organization 
of the corporate structure so that there is no strict continuity between the 
pre- and post- 1969 companies. 
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5-1 COm2aring the Pre- and Post-nationalization companies 
As we saw in chapter 3, from the start of large scale mining operations 
in Zambia the mines were operated by two groups. 
I/ 
By 1969, the parent 
company of one group, Zambian (until 1964, Rhodesian) Anglo American Ltd., and 
its subsidiaries had interests of 53.7 per cent in Rhokana Corporation, 57.1 
per cent in Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 99.4 per cent in Bancroft 
Mines Ltd., and 34.4 per cent in Mufulira Mines LtdY Rhokana operated the 
Nkana mine, Nchanga the Nchanga mines and Bancroft what is now known as the 
Konkola mine. The Nchanga and Rhokana companies had a 50% interest in Rhokana 
Copper Refineries that treated the Zambian Anglo American group's output. 
The parent company of the other group, Roan Selection Trust Ltd., had a 
100 per cent interest in the Luanshya mine, having absorbed Roan Antelope 
Copper Mines Ltd. in 1962, and a 65 per cent interest in the Mufulira Company 
which operated the Mufulira, Chibuluma and Chambishi mines. in addition, the 
Trust controlled the Ndola Copper Refinery, the Baluba deposit, which was on 
the point of being developed as an extension of Luanshya, a small mine called 
Kalengwa which had also just begun production in 1969, and several exploration 
companies. All the above-mentioned companies were registered in Zambia. 
In 1969, the output of Zambian Anglo American's mines amounted to 393 
thousand tonnes and that of Roan Selection Trust's to 361 thousand tonnes (see 
Table 5.1). These groups also produced cobalt from their copper mines and the 
Zambian Anglo American group produced lead and zinc elsewhere, at Broken Hill 
(Kabwe). Together, they accounted for almost all of the country's mineral 
j/ For a more detailed acount of the pre-1969 corporate relationships 
see FABER M. L. O. and Potter J. G. Towards Economic Independence Cambridge, 
2ambridge University Press 1971, and BOSTOCK M. and HARVEY C. Economic 
Independence and Zambian Copper New York, Praeger 1972. 
2/ Zambian Anglo American Ltd. Annual Report 1970 page 11. 
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Table 5.1 
Production of Cooper from the Two Mininct Groum in 1969 
(tonnes) 


















6,355,000 1.82 116,820 
7,605,000 2.50 188,560 
1,297,000 2.33 - 26,584 
634,000 4.31 0.18 29,315 
15,891,000 2.29 361,279 
1,752,000 3.37 50,361 
9,418,000 3.69 - 242,442 
5,458,000 1.97 0.12 100,122 
16,628,000 3.09 392,925 
32,519,000 2.70 754,205 
Source-. RST and Anglo American Corporation Mining Year Book of Zambia 1969 and 
Mindeco, Mining Year Book of Zambia 1970. 
Notet The figures exclude Kalepgwa which only started production on July lst 
1969. It produced 1,264 tonnes of copper in 1969. 
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production. Their other interests in the Zambian economy were very small 
compared to their interests in mining. Also, they had ancillary companies 
such as the Ametalco group of companies, 100 per cent owned by Roan Selection 
Trust. 
The mines of the- Zambian Anglo American group were operated, as were 
other properties controlled by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, 
by personnel drawn from within the group. On the other hand, the mines of 
Roan Selection Trust were not operated by its largest shareholder, American 
Metal Climax, now Amax, of New York, although this company did supply 
directors and often technical staff. The two groups were linked, most 
importantly, as we have seen, through the Zambian Anglo American group having 
a one-third interest in all the operating mines, except Luanshya, belonging to 
the Roan Selection Trust group. They frequently co-operated on projects of 
common concern, jointly forming, for instance, the Rhodesia Congo Border Power 
Corporation in 1949 to co-ordinate and expand the power supplies for their 
mines. 
Y 
Moreover, they frequently treated each other's ores or 
concentrates for a fee. 
In other respects they were, though, independent groups, and so when 
reference is made to their "controlling interests" it is to the Anglo American 
Corporation and its associated companies, backed predominantly by South 
African and British capital, over the Zambian Anglo American group and to Amax 
Inc., backed predominantly by American and British capital, over the Roan 
Selection Trust group. By 1969, Amax's interest in Roan Selection Trust was 
3/ PRAIN, SIR RONALD Reflections on an Era London, Metal Bulletin 
Books 1981, pages 92-93. 
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42.3 per cent. The interest of the Anglo American Corporation in the various 
companies of the Zambian Anglo American group was considerably more 
complicated and was not publicly available. It was however about 50 per 
cent 
y 
and gave the corporation a clear controlling interest 
The Zambian Government took an interest in the producing mines and 
treatment plant and not in the parent companies. It reorganized the mines of 
the Roan Selection Trust group into a new company called Roan Consolidated 
Mines and those of the Zambian Anglo American group into Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd. In both companies, its interest initially was 51 per cent 
and the scheme became effective on lst January 1970. In May 1981, the 
Government decided to merge the two companies and in March 1982 the High Court 
of Zambia approved the merger. The new company is called Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd. 
A year_ after the 1969 take-over, Roan Selection Trust Ltd. was acquired 
by and became a wholly owned subsidiary of Amax. It is no longer, then, -an 
independent company. On the other hand, Zambian Anglo American was 
re-incorporated in Bermuda in 1970 and its name changed to Minerals and 
Resources Corporation (Minorco) in August 1974. It has 50 per cent of Zambia 
Copper Investments Ltd., which holds the Anglo American Corporation's Zambian 
investments, but it is now essentially the Corporation's vehicle for spreading 
-its activities outside Africa into the United States, South America and 
Australia. In 1982, Minorco decided to provide for a possible permanent 
diminution of its Zambian holding because of the inability to externalize 
dividends from there. Minorco's Zambian holdings were in any case a small 
percentage by then of capital employed, North America and Europe accounting 
for 77 per cent of business. -V Similarly Amax decided in 1977 to write down 
4/ FABER AND POTTER 2p. cit. page 25 and BOSTOCK AND HARVEY 2p. 2jit. 
pages 259-560. 
5/ Mining Journal March 6th 1981, pages 182-183, October lst 1982, page 
240, November 19th 1982, page 367. 
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its investment in Roan Consolidated Mines to a nominal sum. 
Y 
In 1982, the 
interests of Zambia Copper Investments and of Amax in Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd. were respectively 27.3 per cent and 6.9 per centj that of 
the Zambian Government was 60.3 per cent and of public investors 5.5 per 
cent. In July 1984, Amax sold its holding in Z ambia Consolidated Copper 
2a/ Mines to ITM International, a private trading group. 
From the above description, it can bee seen that the comparison will be 
essentially between Roan Consolidated Mines and the mines and treatment plant 
operated by the Roan Selection Trust group and Nchanga Consolidated Copper 
Mines Ltd. and the mines and treatment plant operated by the Zambian Anglo 
American group. 
5.2 Figures on Mine Production 
5.2.1 Copp? r production 
One of the most important indicators of the industry's performance was 
the rate Of Production that it was able to achieve. Table 5.2 gives this rate 
in terms of tonnes of recoverable copper produced by the mines. Recoverable 
copper is the amount of copper contained in the ores that were brought to the 
surface. The performance of the Zambian mines cannot be viewed in isolation 
and so columns (b) to (d) give the percentage shares of Zambian production in 
-world production and in that of the market economies and of the devel6p-ing 
countries. 
I/ 
This is to clarify whether changes in Zambian production 
reflected (a) changes in world copper production as a whole; 
6/ Mining Annual Review 1978, page 15. 
7/ Mining Journal February 26th 1982, page 163. 
7a/ Mining Journal, July 6,1984, page 15. 
8/ The United Nations definitions are used throughout. Cuba is 
classified as a developing country and Romania as a centrally planned economy. 






Trends in Zambian Mine Production 1960-1983 
(in thousand tonnes of recoverable copper) 
(b) (c) (d) 
Zambia/ 
Zambia/Market Developing 
Zambia/World economy2/ countr ies'. 
Y 






1960 576.4 13.6 15.9 30.4 0.976 
1961 574.7 13.1 15.5 30.1 0.689 
1962 562.3 12.3 14.7 29.2 0.727 
1963 588.1 12.7 15.2 29.5 0.682 
1964 632.3 13.2 15.8 30.7 1.362 
1965 695.7 14.0 16.8 32.9 1.544 
1966 623.4 11.9 14.4 29.0 1.515 
1967 663.0 13.1 16.3 28.6 1.455 
1968 684.9 12.5 15.5 29.8 1.197 
1969 719.5 12.1 14.9 29.8 1.073 
1970 684.1 10.7 13.2 27.8 2.052 
1971 651.4 10.1 12.7 26.0 2.079 
1972 717.1 10.2 12.7 25.6 2.055 
1973 706.6 9.4 11.7 23.6 1.929 
1974 698.0 9.1 11.3 21.8 1.964 
1975 676.9 9.3 11.9 22.4 1.843 
1976 708.9 9.0 11.5 21.5 1.620 
1977 656.0 8.3 10.5 18.9 1.703 
1978 643.0 8.2 10.5 18.9 1.560 
1979 588.3 7.4 9.6 17.4 3.271 
1980 595.8 7.6 9.9 17.2 3.309 
1981 587.4 7.0 9.0 16.4 2.569 
1982 529.6 6.4 8.5 13.9 2.444 
1983 515.2 6.3 8.3 13.6 2.407 
Sourcez Wor ld Bureau of Metal S tatistics, World Metal Statistics and 
-Metallgesellschaf t A. G. Me tal-Statis tics and Republic of Zambia Monthl y Digest 
of Statistics. 
Notest a/ The developed market economies and the developing mar ket 
countries (including Cuba). 
The developing countries, including Cuba, but excluding the 
socialist countries of South East Asia and China. 
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(b) changes in the production of the market economies as the centrally planned 
economies, which are perhaps not guided by developments in the world copper 
market, increased their production at the expense of countries that were 
exposed to the rigours of the market; or, finally, (c) changes in the 
production of the developing countries, because they were seen as inhospitable 
to private enterprise or bad credit risks and thus did not attract the private 
direct investment or loans required to develop their copper industries. These 
three explanations for changes in Zambian production would appear to be the 
most obvious ones. Another reason for calculating Zambian production as a 
percentage of world and market production is to take into account the effect 
of any formal or informal agreements amongst prod ucers to cut production in 
order to restore stability to the market. 
Column (e) gives the production of cobalt, which is found at several 
Zambian mines - Nchanga, Nkana, Baluba and Chibuluma - and is essentially a 
by-product-of copper. 
The country's copper production can also be separated into that coming 
from each of the two groups. We do this so as to be able to separate out 
particular problems that affected only one group. The several companies' had 
different financial years and Table 5.3 simply gives for each calendar year 
the total of the companies' finished copper production for the financial years 
-ending --in the year in questi6-n. We have not given a figure for the annual 
output of t he Zambian Anglo American group in 1970. This total is part of the 
15 months total for 1971. What is missing is the sum of 9 months production 
in 1969 from Bancroft and Nchanga and six months production from Rhokana, 
hardly a meaningful figure. No separate figures are given after 1982 because 
of the merger of the two companies in that year. 
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Table 5.3 
Production of the two major groups 1960-198k (tcnnes of finished copper) 
Zambian Anglo- Roan Selection- 
Year American/NCCM-a/ Trust/RCM-b/ Total-c/ 
1960 338,496 220,542 559,038 
1961 348,158 205,285 553,443 
1962 352,441 212,535 564,976 
1963 322,187 211,643 533,830 
1964 354,111-Y 274,545 628,656 
1965 361,752 281,443 643,195 
1966 397,052 285,327 682,379 
1967 306,717 230,421 537,138 
1968 343,975 305,426 649,401 
1969 365,860 333,981 699,841 
1970 * 342,663 
1971 49ý , 816. t/ 250,355 
1972 401,283 242,734 644,017 
1973 440,007 278,788 718,795 
1974 408,753 281,121 689,874 
1975 408,666 288,564 697,230 
1976 385,414 280,994 666,408 
1977 427,810 261,444 689,254 
1978 377,156 270,489 647,645 
1979 368,332 255,543 623,875 
1980 359,816 177,424f/ 




Years ending March 31st, except for Bancroft from 1960 to 1964 and 
Rhokana from 1960 to 1969 when years ended June 30. 
Years ending June 30, except 1981 when year ended March 31st. 
Total of results of financial years. 
Includes nine months only for Bancroft mine. 
Fifteen months to March 31st 1971. 
Nine months only. 
Source-. Roan Selection Trust, Zambian Anglo American, Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Reports, 
various years. 
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5.2.2 Ore production 
In looking at the economic theory of mining, we saw that a company might 
be in a position to alter the grade of ore that it mines so as to obtain the 
same finished copper production from a smaller or. larger tonnage of ore. 
Table 5.4 gives the tonnage of ore mined and the grade of ore passing through 
the treatment plant, the mill, for the period 1960 to 1980. There is very 
little difference between the grade of ore mined and that milled. The figures 
came frcxn the Zambian Mining Yearbooks. It is a pity that this fine 
statistical source ceased publication after the 1980 edition. This is in line 
with the Zambian tendency to reveal progressively less information than that 
made available by the private companies, but is nevýertheless regrettable. The 
1973 Yearbook gives a grade of 3.54 per cent for the grade of ore milled in 
1972 and the 1972 Yearbook gives the same figure for 1972 as well as a grade 
of 3.73 per cent for copper milled in 1971. However, both figures appear too 
high and so we have given the figures froin the 1971 Yearbook for the grade of 
ore milled in that year - namely 2.52% and have calculated from the data given 
for the individual mines the average grade of ore passing through the mill in 
1972 - 2.60 per cent. It should be added that these figures were close to 
those given in the Zambian Monthly Digest of Statistics for the metal content 
of the copper ores treated-2/. We have used the figures for the tonnage of 
-ore treated from the Monthly Digest to extend the series to 1983. 
9/ Republic of Zambia Monthly Digest of Statistics, Central Statistical 
Office, Lusaka, Volume XVIII Nos. 1 to 3, January to March 1982, Table 10(a), 
page 16. 
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Table 5.4 
Ore mined in Zambia 1960-1983 
(000 tonnes) 
Year Tonnage mined Grade of ore milled 
M 
1960 22,660 2.98 
1961 21,558 3.09 
1962 21,256 3.05 
1963 22,690 2.94 
1964 24,801 2.93 
1965 27,942 2.99 
1966 25,175 2.55 
1967 27,818 2.79 
1968 30,860 2.66 
1969 32,654 2.70 
1970 32,050 2.67 
1971 30,726 2.52 
1972 33,853 2.60 
1973 35,013 2.53 
1974 35,954 2.46 
1975 34,312 2.65 
1976 32,996 2.52 
1977 32,698 2.43 
1978 31,822 2.44 
1979 29,838 2.31 
1980 29,997 2.28 
1980A/ 31,169 2.29 
-1981a/ 30,325 2.27 
198Zý/ 31,909 2.18 
1983A/ 30,532 2.13 
a/ Tonnage of ore treated. 
source: Zambia/Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Mining Yearbook, 
various years (until 1980), Republic of Zambia Monthly Digest of Statistics 
January/March 1984, page 14. 
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5.3 The Efficiency of operations 
5.3.1 Labour productivity 
. 
Productivity, as measured by the output of copper or copper ore per 
employee, can be calculated from the preceding figures for copper and ore 
production. Output of ore per man is probably the better measure of 
productivity as output of finished copper per head would not bring out the 
effect of falling ore grades. Table 5.5 gives these figures, both for the 
output per employee and. per local employee. Table 5.6 gives the establishment 
figure& for the Zambian copper mines, divided into local and expatriate 
employees, that were used in the calculations, and the ratio of expatriate to 
local employees. 
5.3.2 Technical efficiency of the treatment plant 
Not all of the copper contained in -tHe ore extracted from the ground 
becomes finished copper. Some is lost in the treatment plant. Another 
indicator of efficiency would then be the recovery rates at the treatment 
plants which are given in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. These show the percentage of 
contained copper recovered at the concentrator stage, the stage where the 
greatest losses occur. Recovery rates are difficult to interpret because a 
6hange could simply be caused by changes-in the ores being mineS-, from a more 
to a less tractable ore, for example. 
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Table 5.5 
Productivity at the Zambian mines 
(tonnes per year) 
Ore mined per Ore mined per Copper produced Copper produced 
Year employee local employee per employee per local employee 
1960 511 616 13.0 15.7 
1961 462 552 12.3 14.7 
1962 468 564 12.4 14.9 
1963 508 614 13.2 15.9 
1964 544 651 13.9 16.6 
1965 598 704 14.9 17.5 
1966 525 600 13.0 14.9 
1967 569 639 13.6 15.2 
1968 642 714 14.3 15.9 
1969 677 751 14.9 16.5 
1970 661 727 14.1 15.5 
1971-a/ 618 683 13.1 14.5 
1972 666 732 14.1 15.5 
1973 663, 725 13.4 14.6 
1974 641 695 12.4 13.5 
1975 597 647 11.8 12.8 
1976 577 622 12.4 13.4 
1977 554 590 11.1 11.8 
1978 561 596 11.3 12.0 
1979 537 565 10.6 11.1 
1980 519 543 10.3 10.8 
198la/ 499 521 9.7 10.1 
1982 543 567 9.0 9.4 
1983 529 549 8.9 9.3 
Source: As for tables 5.2,5.4 and 5.6. 
a/ After 1971 includes the Centralized Services Divisions of NCCM and 
RCM. 
b/ Break in series. The labour figure is calculated from Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 





-Ratio of expatriate 
to local employees 
1960 44,334 36,806 7528 20.5 
1961 46,677 39,036 7641 19.6 
1962 45,461 37,681 7780 20.6 
1963 44,624 36,948 7676 20.8 
1964 45,552 38,097 7455 19.6 
1965 46,712 39,677 7035 17.7 
1966 47,932 41,951 5981 14.3 
1967 48,891 43,513 5378 12.4 
1968 48,043 43,198 4845 11.2 
1969 48,227 43,500 4727 10.9 
1970 48,469 44,094 4375 9.9 
1971-a/ 49,748 44,997 4751 10.6 
1972 50,845 46,245 4600 9.9 
1973 52,792 48,287 4505 9.3 
1974 56,128 51,736 4392 8.5 
1975 57,487 52,992 4495 8.5 
1976- 57,142 53,082 4060 7.6 
1977 59,055 55,446 3609 6.5 
1978 56,682 53,437 3245 6.1 
1979 55,525 52,831 2694 5.1 
1980 57,743 55,258 2485 4.5 
1980h/ 60,078 57,457 2621 4.6 
1981b/ 60,259 57,720 2539 4.4 
1981-c/ 60,803 58,207 2596 4.5 
1982-c/ 58,795 56,223 2572 4.6 
1983S/ 57,676 55,644 2032 3.7 
f5ýhs/ 58,104 56,316 1788 3.2 
Source: Mining Yearbooks, Roan Consolidated Mines, Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd., Zambia Consolidated Mines Ltd., Annual Reports. 
a/ After 1971 includes the Centralized Services Division of NCCM and 
RCM. 
b/ Figures from Roan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga Consolidated Copper 
Mines Ltd. Annual Reports. 
C/ Figures from Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Reports. 
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Table 5.7 
Recovery at the Concentrators, 1960-1984 
Roan Selection TrUSt/Roan Consolidated Mines: 
(Percentage) 
Year. 2/ Chambishi Chibuluma Kalengwa Luanshya Mufulira Baluba RCM 
1960 97.61 85.61 92.02 
1961 96.83 87.44 98.98 
1962 97.25 89.07 91.15 
1963 96.86 89.57 90.82 
1964 96.12 90.61 90.52 
1965 95.69 91.84 91.38 
1966 n. a. 96.53 92.03 91.70 
$967 n. a. n. a. 91.36 91.23 
1968 n. a. n. a. 90.57 91.69 
1969 n. a. n. a. 90.72 91.70 
1970 96.14 96.82 91.96 91.26 
1971 92.34 96.17 90.80 90.71 
1972 90.15 96.51 83.09 90.01 91.08 
1973 90.39 96.55 75.94 89.97 91.71 
1974 87.73 96.39 81.99 87.90 93.28 
1975 72.92 96.15 81.52 89.50 92.65 
1976 91.65 96.78 85.31 89.30 92.67 
1977 74.80 96.52 88.23 90.19 93.30 
1978 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 92.05 
1979 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 91.77 
1980 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 92.61 
1981 93.29 96.53 61M 95.10 92.52 96.28 93.13 
1982 94.60 96.89 62.15 93.65 93.00 92.13 
1983 94.18 96.36 -- 92.00 92.97 89.31 
1984 94.12 94.55 92.15 93.95 93.47 
Sources: Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd., Roan Consolidated Mines, Roan 
Selection Trust, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, Annual Reports. 
a/ For the financial years as described in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.8 
Recoverv at the Concentrators, 
Zamanglo Group/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 1960-1984 
(Percentage) 
Nkana Nkana Nkana 
YearA/Bwana Mkubwa Konkola Nchanga Underground Open Pit Torco 
1960 86.08 88.56 92.13 
1961 84.70 87.53 92.29 
1962 84.28 88.86 93.58 
1963 84.97 90.77 92.88 
1964 84.97 92.58 93.52 
1965 86.83 92.07 93.61 
1966 86.62 90.47 93.55 
1967 86.84 88.20 93.91 
1968 84.07 87.58 94.14 
1969 82.11 83.83 93.17 
1970 92.9311-1 
1971 85.90 83.80 92.63 
1972 72.07 84.27 83.74 92.33 
1973 72.90 87.19 81.56 92.36 83.80 
1974 78.67 85.57 82.25 94.78 26.75 82.60 
1975 77.86 82.59 82.57 94.24 55.95 78.40 
1976 
1977 81.27 85.52 75.39 92.70 64.73 76.56 
1978 76.86 88.61 69.61 92.74 70.32 74.95 
1979 82.60 87.45 68.85 91.08 66.48 71.73 
1980 78.59 82.68 67.46 90.94 63.78 71.67 
1981 77.52 84.65 70.46 92.92 75.26 67.40 
1982 77.52 84.42 70.95 92.52 79.20 71.13 
1983 70.20 85.93 64.36 91.01 67.88 76.09 
1984 70.15 86.77 63.34 92.03 46.05 
Source: Bancroft Copper Mines, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, - 
Rhokana Corporation, Zambia Consolidated Coppr Mines, Annual Reports. 
a/ For the financial years described in Table 5.3. 
b/ Last six months of 1969. 
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5.3.3 The accident rates 
The other technical aspect of mining that should be examined is the 
safety aspect. It could be the case that higher ore production was being 
achieved at the expense of a relaxation of safety standards. In this 
connection, it could be pointed out that it has been suggested that one of the 
reasons why the military government in Poland was able to increase coal 
production so rapidly after the imposition of martial law was that safety 
standards at the mines were relaxed. 
18/ 
Table 5.9 gives the safety figures as published in the Mining Yearbooks. 
The first column shqws the casualties, excluding fatalities, per 100,000 hours 
worked. A casualty is defined as an employee who suffered a lost time 
accident which prevented him from continuing his normal duties beyond the end 
of the shift in which the accident occurred. The second column shows the 
shifts lost as a result of non-fatal accidents and the final column the number 
of fatalities per million hours worked. 
5.4 The trend in costs of production 
The efficiency of all branches of operations was reflected, in the final 
outcome,, 
_ 
in the costs of production. There is some difficulty in giving a 
consistent series for the pre- and post- nationalization periods as the way in 
i4hich the cost figures were set out was changed after 1970. Also, befor&- 
nationalization, the Zamanglo group only gave the cost of sales for the 
individual companies and no further break-down. 
5.4.1 Costs at the mine 
The Roan Selection Trust broke its costs for every producing mine down 
into costs at the mine, provision for replacements, which together made up 
costs free on rail (f. o. r. ); then transport to an African port, port handling 
18/ Mining Journal, August 19,1983, page 126. 
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Table 5.9 





Shifts lost Fatalities per 
per 1000 1,000,000 hours 
hours-worked worked 
1960 2.89 0.59 0.50 
1961 2.70 0.56 0.52 
1962 3.08 0.66 0.48 
1963 3.42 0.61 0.26 
1964 3.46 0.59 0.33 
1965 3.29 0.64 0.20 
1966 3.65 0.75 0.29 
1967 3.31 0.60 0.26 
1968 2.82 0.54 0.26 
1969 2.69 0.51 0.38 
1970 2.02 0.41 0.91a/ 
1971 1.82 0.38 0.36 
1972 1.89 0.45 0.18 
1973 1.78 0.45 0.28 
1974 1.78 0.42 0.22 
1975 1.64 0.36 0.27 
1976 1.63 0.42 0.21 
1977 1.56 0.36 0.20 
1978 1.40 0.32 0.21 
1979 1.48 0.26 0.15 
1980 2.22 0.35 0.22 
Source: Zambia Mining Yearbooks, various years. 
a/ The Mufulira disaster was in September 1970. 
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and freight to the final destination and administrative and selling costs. On 
top of this had to be added mineral royalties and the export tax to arrive at 
cost delivered buyers. Table 5.10 gives these figures worked out as an 
average for the group, using final copper production as the weights. Only 
incomplete figures are given for 1960 as the cost figures prepared for that 
year had a different breakdown into categories. 
Roan Selection Trust also gave figures for the cost of sales which 
amounted to slightly less in most years than the figures we have given for 
cost delivered buyers. The reason for this is that we have used production 
figures rather than sales to weight the cost figures and also have only given 
the final cost per top of electrolytic copper, whereas much of the Trust's 
output was sold as fire refined copper. Also, certain administrative charges 
are not given in the cost of sales. 
After April lst 1970, the royalty and mineral taxes were discontinued and 
so the figures from 1971 onwards for the cost of sales should be compared to 
the cost of sales of the Trust less mineral royalties and export taxes. These 
figures are given in the last column of the table. We have also given, in 
Table 5.10, the totals of railage, freight and administrative charges for the 
Trust's mines and, from 1970 onwards, the simple difference between the cost 
of sales and the costs free on rail. Although not strictly comparable before 
a's opposed to after 1970, the trend in these costs should-give an idea of the 
trend in these additional costs. 
After nationalization, costs f. o. r. were shown in some detail, broken 
down into mining costs, concentrating costst leaching, smelting and refining 
costs, administration, technical services and mine general expenses and, 
later, depreciation. These figures are given in Table 5.11. There was a 
discontinuity between 1969/70 and 1970/71 because of the ending of the 
provision for replacements. 
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Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Minest 
Costs at the Mine 




Smelting technical Costs Replace- Average 
and and mine excluding ments or cost 
Concentra- leach general deprecia- Deprecia- f. o. r. 
Year2/ Minin ting plant Refinin expenses tion tion mine 
_ 
1961 227.2 22.9 250.1 
1962 220.0 21.8 241.7 
1963 218.9 23.8 242.7 
1964 200.7 18.5 219.3 
1965 209.7 18.9 228.6 
1966 243.8 21.4 265.1 
1967 298.5 30.6 329.2 
1968 283.6 24.1 307.8 
1969 155.0 32.1 51.0 24.1 32.9 295.0 18.1 313.1 
19 7 OY 167.9 32.1 48.3 22.0 43.3 313.6 26.0 339.6 
1971Y 232 47 51 22 60 412 
1972 252 . 54 64 21 58 448 
1973 26 2 58 65 21 58 464 
1974 288 60 78 24 73 523 
1975 355 75 88 30 71 619 
1976 403 77 90 32 78 680 
1977. E/ 485 85 122 32 82 806 
1977ý/ 458 81 118 31 77 765 41 806 
1978 457 90 ill M 89 777 32 809 
1979 477 100 122 28 105 832 36 868 
1979. t/ 477 100 122 28 105 832 76 908 
1980 60§ 131 148 30 204 1122 91 1213 
1981 760 153 183 40 157 1293 87 1380 
Source% Roan Selection Trust, Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Reports, various years. 
For the financial years described in Table 5.3. 
Discontinuity because of -the end of the provision account for replacements in 
1970/71. 
Costs without replacements being shown separately. - 
Costs with replacements being shown separately. 
Costs restated to. show change to new accounting method for depreciation. 
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Table 5.11 shows that the order of importance of the different stages of 
production was the following: mining, smelting, concentrating and refining. 
Table 5.12 is the final one covering the costs of production. It shows 
the costs of each stage in the metal production process in relation to its 
particular output. 
As mining costs are given per tonne of ore hoisted and concentrating 
costs per tonne of ore milled, they do not take into account changes in ore 
grades as do the figures for mining and concentrating costs per tonne of 
copper produced. Smelting and refining costs are shown per tonne of copper 
produced. These costs are for the three Roan Selection Trust/Roan 
C. onsolidated Mines that were operating continually from 1960. No such cost 
figures were available for the Zamanglo/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines' 
mines, and Roan Consolidated Mines stopped giving these figures after 1977. 
These figures outline the trend in costs, particularly before 1969, at 
the different mines and should be helpful in showing whether trends in overall 
costs at the group marked significant developments at the individual mines -- 
for instance wherther one mine's approaching exhaustion, and therefore rising 
production costs, was partly responsible for the adverse cost developments of 
the group. 
5.4.2 The cost of labour 
As well as trying to improve the technical efficiency-of operations, the 
mining companies could also attempt to use labour more economically or to keep 
down wage increases so as to reduce the labour component of production costs. 
Table 5.13, which is a modified and up-dated version of that given by 
Philip Daniel! -91 shows labour, and also transport, costs in absolute terms 
and as a proportion of total costs of sales (excluding mineral royalties and 
19/ DANIEL, P. Africanisation, Nationalisation and Inequality Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 1979, page 85. 
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Table 5.13 
Cost of SalesA/ per tonne diýided into labour, transport and-other costs 
1960-1980 
Labourt/ Transportc-/ Otber Total 
K K % K % 
1960 93 33 39 14 146 53 278 
1961 96 33 42 14 153 53 291 
1962 97 33 43 15 152 52 292 
1963 97 35 45 16 139 49 281 
1964 88 32 46 17 144 52 278 
1965 101 34 47 16 151 51 299 
1966 130 37 55 16 168 48 253 
1967 143 37 62 16 186 48 391 
1968 137 35 63 16 191 49 391 
1969 110 27 64 16 221 56 39 52/ 
1970 137 27 63 13 301 60 500e/ 
1971 161 29 65 12 321 59 547 
1972 156 (162) 28 68 12 343 60 567 
1973 182 (196) 30 68 11 363 59 613 
1974 202 (214) 28 79 11 440 61 721 
1975 221 (234) 27 87 11 503 62 811 
1976 216 24 86 9 616 918 
1977 273 27 88 9 642 64 1003 
1978 306 28 98 9 682 63 1086 
1979 295 23 109 8 901 69 1305 
1980 354 22 139 8 1135 70 . 1628 
Source: DANIEL, P. Africanization, Nationalisation and- 
Inequality: Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1979, page 85 for the 
figures 1960-1971. From 1972 onwards, own estimates, ' using the same Roan 
Antelope Copper Mines Ltd., Roan Consolidated Mines and Roan Selection Trust 
Annual Reports, various years, Zambia Mining Yearbook., various years. 
a/ Costs of sales at the Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines 
were used. Figures for the calendar year were obtained as the weighted 
average of the_results; for the two reiýevant financial years. The weights were 
the tonnages of sales. Cost of sales were calculated exclusive of royalty and 
export tax payments. 
b/ The figures in brackets are those given by Daniel. 
Transport costs were calculated f. o. r. mine to c. i. f. United Kingdom 
and world ports. 
d/ For six months only to 30th June 1969. 
e/ Based on the 18 months from Ist January 1970 to 30th June 1971. 
Totai costs per ton were temporarily exaggerated by the Mufulira mine disaster. 
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export taxes in the period before nationalization) A rising percentage of 
total costs attributable to labour costs would be an indication that the 
companies were not able to contain the upward pressure on total costs of 
labour costs. It is not an unambiguous indicator however as "other costs", 
which as Table 5.13 indicates normally formed over 50t of costs of sales, 
could have changed because of factors that were, in the short term, outside 
the companies' control - such as through an increase in fuel' prices. The 
actual as well as the percentage contribution of labour costs to costs of 
sales must, therefore, be examined. 
The cost of labour was not just a component of the total costs of 
production but also a very sensitive political and economic issue. The 
disparities between expatriate and local labour rates led to industrial 
friction particularly in the early 1960's 
1-0/, 
and movements in wage rates 
at the mines have been found to determine wage movements elsewhere in the 
Zambian 
21/ 
However, the disparity between expatriate and Zambian labour costs did 
allow the companies room to reduce overall labour costs by displacing 
expatriates from jobs which had previously been their preserve and replacing 
them by Zambians. This was particularly the case after March 1966 when the 
European work force in effect allowed the companies to remove the guarantee of 
employment, which had been an integral part of the African Advancement 
agreements of the 1950's, and to replace Europeans by Zambians as soon as the 
20/ For a fuller treatment vide BURAWOY, M. The Color of Class on the 
Copper Mines, Zambian Papers No. 7, Manchester University Press 1972 and FRY, 
James, Employment and Income Distribution in the African Economy, London, 
Croom Helm, 1979. 
21/ KNIGHT, J. F. "Wages and Zambia's Economic Development" in ELLIOTT, 
C. Constraints on the Economic Development of Zambia, Nairobi, Oxford 
University Press, 1971. 
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Table 5.14 
Average annual earnings in the mining and quarryinq industry 1960-1980, 
(K) 
Local Expatriate 
Ratio Year Labour Labour 
1960 570 5 188 9.10 
1961 578 5 178 8.96 
-1962 592 5 126 8.66 
1963 596 5 128 8.60 
1964 732 5 150 7.04 
1965 826 5 378 6.51 
1966A/ 12/ 934 6 598 7.06 
1967a/ b/ 1 322 7 608 5.75 
1968a/ b/ 1 248 7 604 6.09 
-1969a 
/ 1 412 8 174 5.79 
1970a/ 1 543 7 229 4.69 
1970a/ 1 480 6 982 4.72 
1971-a/ 1 569 .7 
336 4.68 
1972a/ 1 491 6 971 4.68 
1972a/ b/* 1 60i 5 014 3.13 
1973a/ b/ 1 685 5 406 3.21 
1974a/ b/ 1 701 6 629 3.90 
197; 
7b-/ ýTl 1 478 6 784 4.59 
197612/ S/ 2 510 10 304 4.11 
1977h/ 2 344 7 224 3.00 
1978b/ 2 521 7 940 3.15 
1979ý/ 2 636 6 916 2.62 
MOE/ 2 935 10 127 3.45 
Source: Republic of Zambia Monthl y Diqest of Statistics, various issues. 
a/ Based on 4th quar ter only. 
i; / Cash earnings only, excluding ea rnings in kind and - employers' 
contributions to pension funds, and so forth 
c/ December 
d/ June 
e/ Based on second q uarter. 
Revised. 
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Zambians were ready to take over their jobs. 
22/ 
Indeed, whereas in 1960, 
the expatriate wage bill came to 63% of the total wage bill, by 1975 it came 
to only ý9% 
23/ 
An indication of the disparities between Zambian and expatriate earnings 
is provided by Table 5.14 which gives the average annual earnings for Zambian 
and expatriate workers in the mining and quarrying industry (which employed, 
in June 1980,62,940 workers, as against 57,743 in the copper mines in 1980). 
These figures are not then strictly those for the average earnings of the 
local and expatriate copper miners. Moreover, certain very important costs, 
especially for the expatriate labour force, were excluded - such as 
contributions to their pension fundsand the many benefits they received such 
as educational assistance, repatriation and leave allowances. These would 
have made the ratio of expatriate to local labour costs even higher. It is, 
through, quite clear from Table 5.14 that expatriate labour costs were 
considerably higher than local labour costs even before these extras -were 
taken into consideration. 
The trend in the ratio of expatriate to local labour costs would appear, 
from Table 5.14, to have been downward. Not too much can be read into this, 0 
though, both because of problems with the data and because of Zambianization. 
If at the end of Zambianization, only the senior -managers at the mines were 
still expatriates, the ratio of their average salaries to those of the. -average 
Zambian mine worker would still have been very high (even if Zambian senior 
managers had been paid the same as expatriates senior managers). 
Zambian wage costs were, though, lower than expatriate wage costs for the 
41 
sameposition. Specific examples of this are given by Pry 
a. 
An 
22/ BrowTi Commission: Republic of Zambia. Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Mining Industry 1966. Under the Chairmanship of Mr. Roland 
Brown, Lusaka, 1966, pages 19-20. 
23/ DANIEL, P. 22. cit., page 181. 
. 
L4/ FRY. 22. cit. , page 128. 
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expatriate mining plant operator at the concentrator was paid K 258.5 a month 
in 19 66. In 1967, when this post had been Zambianized, the Zambian operative 
earned K 137.3. Similarly the Zambianization of the post of a certified 
winding engine driver reduced the cost of this post from K 329.7 in 1965 to 
K 165.5 in 1967. Even in- jobs that were partly Zambianized, the Zambian 
earned less than the expatriate operative. An expatriate mining plant shift 
boss/foreman earned K 561.8 a month in 1975, whereas his Zambian counterpart 
earned K 308.7. 
The best way to look at the trend in labour costs, particularly with a 
view to seeing how successful the companies were in moderating their increase, 
is to look at. trends in the wage rates for specific posts performed by local- 
workers. To some extent, the cost of expatriate labour is outside the 
companies' control as they really have to compete on international markets for 
expatriates' skills and so have to pay this market's rates. Table 5.15 gives 
the local wage rates for these jobs. Where two-figures are giv . en, this 
indicates the range of the wage rate for that grade. The surface wage for the 
unskilled workman and then the rate for the Pl grade in which this post was 
placed is given in the- first column. Beside it, in brackets, is given this 
rate deflated by the consumer price index for lower income urban workers with 
1975 as the base. ' Next is given, the rate for a surface Operator I and then 
for the corresponding P5 grade and beside it- the deflated figure. - The 
following two columns show the rates given by Fry for P5/rockbreakers., who 
were underground workers, for the period 1961-1966 and then these rates, 
similarly deflated. These P5 workers were semi-skilled workers. In the last 
two columns are given the local wage rates of a skilled worker - from 1964 to 
1969 for an artisan foreman and then from 1970 for the corresponding Pll 
surface workers. These were deflated by the consumer price index for higher 
income urban workers. 
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5.5 Investment in the mines 
Costs, efficiency and productivity were affected by past investment in 
the mines which will be examined in this part of the chapter. Tables will be 
given for the accumulated net investment, in other words, the capital stock, 
and the nominal and real net investment by the two major groups. 
5.5.1 The capital stock of the Roan Selection Trust/ 
Roan Consolidated Mines Group 
In Table 5.16, two sub-totals are given for the accumulated gross and net 
investment outlays for the Roan Selection Trust group. One shows the 
expenditure on mining properties, such as Roan Antelope, Mufulira, Chibuluma 
and Chambishi, and the other that for expenditure on exploration and service 
corppanies. Rhodesian Selection Trust was, until the merger with Roan Antelope 
Copper Mines Ltd. in 1962, primarily a holding rather than an operating 
company. Its income came from the Mufulira and Chibuluma companies. After 
the merger, it became an operating company controlling not only the Luanshya 
and other mines but also exploration companies such as Mwinilunga Mines, small 
properties such as Kalengwa mine, important but as yet undeveloped properties 
such as the Baluba mine and ser-Vice companies such as RST Administrative 
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Table 5 . 16 
Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines 
Fixed Assets. 
(K million) 
Service & Exploration 
Mining Properties Companies Total 
Gross Gross Gross Replace- 
Expen- Re- Expen- De- Expen- ments or 
d itur e place- Net d itur e preci- Ne t diture De pr e- Ne t 
Year2/ to Date me nts to Date ation to date ciation 
1959 125.5 61.7 63.8 ... ... 125.5 61.7 63.8 
1960 134.0 65.6 68.4 * ' * 134.0 65.6 68.4 1961 147.8 71.0 76.8 :2 4 
i: 4 ý: 8 152.0 72.4 79.6 
1962 147.9 75.4 72.5 18.0 2.5 15.4 165.9 77.9 87.9 
1963 156.0 80.9 75.1 25.3 10.1 15.2 181.3 91.0 90.3 
1964 168.3 85.5 82.8 29.3 12.9 16.4 197.6 98.4 99.2 
1965 182.8 90.7 92.1 32.9 15.2 17.6 215.7 105.9 109.7 
1966 182.8 90.7 92.1 32.9 15.2 17.6 227.4 113.0 114.4 
1967 197.1 100.9 96.2 44. Z' 20.0 24.1. 241.3 120.9 120.3 
1968ý/ 206.0 107.4 98.6 40 .5 19.7 20.8 246.5 
'1 127. 119.5 
1969 224.1 117.7 106.3 42.3 21.3 21.0 266.4 139.0 127.3 
19 69EI 238.3 119.0 119 .3 21.1 4.9 16.2 259.4 123.9 135.5 1970,1/ 252.0 119.0 132.9 
1970 264.7 124.3 140.5 
1971 296.8 130.1 166.7 
1972 330.3 133.0 197.4 
1973 358 .6 137.0 221.6 
1974 385.2 149.0 236.2 
1975 421.8 157 .3 264.5 
1976 456.1 161.0 295.1 
1977 512.0 165.9 346.1 
1979 563.3 170.3 393.0 
19791/ 589.2 175.8 413.5 
197911 428.7 20A 408.7 
1980&/ 456.7 37.8 418.9 
1981V 512.0 58.2 453.8 
Source-. Roan Selection Trust, Roan Antelope Copper Mines and Roan Con solida ted 
Mines Annual Reports, various years. 
a/ For the years ending June 30th. 
RST Exploration ceased exploration in Zimbabwe and its assets were disposed 
of. (Roan Selection Trust Annual Report 1968, page 6. ) 
c/ Pro forma balance sheet of Roan Consolidated Mines on 31st De cember 1969 as 
calculated in Roan Selection Trust, Appendices to Explanatory Statement of 
Roan Selection Trust for Meetings of Shareholders to be held on 6th Augu3-t 
1970,30th June 1970 page C-12. 
d/ For January 1970. 
on the old accounting basis. 
on the new accounting basis. 
Fixe, d assets as of March 31st. 
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I 
Services Ltd. , and RST Technical Services Ltd. and the Ametalco Ltd. metal 
sales group that had a much larger clientele than just the Roan Selection 
Trust. 
25/ 
In 1969, the Zambian Government acquired a 51% interest in the operating 
mines, Mufulira, Chibuluma, Chambishi, Kalengwa and Luanshya and set up P. 6. an 
Consolidated Mines. Only in February 1971 did this company acquire Baluba 
Mines Ltd. 
2-61 
After the cancellation of the management contracts in August 
1973, Roan Consolidated Mines began to take on more of the functions that had 
previously been performed by Roan Selection Trust. It can be seen then that 
Roan Consolidated Mines' fixed assets were in the early days near. to those 
given as the mining properties of- Roan Section Trust but, with time, came 
closer to those represented by the Trust's mining properties and exploration 
and service companies. The fixed assets of Roan Consolidated Mines were not 
disaggregated into mining properties and others as were those for Roan 
Selectiorr- Trust. However, in the Appendices to the Explanatory Statement 
27/ 
issued in June 1970, the Trust set Put what it thought would have been the 
fixed assets of Roan Consolidated Mines in December 1969, dividing them into 
mining assets, which were not markedly different from those shown for June 
1969, and non-mining assets which were smaller than the figure for the service 
and exploration companies. 
25/ The companies of the Roan Selection Trust group just before 
nationalization are given in Roan Selection Trust Ltd. Annual Report 1969, 
page 32. - The Ametalco, group of companies was purchased from the American 
Metal Climax in 1963 for 1 million shares. This purchase gave the Trust its 
first earnings base outside Zambia (U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit Harold E. Kohn v. American Metal Climax Inc. and Roan Selection Trust 
Ltd. (D. C. Civil No. 70-933) Joint Appendix page 314a. ) 
26/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1971, page 4. 
27/ See note c to Table 5.16. 
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The figures for 1959 to 1961 are obtained by adding the fixed assets 
figures for Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd. to those for Roan Selection 
Trust. No official figures were given of what Roan Selection Trust's balance 
sheet would have looked like before 1962 if it had absorbed Roan Antelope then 
and so these figures must be treated with caution, especially when a 
comparison between 1961 and 1962 is made. 
Roan Selection Trust did not make any provision for the depletion or 
amortization of its capital expenditure. All expenditure which was regarded 
as creating or increasing the earning power of the mining properties was 
classed as capital expenditure. The accumulated total of this expenditure is 
described as-, net fixed assets in Table 5.16. That expenditure wh-ich was 
regarded as maintaining the assets' earning power was classed as replacements 
and was provided for by transfers from profits to provision for replacements. 
The total of the two is shown as gross capital expenditure. 
Roan Consolidated Mines changed its accounting procedure with effect from 
July lst 1970 (i. e., the change was seen in the 1971 accounts). Under the new 
basis, expenditure on items actually replaced was charged direct ly to 
operating costs. Some figures were given for this expenditure and are shoyn in 
Table 5.20. All other expenditure was classed as capital expenditure. 
Capital expenditure on assets which provided the necessary facilities and 
ameni'ti-es for the efficient operation of the undertaking but which was not 
directly related to production was written off by transfers from profits 
appropriated for capital expend iture. 
2-8/ 
This figure is shown in the column 
for "Replacements". 
28/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1971, pages 6 and 13. 
- 98 - 
It can be seen that there was not a substantial difference between the 
definition of total net capital expenditure used by Roan Selection Trust and 
Roan Consolidated Mines. Wýat changed was the treatment of replacements and 
other expenditure. - 
From lst July 1979, Roan Consolidated Mines changed its accounting to a 
depreciation basis. Henceforth all expenditure on fixed assets was 
capitalised and depreciation was provided to write off the assets over the 
lower of the estimated useful life of the assets or the mines to which they 
related, subject to a maximum life of 25 years. Previous years' fixed assets 
were not revalued to reflect the change but depreciation would have amounted 
to more than the replacement expenditure chargikd to the cost of sales -- 
whereas the former would have -come to K20 million in 1979, if the accounts had 
been prepared' on the new basis, only K9.7 million had been charged as 
replacement expenditure to the cost of sales under the old acco. unting 
system -L9/and a further K5.5 million had been vritten off. 
5.5.2 The capital stock of the Zambian Anglo American/ 
Nchanqa Consolidated Copper Mines Group 
In January 1970, the Zambian Government merged the mining undertakings, 
assets and liabilities of Rhokana Corporation, Nchanga Consolidated Copper 
Mines Ltd. and Rhokana topper Refineries with Bancroft Mines Ltd. which was 
re-named Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. On lst July 1970, the new 
Nchanga Company acquired the Kansanshi Copper Mining Company Ltd. and on 28th 
June 1971, but with retrospective effect to lst January 1971, it acquired the 
properties and liabilities of Zambia Broken Hill Development Company -Ltd., a 
lead and zinc producer. 
29/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1980, page 19. 
- 99 - 
Table 5.17 gives the accumulated total of capital expenditure and 
replacements outlays for the strictly copper companies from 1959 to 1969 and 
for these companies plus the Broken Hill Company. The small Kansanshi mine 
was not in operation during this period and is not included. 
For the companies of the Zambian Anglo American group, expenditure during 
each year whicý was regarded as maintaining, as opposed to increasing, output 
was written off mining assets by transfers from profits appropriated for 
capital expenditure. The amounts written off are those shown in the column 
"Replacements". As with the Roan Selection Trust companies, no provision was 
made for depletion or depreciation. Instead, replacements were charged to 
operating costs or, in the case of certain short life equipment, by the 
operation of provision accounts. 
The nationalized company adopted the same accounting rules as did Roan 
Consolidated 'Mines with the exception that, in the case of open pit vehicles, 
replacement expenditure was provided for by the operation of -a provision 
account. Neither the movements on the 'provision account nor the amounts 
charged to operating costs were normally given in the company reports. 
In the financial year 1978/79, the company changed its accounting system 
to the depreciation basis, as outlined above for Roan Consolidated Mines. 
Table 5.17 shows what the capital expenditure in 1977/78 on the old and the 
new accounting basis was. Previous years' balance sheets we-re not revised. 
It can be seen thati as with the Roan Consolidated Mines' results, the change 
scarcely affected the figure given for net capital expenditure. 
5.5.3 Investment as measured by chanqes in fixed assets expenditure 
Tables 5.18 and 5.19 are derived directly froM Tables 5.16 and 5.17 and 
give the year to year changes in expenditure on fixed assets. Tables 5.20 and 
5.21 give the increases in capital expenditure deflated by, for the period 
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Table 5.17 
Zamanglo Group/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
Fixed Assets 
(K millicn) 
Copper Companies and 
Coppe r CompaniesY Broken Hill Compan 
YearA/ Gross Re placements Net Gross Rep lacements Net 
1959 176.1 41.6 134.2 193.4 42.7 150.7 
1960 185.0 46.0 139.1 204.3 47.8 156.5 
1961 193.4 51.7 141.7 219.5 53.9 165.6 
1962 202.9 56.3 146.6 230.3 58.6 171.8 
1963 216.5 61.5 155.0 244.0 63.9 180.2 
1964 226.7 69.9 156.8 254.9 73.0 182.0 
1965 240.1 80.8 159.3 269.2 84.7 184.5 
1966 254.4 92.3 162.1 284.4 96.9 187.6 
1967 276.3 106.3 170.0 306.8 111.5 195.3 
1968 298.3 124.4 173.9 329.0 131.1 197.9 
1969 - 323.1 129.8 193.3 354.5 138.4 . 216.1 
19692/ 346.0 134.4 211.6 
1970-d/ 382.9 143.7 239 .2 
1971 426.3 153.0 273 *2 
1972 468.4 163.1 305 '3 
1973 527.2 170.3 356 '8 
1974 596.1 176.8 419 '3 
1975 655.0 185.7 469 '2 
1976 694.3 195.0 499 *4 
1977 710.4 200.0 510 *4 
1978-e/ 733.6 215.4 518.2 
1978f/ 549.8 28.5 521.3 
1979 578.7 58; 8 519.9 
1980 639.6 90.7 548.9 
1981 745.8 125.3 620.5 
Source% Bancroft Copper Mines L td., Nchanga Consolidate d Copper Mines Ltd., 
Rhokana C opper Refineri es, Rhokana Corporation, Zambia-Broken Hill 
Developme nt Corporation Annual' Reports. 
a/ The totals for the financial Years ending in the year shown. The 
financial years for the Rhokana and Rhokana Copper Refineries ended on 
June 30th. Until 1964, Bancroft's financial year ended on June 30th. 
After that, its financial year ended on March 31st. Nchanga's financial 
year ended on March 31st, both before and after naticnalizaticn. Br ok en 
Hill's financial year ended on December 31st. 
b/ Bancroft Copper Mines, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, Rhokaýa Copper 
Refineries and Rhokana Corporation. 
Figures for December 31st. 
d/ Figures for January lst. 
Under the old accounting system. 
Under the new accounting system. 
- lol 
Table 5 . 18 - 
Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines 
Increases in Fixed Assets 
(K million) 




















19 79. A/ 





Gross ments Ne t 
8.53 3.91 4 T2_ 
13.76 5.36 8.40 
. 11 4.46 -4.36 8.15 5.49 2.66 
12.26 4.53 7.73 
14.50 5.26 9.24 
7.77 4.97 2.80 
6.55 5.20 1.35 
8.89 6.50 2.39 
18.05 10.35 7.70 
Service & Exploration 
Companies 
Replace- 
Gross ments Net 
4.15 1.41 2.75 
13.80 1.13 12.67 
1.57 1.80 -0. ý3 
4.00 2.78 1.22 
3.58 2.34 1.25 
3.96 2.11 1.85 
7.36 2.72 4.64 
-3.65 h/ -0.35 -3.30 
1.75 1.63 0.12 


















13.91 5.59 8.31 
9.72 7.29 2.43 
16.27 7.32 8.95 
18.09 7.60 10.49 
1134 7.08 4.65 
13.91 7.92 5.99 
5.24 6.15 -0.91 
19.80 11.97 7.83 
12.74 5.22 7.51 
28.37 5.82 22.55 
35.56 2.88 30.67 
28.28 4.09 24.20 
26.63 11.94 14.69 
36.59 8.34 28.25 
34.23 3.66 30.57 
55.92 4.86 51.06 
51.31 4.41 46'89 
25.96 5.51 20: 45 
35.66 19.97 15.68 
28.01 17.84 10 . 17 
57.42 22.47 34.95 
Source-. Roan Selection Trust, Roan Antelope Copper Mines and Roan 
Consolidated Minds Annual Reports, various years. 
a/ For the financial years described in Table 5.3. 
b/ RST Exploration ceased exploration in Zimbabwe and its 
of (Roan Selection Trust Annual Report 1968 page 6). 
C/ For the six months ended June 30th 1970. 
d/ On the old accounting basis. 
On the new accounting basis. 71 For the nine months ended March 31st 1980. 
a ssets were disposed 
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Table 5 . 19 
Zamanglo Group/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. -. 
Increases in Fixed Assets 
(K millionT--- 
Copper Companies and 
Copper Companiesb/ Broken Hill Compa ny 
year! / Gross Repl acements Ne t Gross Re pl acements Ne t 
1960 8.96 4.09 4.86 10.94 5.10 5.84 
1961 8.35 5.71 2.64 15.18 6.13 9.05 
1962 9.52 4.66 4.87 10.86 4.66 6.21 
1963 13.55 5.17 8.38 13.67 5.28 8.39 
1964 10.22 8.42 1.80 10.93 9.13 1.80 
1965 13.40 10.89 
- 
2.51 14.24 11.72 2.51 
1966 14.30 11.52 2.78 15.27 12.14 3.12 
1967 21.90 14.00 7.90 22.35 14.66 7.69 
1968 22.04 18.08 3.96 22.25 19.62 2.63 
1969 24.76 5.39 19.37 25.46 7.31 18.15 
19 69c/ 22.88 4.59 18.29 . %.. 
19 71 d/ Amounts charged to 43.39 9.28 34.11 
1972 operat ing costs 42.16 10.10 32.06 
1973 '58.74 7.22 51.52 
1.974 68.92 6.44 62.48 
1975 
- 
58.89 8.97 49.93 
1976 39.37 9.23 30.14 
1977 16.06 5.02 11.07 
1978j/ 23.2 23.22 15.46 7.76 
19 78±/ 46.40 28.50E/ 10.8 
1979 29.40 30.80 -1.4 
1980 63.20 34.20 29.0 
1981 108.20 36.60 71.6 
Source*. Bancroft Copper Mines Lt d. , Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
Rhokana Cop per Refinerie s, Rhokana Corporation, Zambia Broken Hill 
Development Corporation Annual Reports. 
a/ The totals for the financial years ending in the year shown. 
Bancroft Copper Mines, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, FIhokana Corporation 
and Rhokana Copper Refineries 
C/ The figures cover the nine month period from 31st March 'to 31st December for 
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. and Bancroft Mines Ltd., and the six 
month period from 30 June for Rhokana Corporation and Rhokana Copper 
Refineries. 
d/ 15 rmnth period from lst January 1970 to 31st March 1971. 
e/ On the old accounting basis. 
F/ On the new accounting basis. 
g/ Another K 7.1 million representing the capital expenditure on the Kansanshi 
area that was written off as an extraordinary item was added to this figure. 
I 
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1959 to 1965y the wholesale price of all building materials and, from 1966, 
the wholesale price of goods for fixed capital formation. The base was 1971. 
By 1981, these 'prices had risen over five times. By contrast, the GOP 
deflator, adjusted", for changes in the terms of trade, * trebled between 1971 and 
1981, and so the deflated figures for the period of government ownership show 
quite different trends in real investment expenditures. 
There are serious problems involved in deflating the figures for fixed 
assets expenditure, and especially the accumulated totals of expenditure. The 
company accounts talk of expenditure that maintains or increases the earning 
power of the assets, but this should better be understood as the productive 
capacity of the mines, rather than their earning power. For instance, if the 
price of copper went down, this would not have led to a fall in the figures 
for fixed assets and, indeed, if an investment were-made to increase capacity 
this would have led to an increase in the net fixed assets as shown in the 
accounts. It would -ncM, then, necessarily be correct to deflate a static 
figure for net fixed assets by any price index and conclude that this somehow 
showed a decline -in the assets' earning power. In the case of the older mi. nes 
this could have been misleading. Roan Antelope's net fixed assets, shown in 
the accounts, increased between 194.1 and 1961 from E5.8 million to E6.6 
million, whereas production rose from 67.7 to 81.8 thousand tons and profits 
after tax from EO. 43--million to E2.7 million-. 
30/ 
5.5.4 Investment as measured bydevelopment work completed 
Another indicator of how much investment is being undertaken at the mines 
is the amount of development work shaft-sinking, stope preparation and main 
drives and crosscuts excavation completed. These figures are given in 
Tables 5.22 and 5.23. If the mines were being operated with a view to making 
30/ All figures from Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Rej2orts. 
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Table 5.20 
Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines 
Increases in Fixed Assets (deflated)A/ 
(1971=100) 
Ex penditure on Exploration and 
Mining Prope rties Service Companies Total 
Replace- Replace- Replace- 
Gross ments 
- 
Net Gross ments Net Gross men ts Net 
1960 T2.35 5.66 6.69 12.35 3.66 6.69 
1961 19.86 7.73 12.13 6.00 2.03 3.97 25.86 9.76 16.09 
1962 0.15 6.42 -6.127 19.87 1.63 18.23 20.02 8.05 11.99 
1963 11.55 7.78 3.77 2.22 2.55 -0.33 13.77 10.33 3.44 
1964 16.57 6.12 10.44 5.40 3.76 1.64 21.97 9.88 12.09 
1965 18.49 6.71 11.78 4.57 2.98 1.59 23.06 9.69 13.37 
1966 9.19 5.87 3.31 4.68 2.50 2.19 13.87 8.37 5.50 
1967 7.39 5.87 1.53 8.31 3.07 5.24 15.70 8.94 6.76 
1968 9.98 7.30 2.68 -4.10Y -0.39 -3.70 5.89111 6.91 -1.02 
1969 20.05 11.50 8.56 1.94 1.81 0.14 22.00 13.30 8.69 
Amounts charged to 
operating costs 
1970. C/ ... 13.81 5.66 8.15 
1971 28.37 5.82 22.55 
1972 30.68 2.64 28.04 
1973 ... 24.15 3.49 20.66 
1974 20.06 9.00 11.07 
1975 ... 22.67 5.16 17.50 
1976 5.63 15.97 1.71 14.26 
1977 4.14 20.62 1.79 18.82 
1978 2.48 14.66 1.26 13.40 
1979ýj"- 2.35 6.30 1.34 4.96 
1979. S/ 8.65 4.84 3.80 
1980. t/ 6.08 3.87 2.21 
1981 11.32 4.43 6.89 
Source% Roan Selection Trust, Roan Antelope Copper Mines and Roan Consolidated 
Mines. Annual Reports 
Deflated by the wholesale price of goods for fixed capital formation 
, 1966-1981 and by the wholesale price of all building materials 1960-1965. 
RST Exploration ceased exploration in Zimbabwe and its assets were disposed 
of. (Roan Selection Trust Annual Report 1968, page 6. ) 
C/ For the six months ended June 30th 1970. - ....... 
d/ On the old accounting basis. 
e/ On the new accounting basis. 
f/ For the nine months ended Marqh 31st 1980. 
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Table 5 . 21 
Zambian Anglo-Anerican/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
_ Increases in Fixed Assets (deflated)al 
(19 71=100) 
Copper Companies 
Copper Companies and Broken Hill 
Ye art/ Gross Replacements Net Gross Replacements Net 
1960 12.95 5.9 
,2 
7.03 15.82 7.37 8.45 
1961 12.05 8.24 3.81 21.90 8.84 -13.06 
1962 13.71 6.70 7.01 15.64 6.70 8.94 
1963 19.20 7.33 11.88 19.37 7.48 11.89 
1964 13.81 11.38 2.43 14.77 12.34 2.43 
1965 17.09 13.89 3.20 18.15 14.95 3.20 
1966 16.90 13.62 3.28 18.04 14.35 3.69 
1967 24.72 15.80 8.92 25.23 16.55 8.68 
1968 24.77 20.31 4. '45 25.00 22.05 2.95 
1969 27.51 5.99 21.52 28.28 8.12 20.17 
19 69j/ 25.42 5.10 20.32 
Amounts charged to 
operating costs 
19711/ 43.39 9.28 34.11 
1972 38.54 9.24 29.31 
1973 50-17 6.17 44.00 
1974 51.92 4.85 47.07 
1975 36.48 5.55 30.93 
1976 18.36 4.30 14.06 
1977 5.92 1.85 4.08 
1978. S/ 6.6 6.64 4.42 2.22 
19781/- 13.26 8.14 3.09 
1979 7.13 7.47 -0.34 
1980 13.71 7.42 6.29 
1981 21.33 7.22 14.11 
Source-. Bancroft Copper Mines Ltd., Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 
Rhokana Copper Refineries, Rhokana Corporation., Zambia -Broken Hill 
Development Corporation Annual Reports. - 
a/ Deflated by the wholesale price of goods for fixed capital formation 
1966-1981, and by the wholesale price of all building materials 1960-1965. 
b/ For the financial years described in Table 5.17 F/ See table 5.19, note c. . d/ 15-month period from lst January 19TO to 31st March 19T1. 
Under the old accounting system. 
Under the new accounting system. 
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the maximum profit in the shortest period of time, then we would expect to see 
little development work being completed. If, on the other hand, their 
long-term viability was a concern of the management, then we would expect to 
see development work continuing. 
The one problem with this indicator is, of course, that it is only 
applicable in the case of underground mines and only the Chibuluma, - Konkola, 
Luanshya-Baluba and Mufulira mines are solely underground mines. Until 1972, 
Chambishi was purely an open pit, but after that an underground mine was 
developed. Open pit mining ceased in December 1978. Nkana is predominantly 
an underground operation: the figures for 1982/83, show underground ore 
deliveries amounting to 3.93 million tonnes and open pit deliveries to 0.533 
million tonnes. Nchanga, on the other hand is primarily an open pit 
operation with only 3.34 of the 9.93 million tonnes of ore treated coming from 
the underground sections in 1982/83. -L2/ 
5.6 Financing investment in the mines 
The figures for fixed assets expenditure that we have used so far come 
from the companies' balance sheets. These not only give their other assets 
composed of investments, including those in subsidiary companies, and current 
assets such as stores, stocks of metals and concentrates and cash at hand - 
31/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 1983 Annual Report, page 37. 
Th6 Rokana division includes the Bwana Mkubwa mine which, in 1982/83 hoisted 
from its underground workings 0.42 million tonnes of ore. In February 1984, 
the mine ceased operations. 
32/ jbid, page 33 - The Nchanga Division includes the Kansanshi open pit 
whose output, though, is very small -. 86,618 tonnes in 1982/83. 
- 107 
Table 5.22 
Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated mines: 
Mining development underground 
(metres) 
Luanshya 
Year Chambishi Chibuluma and Baluba Mufulira Total 
1960 13 108 79 751 82 . 621 175 
480 
1961 13 184 64 6.83 82 005 159 872 
1962 15 581 59 783 63 552 138 916 
1963 19 713 78 188 40 335 138 236 
1964 14 606 75 484 53 076 143 166 
1965 12 934 85 244 51 810 . 149 988 
1966 8 332 63 153 48 421 119 906 
1967 9 776 58 519 49 474 117 769 
1968 10 874 46 628 47 159 104 661 
1969 12 326 54 051 48 210 114 587 
1970 2 147 8 482 50 678 38 702 100 009 
1971 4 453 9 579 53 852 32 630 100 514 
1972 5 174 10 098 67 553 41 760 124 585 
1973 7 113 7 328 74 439 44 . 
793 133 673 
1974 7 779 8 697 '74 092 44 490 135 058 
1975 7 908 7 457 68 875 43 400 127 640 
1976 7 236 6 476 68 998 42 533 125 243 
1977 10 397 5 036 65 880 35 594 116 907 
1978 11 047 3 354 53 121 26 470 93 992 
1979 12 285 5 547 48 581 29 501 95 914 
1980 20 743 6 491 59 366 31 057 117 657 
1981 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. ai 
1982 27 421 7 283 61 607 33 661 129 972 
1983 31 120 6 465 63 126 33 780 134 491 
1984 30 168 4 G62 56 014 25 602 115 846 
Source: Zambia Min ing Yearbooks (various issues), and Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1982, page 51; Annual Report 
1983, page 47; and Annual Report 1984, page 47. 
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Table 5.23 
Zamanglo Group/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines; Zambia Total: 
mining development underground 
(metres) 
Year Chingola Konkola Nkana Total Zambia Total 
1960 52 454 50 664 98 812 201 930 377 410 
1961 48 198 48 336 103 335 199 869 359 741 
1962 49 123 51 989 99 289 200 401 339 318 
-1963 40 112 49 156 95 974 185 242 323 478 
1964 34 949 41 276 72 862 149 087 292 253 
1965 35 174 48 497 82 810 166 481 316 468 
1966 45 107 49 072 90 386 184 565 304 471 
1967 53 475 53 985 107 936 215 396 333 165 
1968 48 499 58 456 105 707 212 662 317 324 
1969 51 609 54 619 103 966 210 194 324 781 
1970 47 579 53 860 105 486 206 925 306 934 
1971 46 761 59 159 103 524 209 444 309 958 
1972 59 144 50 982 94 130 204 256 328 841 
1973 52 234 53 819 87 761 193 814 327 487 
1974 52 527 59 093 84 548 196 168 331 226 
1975 40 285 51 573 69 991 
. 
161 849 289 489 
1976 46 596 48 292 69 193 164 081 289 324. 
1977 52 849 56 929 49 855 159 633 276 540 
1978 53 063 48 338 52 Oll 153 412 247 404 
1979 50 530 46 615 41 220 144 365 240 279 
1980 46 196 45 302 44 248 135 746 253 403 
1981 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1982 34 139 41 260 50 133 125 532 255 504 
1983 31 405 37 469 48 325 117 379 251 870 
1984 21 303 30 274- '53 680 105 257 221 103 
Source: Zambia Minýing Yearbooks (various issues), and zambi-a 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1982, page 51 and Annual Report 
1983, page 47 and Annual Report 1984, page 47. 
- 109 - 
but also their liabilities. Normally current liabilities such as creditors, 
short term indebtedness, bank overdrafts and dividends payable are subtracted 
from current assets to arrive at net current assets. Adverse movements in net 
current assets would reduce the financial standing of the companies and, 
therefore, their ability to maintain their investment programmes. 
Tables 5.25,5.27 and 5.29 show the asset figures for the different 
groups. The figures for the pre-nationalization companies of the Zambian 
Anglo American group have simply been added together and so represent the 
composite result of a group of companies. No attempt has been made to arrive 
at net figures for the Zambian Anglo American group as a whole by netting out 
inter-company relatiqnships. 
To finance these assets the companies resorted to issuing shares, often 
at a premium, to building up reserves out of current and past profits and to 
long 'and medium term borrowing. The figures for these liabilities are given 
in Tables 5.24,5.26 and 5.28.. Alongside the figures for -Tong and medium term 
indebtedness are given, in brackets, those for the total of short-term debt 
which would appear in the liabilities side of net current assets. we have 
drawn from these tables the total of short, medium and long-term indebtedness 
of the companies and the ratio of debt to. fixed and total assets. These 
figures are given in Table 5.30. 
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Table 5.24 
Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines 
Liabilities-. Share capital, loný and medium term liabilities, reserves and 
replacements provisions 1960-1981 
(Kmn) 
Long and Shor t-t er m Provision 
ShareY Share medium term in deb ted- for re- 
ye arE/ capital premiums iiabilitiesi/ ness Reserves placements Total 
1960ý/ 77.7, 18.5 29.7 9.5 135.3 
1961d/ 78.9 17.3 0.2) 33.8 9.0 138.8 
1962 68.8 30.9 18.1 19.4 8.6 145.7 
1963 70.1 30.5 18.0 21.3 8.1 147.9 
1964 74.8 30.9 20.0 21.3 8.7 155.5 
1965 76.3 30.9 22.3 28.3 8.7 166.5 
1966 77.1 31.3 22.3 32.4 10.4 173.5 
1967 78.5 31.6 25.0 37.5 12.5 184.8 
1968 78.5 31.6 21.4 54.7 13.3 199.5 
1969 124.0 17.3 17.2 50.4 9.0 217.8 
1970E/ 121.3 21.8 10.3 5.1) 22.0 9. li/ 180.5 
1970 121.3 21.8 10.3 1.4) 27.3 6.2 212.7 
1971 121.3 21.8 13.2 56.5 - 250.7 
1972 121.3 21.8 31.5 76.1 250.7 
1973 121. S* 21.8 45.9 89.3 278.1 
1974 121.3 21.8 48.9 112.4 - 304.3 
1975 12-1.3 21.8 71.3 57 . 2) 129.9 - 344.2 
1976 121.3 21.8 72.2 95.3) 125.9 - 341.1 
1977 121.3 21.8 77.7 (111.6) 141.9 - 362.7 
1978 121.3 21.8 195.3 ( 80.9) 153.5 - 491.8 
19 79 1/ 150.9 32.1 130.2 ( . 59.9) 217.7 - 
530.9 
19 79 150.9 32.1 130.2 ( 5 9.9) 213.5 - 526.7 
1980 150.9 32.1 98.7 ( 66.9) 282.8 - 564.5 
1981 150.9 32.1 89.4 ( 58.4) 302.2 - 574.7 
LojEcet. Roan Selection Trust Annual Report 1969, pages 18-19, Roan Antelope 
Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1960,1961-, Roan Consolidated Mines 
Annual Report, various years. 
a/ Figures for the financial years described in Table 5.3. 
The figure for share capital from 1960-1969 is for the capital of Roan 
Selection Trust plus the interests of minority shareholders (principally 
Rhokana) in subsidiary companies. 
After 1973, payments due within one year were included in current 
liabilities. The amDunts involved were, in 1973 K1.8 mn and, in 1974, for 
example, K 5.3 million. 
Figures for 1960 and 1961 are obtained by coubining the accounts of Roan 
Selection Trust and Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd. 
e/ Figure for January lst 1970. 
This figure is for deferred income tax, not provision for replacements. 
Under the old accounting system. 
Under the new accounting system. 
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Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines 
Fixed Assets (net), investment and-loans and net current assets 1962-1981 
(Kmn) 
Assets frozen 
Fixed Net through 
Assets Investments Current exchange 
YearA/ (net) and Loans Assets restrictions Total 
1960 61.5 34.4 39.5 135.4 
1961 70.5 36.8 31.5 138.8 
. 1962 87.9 31.6 26.2 147.9 
1963 90.3 31.0 26.7 149.9 
1964 99.2 29.8 26.5 155.5 
1965 109.7 33.8 23.0 166.5 
1966 114.4 27.5 21.0 10.6 173.5 
1967 120.4 28.6 25.2 10.7 184.8 
1968 119.5 29.3 41.4 9.3 199.5 
1969 127.3 27.6 57.0 ý6.0 
217.8 
197012/ 132.9 15.1 36.4 184.4 
1970 140.5 14.5 31.8 186.8 
1971 166.7 17.4 28.6 212.7 
1972 197.4 19.0 34.3 250.7 
1973 221.6 21.3 
. 
35.3 278.2 
1974 236.2 20.6 47.4 304.3 
1975 264.5 21.7 44.0 14.0 344.2 
1976 295.1 21.8 17.8 6.4 341.1 
1977 346.1 23.5 -7.0 362.7 
1978 393.0 50.4 48.4 491.8 
1979-c/ 413.5 51.4 60.0 530.9 
1979d/ 408.7 51.4 66.6 526.7 
1980 418.9 51.9 93.8 564.5 
1981 453.8 53.0 67.9 574.7 
Source: Roan Selection Trust Annual Rep ort 1969, pages 18-19, Roan Antelope 
Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1960,19 61 and Roa n Consolidated Mines Annual 
Report, various years . 
Figures for the financial years described in Table 5.3. 
Figures for January lst 1970. 
c/ On the old accounting basis. 
d/ On the new accounting basis. 
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rl, nNI X% IC 
Zambian Anglo American/Nchanqa Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. (with Broken Hill) 
Liabilities: -Share capital, share premium, reseEves 
and long and medium term liabilities 
(Kmn) 
Long and Short term 
Share Share Medium Term indebted- Accumulated 
YearS/ Capital Premium Reserves Liabilities ness LossY Total 
1960 143.1 25.8 46.6 20.7 ( -4.1 232.1 
1961. 143.0 25.8 53.3 23.3 ( -3.8 241.6 
1962 143.4 27.0 61.7 25.3 ( -3.8 253.6 
1963 144.3 29.5 64.1 23.2 ( 2.2) -3.8 257.3 
1964 144.2 29.5 60.4 25.4 ( -2.1 257.4 
1965 126.6 17.4 74.3 10.1 228.4 
1966 126.9 17.4 80.4 8.9 1.5) 233.6 
1967 126.8 17.4 89.2 10.1 12.7) 243.5 
1968 126.7 17.4 99.6 7.9 10.2) 251.5 
1969 126.6 17.4 138.0 28.6 7.7) 310t6 
1970 248.5 23.2 __ ) 271.7 
1971 251.0 60.5S/ 22.6 2.6) 334.1 
1972 254.0 79.7 41.1 5.9) 374.7 
1973 253.8 119.9 45.4 7.2) 419.1 
1974 253.6 159.7 41.6 26.5) 455.0 
1975 253.5 192.3 96.7 A 28.7) 542.6 
1976 253.5 187.9 13§. 7 (111.0) 581.1 
1977 253.3 185. 3 140.6 (145.7) 579.3 
1978ý/ 253-. 3 . 188 . .9 168.5 (101.1) 610.7 
1978.2/ 253.2 230.1 168.5 (101.1) 651.8 
1979 310.1 255.5 83.4 (179.3) 649.0 
1980 310.0 302.3 66.2 (162.6) 678.5 
1981 309.9 329.9 112.7 (151.7) 752.5 
Source: Bancroft Copper Mines Ltd., Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines-Ltd., Rhokana 
Copper Refineries, Rh okana Corporation, Zamb ia Broken Hill Development 
Corporation Annual Re ports. 
For the financial yehrs described in Table 5.17. 
Bancroft mines only. 
Includes K 3.3 million in notes and shares to be issued to Zambia Copper 
Investments Ltd. 
Under the old accounting system. 
Under the new accounting system. 
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M-t-l- r- n, 7 
Zambian Anglo American/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
(with Broken Hill) 
Fixed assets (net), investments and loans and net current assets 1960-1981 
(Kmn) 
Fixed 
Assets Investments Net Current Deferred 
Year! / (Net) and loans assetsh/ Expenditure Total 
1960 156.5 49.8 25.8 232.1 
1961 165.6 53.2 22.8 241.6 
1962 171.8 64.7 17.1 253.6 
1963 180.2 66.1 11.0 257.3 
1964 182.0 64.8 10.6 257.4 
1965 184.5 61.4 -17.6 228.4 
1966 187.6 61.8 -15.6 233.6 
1967 195.3 63.9 -15.6 243.5 
1968 197.9 67.2 -13.4 251.5 
1969 216.1 72.8 21.9 310.6 
1970 
. 
212.2 13.2 46.2 271.7 
1971 273.2 15.9 44.0 1.0 334.1 
1972 305.3 18.8 50.7 374.7 
1973 356.8 22.9 39.4 419.1 
1974 419.3 19.6 16.1 455.0 
1975 469.2 17.3 32.0 24.0 5 42. -5 
1976 499.4 18.5 49.5 13.8 581.1 
1977 510.4 22.6 38.8 7.5 579.3 
1978S/ 518.2 50.1 42.4 610.7 
19781/4 521.3 50.1 -80.4 651.8 
1979 519'9 52.3 76.8 649.0 
1980 548: 9 55.6 74.0 678.5 
1981 620.5 56.8 75.2 752.5 
Source: Bancroft Copper Mines Ltd., -Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 
Rhokana Copper Refineries, Rhokana Corporation, Zambia Broken Hill 
Development Corporation Annual Reports. 
a/ For the financial years described in Table 5.17. 
b/ Includes stores as assets. 
a/ Under the old accounting system. 
d/ Under the new accounting system. 
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rp Ah 1 s> t; -2R 
Zambian Angl American (without Broken Hill) 
Liabilitiýst Share capital, share premiurns, reserves 
and long term indebtedness 
Long and Short term 
Share-b/ Share Medium Term indebted- Accumulated 
Yeara/ Capital Premkums Reserves Liabilities ness LossS/ Total 
1960 136.6 25.7 35.8 16.9 -4.1 210.9 
1961 -136.5 25.7 42.2 16.4 -3.8 216.9 
1962 136.9 26.9 50.8 16.1 -3.8 226.9 
1963 137.8. 29.4 52.0 16.5 -3.8 231.9 
1964 137.8 29.4 46.6 18.7 -2.1 230.4 
1965 120.1 17.3 60.1 4.6 202.1 
1966 120.6 17.3 65.4 4.2 207.5 
1967 120.4 17.3 74.7 3.8 ( 12.5) 216.2 
1968 120.4 17.3 84.5 3.3 ( 10.2) 225.5 
1969 120.3 17.3 122.9 24.1 7.7) 284.6 
Source-. Bancroft Copper M ines Ltd., Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 
Rhokana Copper Re fineries, and Rhokana Corporation Annual Reports, var ious 
years. 
a/ For the financial year s describe d in Table 5.17. 
Inc ludes an outside in terest (wo rth K 0.2 -million) in a subsidiary of NCCM. 
Ban croft Copper Mines only. 
TA h1A1; - ') Q 
Zambian Anglo American (without Broken Hill) 
Assets% Fixed assets, investments and loan ssets 
Fixed Assets I nv es; tmen ts Netb/ 
Year2/ (net) and loans current assets Total 
1960 139.1 49.8 22.1 210.9 
1961 141.7 52.9 22.2 216.9 
1962 146.6 64.4 15.9 226.9 
1963 155.0 65.9 11.0 231.9 
1964 156.8 64.6 9.0 230.4 
1965 159.3 61.2 -18.5 202.1 
1966 162.1 61.6 -16.2 207.5 
1967 170.0 63.8 -17.6 216.2 
1968 173.9 67.0 -15.4 225.5 
1969 193.3 72.7 18.6 284.6 
sourcet Bancroft Copper Mines Ltd., 
Rhokana copper Refineries, 
various years. 
a/ For the financial years described 
Y Includes stores as assets. 
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 
and Rhokana Corporation Annual Reports, 
in Table 5.11 
i 
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Table 5.30 
The total indebtedness of the com;: )anies and the ratio of debt 
to shareholders' funds 
(K million and percentage) 
Lon g and 
Total Borrowin gs/ Medium Term Debt/ 
Year2/ Total ' bebt (Kmn) Shareholders Fun*ds (%) Shareholders Funds 
NCCM NCCM , NCCM, 
with without with without with without 
RST/RCM Broken Hill RST/RCM Broken Hill RST/RCM Broken Hill 
1960 18.5 20.7 16.9 15.8 9.8 8.7 ). 5.8 9.8 8.7 
1961 17.5 23.3 16.4 14.4 10.7 8.2 14.2 10.7 8.2 
1962 18.1 25.3 16.1 14.2 11.1 7.6 14.2 11.1 7.6 
1963 18.0 25.4 16.5 13.9 10.9 7.7 13.9 9.9 7.7 
1964 20.0 25.4 18.7 14.8 10.9 8.8 14.8 10.9 8.8 
1965 22.3 10.1 4.6 15.5 4.6 2.3 15.5 4.6 2.3 
1966 22.3 10.4 4.2 14.7 4.6 2.1 14.7 4.0 2.1 
1967 25.0 22.8 16.3 15.6 9.8 7.7 15.6 4.3 1.8 
1968 21.4 18.1 13.5 12.0 7.4 6.1 12.0 3.2 1.5 
1969 17.2 36.3 31.8 8.6 12.9 12.2 8.6 10.1 9.3 
19 7 OY 15 .4 23.2 9.3 9.3 6.3 9.3 
1970 11.7 6.8 6.0 -- 
1971 13.2 25.6 6.6 8.2 6.6 7.3 
1972 31.5 47.0 14.4 14.1 14.4 . 
12.3 
1973 45.9 52.6 19.8 14.1 19.8 12.1 
1974 48.9 68.2 19.1 16.5 19.1 10.1 
1975 122.1 125.4 44.8 28.1 26.1 21.7 
1976 167.5 250.7 62.3 56.8 26e8 31.6 
1977 189.3 286.3 66.4 65.3 27.3 32.0 
1978 276.2 269.6 92.5 61. "0 (55.8)S/ 65.9 38.1 (34.9)-c/ 
19792/ 190.1 262.7 47.9 46.4 32.5 14.7 
1980 165.6 228.8 35.5 37.4 21.2 10.8 
1981 147.9 264.4 30.5 41.3 18.4 17.6 
Source% Roan Selection Trust, Roan Antelope Copper Mines, Roan Consolidated Mines, 
Bancroft Copper Mines Ltd., Broken Hill Development Company, Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Rhokana Copper Refineries and Rhokana 
Corporation Annual Re2orts 
a/ For the financial years described in Table. 5.3 and 5.17. 
lst January 1970 
Under the new accounting system. 
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5.7 Expenditure on Exl2loration 
There are no annual figures that we have seen for the amount of total 
expenditure on exploration in Zambia or for some other variable that indicated 
the intensity of operations -- say the footage drilledi To show the trend in 
exploration will, then, be more difficult. 
The post nationalization period was expected to lead to an increase in 
exploration as the old companies lost most of their exclusive concessions and 
the country was opened up to new entrants. In Table 5.32 we give details for 
the expenditure of these new entrants and of the time period during which they 
conducted their operations. The expenditure is divided between outside 
companies agd parastatal Zambian organizations. 
Table 5.31 gives prospecting expenditure that was begun before 1970. It 
is divided into that expenditure which had ended by 1970j, that which ended 
after 10.0 and, finally, that which was still continuing in 1983. 
The total expenditure detailed in Tables 5-. 3-1 and 5.32, that is the total 
of prospecting expenditure outside the Copperbelt, amounted to K 102.01 
million (all at current prices). By comparison, prospecting expenditure in 
the Copperbelt from 1948-1983 is expected to have amounted to about K 70 
million and at Kabwe (Broken Hill) to about K4 million over the same 
34/ 
per iod'- 
34/ Information supplied privately by Zambia Appointments Ltd'. * London. 
I 
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Table 5.31 
Prospectin4 Expenditure bequn before 1970 
Company Time period Expenditure 
(K million) 
AAC: Kasampa Minerals Ltd. 1957-1967 0.41 
AAC: Barotsel: and Exploration Ltd. 1962-1964 0.2 
RST: Kadola Mines Ltd. 1953-1969 3.0 
Minerals Search of Africa (Rio Tinto) 1955-1965 3.0 
Frobishers 1956-1960 2.0 
New Consolidated Goldfields 1955-1957 0.5 
(with RST and AAC) 
Sub-Total 9.11 
Chartered Exploration Ltd. 1955-1975 15.8 
(Zamanglo Exploration after 19*70) 
RST/RCM: Mwinilunga 1948-1975 15.0 
RST/RC? 4: Chisangwa 1948-1973' 5.0 
RST/RCM: Lusaka East 1955-1975 2.0 
Sub-Total 37.8 
De Beers 1955-present 10.0 
Geological Survey of Zambia. 1955-presený 6.0 
Sub-Total 16.0 
Total 62.91 
Source: Privately supplied by Zambia Appointments Ltd., London. 
- 118 - 
Details of identifiable prospectinq outside the CopPerbelt after 1970 
Company Time period Expenditure 
(K million) 
GEOMIN (Romania) 1972 
- 
2.0 
SIDCO (Yugoslavia) 1969-1974 0.5 
Metallimex (Czechoslovalia) 1972-1978 0.2 
SWICO and PNC (Japan 1972-present 1.0 
AGIP-Nucleare (Italy) 1972-present 15.0 
United Nations 1969-1973 2.5 
Noranda 1974-1978 0.8 
Saarberg-Interplan 1978-present 5.0 
BRGM (France) 1981-present 0.1 
Sub-total 27.1 
Mindeco (Zambia) 1970-1978 6.0 
MINEX (Zambia) 1975-present 12.0 
Total, _ 39.1 
Source: Privately supplied by Zambia Appointments Limited, London. 
C) 
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5.8 Summary 
In this Chapter, we have amassed and put on comparable bases and, where 
feasible, calculated in real terms the data that will be used in the 
subsequent analysis of the performance of the Zambian copper mining industry. 
We gave figures for Zambian copper and cobalt production and for the share of 
Zambian copper production in world market economies and developing countries, 
production. We then gave figures for the size of the labour force, for ore 
production and for the grade of ore milled. We calculated annual copper and 
ore production per employee and per local employee. Statistics werp given on 
the technical efficiency of the concentrators and on accident rates at the 
mines. 
After these physical data, we compiled statistics on the costs of 
production, on labour costs and earnings, on the capital stock of the mines 
and on annual net investment. We deflated the relevant figures to show trends 
in real expenditure. Investment could also be judged by the underground 
development work undertaken for which data were also collected. 
we gave figures for the asset and liabilities sides of the companies' 
balance sheets in order to show how investment was financed, and drew out from 
these data figures for the long and short-term indebtedness of the companies. 
Finally, we gave figures for the expenditure on exploration both by the 
main producers and by other companies before and after nationalization. 
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Chapter 6 
THE ZAMBIAN COPPER INDUSTRY BEFORE NATIONALIZATION 
The performance of the industry before nationalization was a crucial 
determinant of the Zambian government's decision to nationalize it. There 
might have been some lingering hostility towards the industry because of the 
delay in breaking the colour bar, but this was hardly important in making the 
Government decide to nationalize the industry in 1969. Moreover, it was its 
performance in the decade before nationalization and especially after 
Independence, in October 1964, that most attracted the Government's comments 
and criticisms and so we are justified in looking in depth only at this decade 
for an appreciation of the pre- as opposed to post-nationalization performance 
of the industry. 
6.1 Copper production 
One of the most crucial indicators of performance was the level of copper 
production which was given in Table 5.2 and is here reproduced in Graph 6.1. 
Copper 
. 
production rose from 576.4 thousand tonnes oi recoverable copper in 
1960 to 719.5 thousand tonnes in 19'69. However, it was only in 1969 that 
production reached and surpassed its total of 1965. 
6.1.1 The effect of production controls 
The reason for this was that for much of the earlier period controls were 
maintained by the Zambian and other producers on production or sales in order 
to balance supply with demand. Since 1958 production had been held back but 
in January 1960, all restrictions placed on the production of copper by the 
world's producers were removed. However, in October of that year Zambian 
producers again decided to try to balance global supply with demand. Roan 
Selection Trust cut production by 10 per cent and Zambian Anglo American 
reduced sales by the same percentage. In July 1962, these cuts were increased 
to 1ý per cent. Only in early 1964 were full scale production and sales 
resumed when demand was outstripping supply. For the rest of the period of 
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private ownership, the Zambian producers did not restrict production or sales 
as part of any concerted effort to stabilize the market. 
The years 1964 and 1965 can,. then, be viewed as ones when the Zambian 
producers expanded production rapidly to come up. to their more normal 
production rates. In 1965, Zambian* production as a percentage of world, the 
market economies' and the developing countries' production was the highest 
that it was to reach in this period, as can be seen in Graph 6.2. After 1965, 
Zambia's share in the production of all three categories slipped until it was, 
even in 1'969, slightly below that in 1960. The fall in production from 1965 
is then a reflection of the Zambian producers' inability to sustain the burst 
irL production that came after the removal of controls in early 1964. 
6.1.2 Rhodesian UDI and production 
What can help to explain the absolute and relative fall in production 
after 1965 are the events occurring after the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by Southern Rhodesia in Norember 1965 and the general adjustment 
in the industry to Zambia's Independence and Zambianization. The ef f ects of 
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence will be treated in Chapter 
9, but Zambia's having to adjust rapidly to a disruption of its established. 
trading patterns would clearly have tended to affect adversely the output of 
the mining industry. In September 1966, . -the mines had to restrict production 
to 75% of normal output mainly as---a consequence of a -9hortfall in fuel 





production only resumed in June 1967.21 
Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Labour. Annual Reoort of the Department 
of Labour for the year 1966, Lusaka, The Government Printer 1967, page 1. 
2/ RST Group of Companies "Statement by the Chairman, Sir Ronald L. Prain 
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6.1.3 Independence, Zambianization and production 
it is even more difficult to quantify the effect of the shock of 
Independence and Zambianization on output. output was clearly affected by 
strikes, of which there were two major ones in 1966, -in March and April and in 
August and September 
1/ 
, but output was also affected in more subtle ways. 
One report, by Professor H. A. Turner of Cambridge University for the 
International Labour Office stated, in 1969, that OThe reason for this fall in 
labour efficiency seems to be basically that the colonial system of labour 
discipline has broken down and nothing has yet developed to take its 
place. "-V Whatever the merits and demerits of the colonial system of labour 
discipline, both expatriate and Zambian workers had to adjust in a very short 
period of time to a very deep change in their relationships. Some expatriates 
claimed that they were unable to maintain discipline on the job. They 
were afraid to exercise their authority in case there were accused of racism 
and deported. 
6/ 
On the other hand, Zambians felt, with Independence, that 
they should no longer tolerate certain insulting behaviour by expatriate 
supervisors. -Z/ 
In view of the potential for a major explosion, the fact that the Zambian 
3/ Copperbelt of Zambia Mining Industry Year Book 1966, Nkola 1966, page 15. 
4/ Internationil Labour Office: Report to the Government of Zambia on 
Incomes, Wages and Prices in- Zambia, Lusaka, Government Printer 1969, 
page 14. 
5/ Copperbelt of Zambia Mining Industry Year Book 1966, page 21. 
6/ Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Labour Annual Report of the Department of 
Labour for the year 1966, Lusaka, 1967, page 13. 
7/ Michael Burawoy The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines: From African 
Advancement to Zambianization, University of Zambia, Institute of African 
Studies, 1972, contains full descriptions7and analyses of expatriate and 
Zambian attitudes to Zambianization. 
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copper mining industry was able to meet the challenge of Independence and 
Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence and to see production in 1969 
reach a record level must be considered a subsEantial achievement. The Mining 
Journal's view was that the achievements of the. copper mining industry 
"despite many severe problems" had been "remarkable". 
1/ 
This assessment 
referred not only to the increased output of industry, but also to 
achievements in other directions - such as the "relatively smooth application 
of the policy of Zambianization. " 
It should be remembered that the effect of the shocks administered to the 
industry at around the time of Independence and the Rhodesian Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence could be expected to diminish 9ver time. In this 
respect, only one year in the post -Independence period, 1966, saw production 
fall below its level of the *previous year. Subsequent years saw a revival in 
output. 
6.2 Productivity and Efficiency 
6.2.1 Copper and ore production per employee 
Trends in productivity and efficiency also give an indication of how well 
the industry coped with the transition from colonial rule to Independence. 
The productivity figures in Table 5.5 and Graph 6.3 show that, in terms of 
copper production -per employee and per local employee the trend was generally 
upward in the years 1960 to 1969. Productivity dropped off with the fall in 
output in 1966. Indeed, 1965, the year of highest copper production before 
1969 saw copper output both per employee and per local employee at a maximum. 
Productivity measured in terms of ore mined per employee and per local 
employee displayed a much stronger upward trend as shown in Graph 6.4. . It 
also was very closely followed by movements in total ore output. Thus., a 
sharp fall in productivity was recorded in 1966 but the peaks reached in 1969 
8/ Mining Journal, November 22nd 1968, page 393. 
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were substantially above the previous peaks of 1965. By 1969, ore mined per 
local employee was 22 per cent higher than in 1960, and that mined per 
employee 33 per cent higher. 
The difference between these two figures lies. in the fact that local 
employment grew more quickly than total employment as Zambians replaced 
expatriate workers. As Table 5.6 shows, the ratio of -expatriate to local 
employees fell substantially between 1960 and 1969 -- from 20.5 per cent to 
10.9 per cent -- as 
-the 
number of expatriate workers declined by 2,801 or 36 
per cent. In the same period the local labour force grew by 3,893 or nearly 9 
per cent. 
6.2.2 The efficiency of metallurgical oper-ations 
The sharp reduction in the expatriate labour force did not have an 
adverse effect on production or productivity, as we have seen, nor even on 
metallurgical operations where it might have been , 
thought that the 
expatriates'. expertise would have been most needed. As Table 5.8 shows, the 
recovery rates improved at Luanshya and Nkana and showed little change at 
Mufulira and Chibuluma. Recovery rates did decline somewhat at the Konkola 
and Nchanga mines but this was hardly surprising as both mines produced oxide 
as well as sulphide ores *and as the Konkola concentrator treated much of 
Nchanga's ore over this period. 
Sulphides are relatively easy to treat, as -shown by the high recovery 
rates at Mufulira and Luanshya whose ores are predominantly sulphides. On the 
other hand, the recovery from oxide ores is lower and the Nchanga mine was 
steadily producing relatively larger amounts of oxide ores. In 1959/60, the 
ration of oxide to sulphid e ores passing through the Nchanga concentrator was 
1.07 and in 1968/69 1.98.. 
2/ Moreover, as the mine is predominantly open 
9/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1960, page 11, 
Annual Report, 1969, page 17. 
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pit, it brings to the surface material that might be left behind in an 
underground mine. 
Great efforts were made by the Nchanga company to extract as much copper 
as possible from the material being brought to the-surface. One result was 
that- the average grade of ore passing through the concentrator declined -- 
from 5.37 per cent in 1959/1960, made up of 2.77 per cent oxide copper and 
2.60 per cent sulphide copper, to 3.81 per cent in 1968/69, made up of 2.53 
per cent oxide copper and only 1.28 per cent sulphide copper. 
The leach plant at Nchanga consequently' expanded in complexity and 
capacity -- from 6,000 tonnes of cathode copper per month in 1960 to 9,900 
10/ 
tonnes in 1972-; 'ý' -- to treat the low grade oxide and sulphide ores coming 
from the open pits. In December 1962, a low grade oxide section was 
commissioned and enabl ed copper production to rise by increasing recovery at 
the concentrator rather than by increasing ore production. The rate of copper 
recovery from oxides passing through the concentrator consequently rose from 
83.89 per cent in 1961/62 to 86.45 per cent in 1962/63 and to 90 per cent in 
1963/64. However, from 1966 to 1969, this plant was closed because of acid 
shortages and technical problems. 
In June 1964, another plant, designed to roast low grade sulphide 
concentrates, was commissioned. Roasting converted this material, which could 
not be so economically treated at the smelter, into oxides or sulphates, which 
were then treated in the normal way at the leach plant. This plant operated 
very successfully. 
ll/ 
10/ Bosse P. J. W. "New Developments at the Leach Plant at Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Chingola Division" Geologie en Mijnbouw 
51 (May/June 1972) page 404. 
ll/ Ibid., page 411. 
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Two new sections were added to the leach plant after the Government 
assumed a 51 per cent ownership of the industry. However, both had been in 
consideration before 1970 because of the problems that arose as the percentage 
of oxide to sulphide ores had continued to increase and as the volume of low 
grade oxide concentrates that were difficult to treat had grown. The first 
section, (Stage I), which came into operation in October 1971, was a leach 
cementation plant designed to treat the large stockpile of low grade oxide 
concentrates 
12/ 
, current arisings of this material and also leach residues. 
The second section (Stage II) first came on line in April 1974 and used a 
solvent extraction process - itself developed in the United States in the 
1960's - instead of cementation to tre at current tai-lings, reclaimed tailings 
1: 3/ from the old slimes' dam and residues It was the largest plant in the 
world to use -this technology and so, unsurprisingly, initial problems were 
encountered which prevented the realisation of the production targets set - 
55,000 tons of copper 12tr- annum over a twelve. year period from the annual 
treatment of 12 million tonnes of material. . 
14/ 
Although not part of the Nchanga Leach Plant, another plant of particular 
interest to Nchanga was the TORCO (Treatment of Refractory Copper Ores) plant 
at Nkana. This plant, designed to treat principally micaceous and silicate 
ores that are neither floatable nor leachable, provided an excellent example 
of the length of timeý- required to develop new technical processes. Work 
started on the TORCO process in 1961, in 1963 a pilot plant was built at 
12/ By I April 1969, Nchanga had accumulated a stock-pile of 847,411 tons of 
oxide concentrate containing over 27,000 long tons of copper, of which 
almost 17,500 accrued in 1968/69. (Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines 
Ltd. "Review by the Chairman, Mr. H. F. Oppenheimer" to accompany Annual 
Report, 1969) . 
13/ Mining Magazine, February 1974, page 100. 
14/ Mining Annual Review, 1976, page 444,1977, page 484 and Nchange 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. "Review by the Chairman, Mr. H. F. 
Oppenheimer", 4 May 1970. 
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15/ 
Nchanga to treat 10 tons of ore a day- and, in October 1965 a commercial 
scale 500 tonne a day plant was commissioned at Nkana to treat -the refractory 
ores of Mindola Open Pit. Modifications were made to this plant to allow it 
to come into full commercial operation in January 196.7. 
Its subsequent history has not jqstified the early optimism that "it 
could be one of the most important developments in the copper industry for 
16/ 
many years' No other units were built at Nkana as had been hoped, and 
plans ýo use the TORCO process to treat Kansanshi's ores 
17/ 
were abandon . ed 
in -favour of transporting the ore for treatment in Chingola's leach 
plant'-81. Also, Roan Selection Trust, which acquired a licence from Zambian 
Anglo American to use the process on its own ores, and built a pilot plant in 
the mid 1960's at Mufulira, gave up the project after it realized that the 
process, to be economical, required a higher grade of ore than was available 
in Zambia. It lost about $1 1/2m in- the venture. 
L9-/ 
Operations ceased at 
the TORCO plant in May 1983 because of the high and uneconomical costs of ore 
20/ 
treatment. A similar treatment process undertaken by Charter 
Consolidated; %tAkjoujt, Mauritania, ' also proved to be unsuccessful, and the 
21/ 
plant was closed in May 1978. - 
. It will be noted, that most of the material to be treated by the TORCO 
and the Nchanga leach plants did not come from new mines but rather from 
existing open pits. The 'Eosts involved in obtaining this material were so low 
15/ World Mining, December 1966, page 20. 
16/ World Mining, December 1966, page 20. 
17/ World Mining, February 1967, page 46. 
IS/ Mining Annual Review, 1972, page 345. (So far, though, Kansanshi has not 
come into full scale production). 
19/ From discussion with Mr. Jean Vuillequez. 
20/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd, Annual Report, 1984, page 38. 
21/ Mining Annual Review, 1980, page 540. 
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as to offset the higher costs of treatment through the complicated new 
processes 
22/ 
When the material was already at hand, as with the old 
tailings that had a grade of under 1 per cent copper, no costs of. ore 
23/ 
extraction were involved. 
The costý at any one section of the complex Nchanga leach plant cannot be 
viewed in isolation because often the justification for using a particula r 
process was that it would enable another more important section to be operated 
more efficiently. The roasting plant, for instance, was constructed so that 
the grade of sulphide concentrates going to the smelter would be increased and 
that plant's performance improved with the removal from the circuit of the low 
24/ 
grade sulphide concentrates which had a high silica content INrthermore, 
the transformation of copper sulphides into copper sulphates increased the 
production of acid, which was in short supply, as copper sulphate produced 
sulphuric acid on electro-winning 
25/ 
The experience of Nchanga also illustrated how, in examining the 
treatment of different ores to produce copper, the sole consideration was not 
just the cost of the copper produced but also that of mining and treating 
those ores that were not immediately treated to produce copper because of 
bottlenecks in the treatment plant. The change in mineralization at the mine 
221- Cf. World Mining, December 1966, page 20. Unfortunately the mines of 
the Zambian Anglo-American groupt neither before nor after 
nationalization, published detailed costs figures for the different 
treatment processes that would be useful for our study. However, the 
validity of the above argument can be appreciated from the temporary 
closing, in 1976, of the Mindola open pit and the Rhokana Division oxide 
concentrator that treated its ores. The flotation performance had been 
very poor (Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. ' Annual Report, 1974, 
page 23), and the mine did not contain compensating high grade sulphides. 
23/ Mininq Magazine, February 1974, pages 100,101. 
24/ BOSSE 22- cit., page 411. 
25/ Ibid. Pages 411,413. 
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from sulphides to oxides placed heavy strains on the Zambian Nnglo American 
group's smelter at Nkana and forced the group in 196B to stock-pile low grade 
oxide concentrates. 
We have discussed the Nchanga treatment plant at some length because it 
does illustrate that the companies went to considerable efforts to improve 
their recovery rates. Both this specific example and also the overall figures 
for recovery rates at the other concentrators show that in the period before 
nationalization there was no real deterioration in the efficiency of the 
treatment operations. 
6.2.3 The safety record 
The other related measure of technical performance we discussed in 
Chapter 5 was the safety record. The figures in Table 5.9 which are 
reproduced in Graph 6.5, show that, on the whole, shifts lost through 
accidents and non--fatal casualties increased up to 1966, after which they 
began to fall quite steadily. One reason for this could have been the 
generally unsettled atmosphere in the mines at the time of Independence with 
the consequent weakening of labour discipline as referred to above. 
26/ 
Another important factor making for increasing safety was the sharp fall 
in the turn-over. rate for local employees as the labour force stabilized. In 
1960 the annual turnover was 28.33 per cent, but by 1963 it had fallen to 9.23 
per cent. The figure stood at 7.28 per cent in 1966 and 6.35 per cent in 
1969. As a result, the average length of service of the local employee rose 
from 5.2 years in 1960 to 9.4 years in 19692-7/. A more experienced work 
26/ Republic of Zambia Ministry of Labour Annual Report of the Department of 
Labour for the year 1966, Lusaka, 1967, page 13 and Annual Report of the 
Department of Labour for the year 1967, Lusaka 1969, page 9. 
27/ Mindeco Mining Yearbook of Zambia 1970, page 46 and Copperbelt of Zambia 
- ýiining Industry Year Book 196B, page 47. 
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force was one which would have had a greater amount of time to learn about and 
to practise safety precautions than one whose members were continually moving 
out into other employment. 
As with the technical proficiency of the treatment plant, the safety 
figures do not indicate any collapse in the performance of the industry with 
Independence, but rather an actual improvement after Independence. 
6.3 The Costs of production 
6.3.1 Costs of sales and production: overall trends 
While technical efficiency of operations was maintained during the period 
of private ownership, figures for the costs of production do not paint so 
encouraging a picture. 
As can be seen -from Table 5.10, between 1961 and 1969, the Roan group's 
total cost of sales per tonne increased by 71 per cent or by K244, from K344 
to K588. The figures for the cost delivered buyers of electrolytic copper 
given in the same table. point to a similar pattern - these costs increased by 
K258, or by 71 per cent, between 1961 and'1969, with royalties and export 
taxes, both taxes on production, increasing by K159. The other costs, which 
we re within the companies' control, therefore increased. by nearly K100, or by 
32 per cent. Most of this increase, K63, was caused by increases of costs at 
the mine as can be seen from graph 6.6. In spite- of the transport 
difficulties caused by Rhodesia's --Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 
direct transport costs increased by only-K18. 
The effects of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on costs are 
perhaps more clearly seen from Table 5.12 which shows the trend in costs at 
the different stages of production. Smelting requires a large input of fuel, 
particularly coal, and indeed smelting costs at Mufulira and Luanshya rose by 
168 per cent and 62 per cent respectively between 1965 and 1969. No other 
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increase. The use of lower grade coal from Zambia rather than the 
higher-grade Wankie coal from Rhodesia was -partly responsible for this large 
increase. Lower grade coal adversely affected efficiencies. 
28/ 
Table 5.12 also shows that pining costs per tonne of ore in 1960 were 
lower at Luanshya than at Mufulira but by 1969 were higher. This reflected 
the approaching exhaustion of the former 'mine. As deeper and more difficult 
zq/ 
ore-bodies had to be extracted to maintain production, mining costs could 
only-be expected to increase, and there would be very little that could be 
done to arrest this trend. 
6.3.2 Tae costs of p roductio when deflated 
It is difficult- to choose a suitable deflator for the costs of 
production. We are essentially dealing with an industry in competition on 
world markets, and so would like* to see whether cost trends in Zamt)ia were 
unfavourable relative to trends elsewhere. A domestic deflator, such as the 
Zambian wholesale price index or the Zambian GDP deflator is largely 
irrelevant for this exercise. The measure we have chosen is the unit value 
index in U. S. dollars of the manufactured goods exports of the developed 
market economies, as published by the United Nations. This gives an 
indication 'of the trend ifi world prices in dollar terms. The -Zambian cost 
figures are in Kwachas, but this presents no conceptual problems as we really 
do not want the-figures to have been adjusted for devaluations, as they would 
be if we were comparing two Kwacha indices. One of the problems of Zambia's 
open economy is that increases in the costs of producing copper that would 
28/ Roan Selection Trust Annual Report 1969, page 26 and 1968, page 26. 
29/ cf PRAIN, Sir Ronald: "MacLare *n 
Shaft". Speech at opening of MacLaren 
Thaft, Roan Antelope, August 16th, 1963 in 
' 
Selected Papers Vol. III 
(1961-1964) London 1964 pages 113-114, and Economist December 16th 1961. 
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render the industry uncompetitive and bring about a devaluation would not be 
in the country's interests in so far as the costs of imports, including those 
for the mining industry, would rise. 
Using this export price index as a deflator, the figures given in Table 
6.1 were calculated. The first two columns are given in Graph 6.7 and show a 
I 
favourable downward trend for real mine costs free on rail (f. o. r. ) and costs 
of sales less royalties and export taxes for the years until 1965. Between 
1965 and 1969 real costs at the mine and costs of sales less royalties and 
export taxes increased by 30 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. The 
really large increase was seen in the total cost of sales, of 54 per cent, as 
royalties and export taxes rose sharply. The net result was that between 1961 
and 1969 real costs at the mine increased by 13.2 per cent, the cost of sales 
less royalties and export taxes by 20 per cent and the total costs of sales by 
55 per cent. 
6.4 Labour costs and p oblems 
6.4-. 1 The increase in labour costs 1965-1966 
Table 5.10 and graph 6.6 showed that the greatest increase in mining 
costs in the pre-nationalization peri6d took place between 1965 and 1967. As 
previosly mentioned, part of the explanation lies in the effects of Rhodesia's 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, but part also lies in the sharp 
increase in labour costs. Table 5.13 showed that these costs rose from K101 
per tonne of copper in 1964 to K143 per tonne in 1967. As a share of total 
costs of sales, less royalties and export taxes, they increased from 34 to 37 
per cent. The percentage increase was moderated by the fact that transport 
and other costs also increased between these two years. 
6.4.2 The Brown Award, 1966 
Table 5.15, and Graphs 6.8 and 6.9 which were derived from it, show 
nominal and inflated wage rates and identify the major cause of the rise in 
labour costs as the salary increases granted between April 1965 and October 
1966. The wage award of October 1966 was the most notable, and controversial 
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Table 6.1 Roan Selection Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines: 
Cost figures electrolytic copper (deflated, 1975=100)2/ 
Cost of sales 
Cos ts\ less royalties Total cost 
Year f. o. r. mine and export tax of sales 
1960 617 726 
1961 532.1 634 732 
1962 514.3 626 726 
1963 516.4 613 713 
1964 456.9 575 681 
1965 466.5 569 735 
1966 541.0 649 896 
1967 658.4 792 1232 
1968 61-5.6 774 1172 
1969 6-02.1 760 1131 
1970 628.9 859 
1971 710.3 910 
1972 723 915 
1973 636 777 
1974 588 740 
1975 619 (619) 778 (778) 
1976 667 (642) 830 (799) 
1977 739 (713) 909 (877) 
1978 647 (669) 812 (839) 
1979 607 (648) 779 (831) 
1980 768 (825) 973 (1046) 
1981 926 (902) 1139 ('1109) 
Source and Notes: As in Table 5.10 
a/ Deflated by the Unit value indices of the exports of manufactured goods 
from the developed market economies, in U. S. dollars, given in the U. N. 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. Figures in brackets are for the 
comparable index in Special Drawing Rights. 
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in the history of the Zambian mining industry and is generally known as the 
Brown award after the Chairman of the Commmission of Inquiry, Roland Brown, 
that recommended it.! -O/ 
There had been an earlier agreement, in January -1966, which provided for 
an average increase of 8 per cent in wages 
31/ 
, but this did not prevent the 
outbreak of serious strikes, beginning in March 1966. The Brown Commission, 
appointed as a result of these strikes to restore peace to the industry, 
decided that there should be a single basic scale for all employees in the 
industry- 32/ , and recommended that there be a uniform increase in 
'the 
existing local scale of 22 per cent -- this figure being chosen because it was 
one third of the difference between the local and expatriate wage rates for 
Shift Bosses.! -3/ In choosing such. a large wage increase, the Commission 
hoped inter alia to 'remove the sense of injustice which permeated the 
relations between labour and management in the mining industry". 
L4/ 
The Commission spent some-time arguing that it was not going against the 
recommendations of the earlier Report drawn up in 1964 for Zambia by a United 
Nations team under Professor Dudley Seers, and also invariably known after its 
Chairman. This Report had stated boldly that "There is really a choice for 
Zambia: in the next five years it can have big increases in wages or big 
increases in employment, not. both" (the Report's emphasis). 
15/ 
The 
10/ Republic of Zambia. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining 
Industry 1966. Under thd Chairmanship of Mr. Roland Brown, Lusaka, 
Government Printer 1966. 
31/ ibid. page 29. 
32/ ibid. page 42. 
33/ ibid. pages 45-46. 
34/ ibid. page 48. 
35/ United Nations/FAO/ECA Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development 
of Zambia Ndola 1964, pages 32-33. 
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companies had quoted this finding in their submission to the Brown Commission, 
but the latter arqued that it was not "challenging the economic reasoning on 
which the recommendations of the Seers Report (was) based 
36/ 
but that 
"weighing in the balance the importance of the industry on which the 
development of Zambia ultimately depends, (it) felý justified in recommending, 
as part of a new agreement, a general increase in wages which might otherwise 
be regarded as excessive in terms of the growth rate of the economy as a 
17/ 
whole" 
- After the Brown award, there was industrial peace on the Copperbelt, until 
after the end of private ownership, and the next wage award was only given 
four years later in November 1970. To this, extent, then, it can be 
justified. What would have happened if such an increase had not been awarded 
is, of course, impossible to judge. The effects on labour costs are, though, 
clear - they rose substantially as we saw earlier. Moreover, the Seers Report 
was apparently c orrect in arguing that Zambia could. not afford such wage 
increases. As the wage rates deflated by the relevant consumer price indices 
that are given in Table 5.15 and Graph 6-. 9 'indicate, real wage rates reached 
their highest point in 1966, at a level about 50 per cent higher than in 1961, 
but have fallen since then. By the end of private ownership, real wages were, 
though, still higher- than in 1961,.. but at about their levels of 1964, at the 
time of the Seers Report. 
6.4.3 The progress of Zambianization 
In the context of labour relations, reference must be made to the progress 
of Zambianization in the industry. Graph 6.10 shows the number of workers in 
the industry, divided into expatriates and Zambians, and comes from Table 5.6. 
36/ Brown Commission, op. cit., page 46. 
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The overall picture was clearly one of a rise in the Zambian and a fall in the 
expatriate labour force. Table 6.2, which is directly derived from Table 5.6, 
gives three columns which are also of interest in this regard, the first being 
the yearly change in the number of local employees ' the second that in the 
number of expatriate workers and the third the ratio of the changes. This 
latter -is expressed with the sign reversed and can be viewed as the 
displacement ratio: the number of Zambians replacing every expatriate that 
left. This ratio should given us an idea of the efficiency with which local 
labour replaced expatriate labour. 
It can be seen that in only one year, 1962, was the relationship perverse 
- i. e., that the local labour force fell while the expatriate labour force 
grew. In the seven years in which the two labour strengths moved in the same 
direction, four were doubly efficient in that not only did the expatriate 
labour force fall, but so did the local labour force. 
Looking at the pre-nationalization -peTiod, it can be seen that the 
greatest increase in the local labour force took place in the years 1964 to 
1967 when the increase, of 6565 workers, roughly equalled the total increase 
in the local labour force between 1960 and 1969. 
The size of the expatriate labour force fell most sharply in the years 
1964 to 1968, which saw a total loss of 2831 jobs. In 1968 the size of the 
expatriate labour force stood at 4845 and-was still to be 4495 Gn 1975. After 
that year it fell rapidly. 
The figures, then, show that the companies did respond well to the 
realities of Independence in so far as the immediately ensuing years saw 
substantial changes in the size of the labour forces in- the desired 
direction. The avfýrage displacement ratio for the whole period 1960-1969, was 
2.4, and in no year after 1963 was the ratio perverse - although in 1968 the 
size of both'labour forces fell. 
4 
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Table 6.2 Chanqes in Labour strengths at the Zambian mines and 
the displacement ratios 













































































































18452 -5043 3.7 
6694 -2801 2.4 
11758 -2242 5.2 
10130 -3132 3.2 
Source: As for Table 5.6. 
Notes: a/ Years where the local labour force fell and the expatriate labour 
force rose. 
b/ Years where the numbers of local and expatriate workers both fell. 
a 
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6.5 The performance of investment 
6.5.1 The change in investment expenditure as_qiven in the companies' 
reports 
The performance of investment was given in Tables 5.16 to 5.23. From 
tables 5.16 and 5.17, reproduced as graphs 6.11 and 6.12, it can be seen that 
the net capital stocks of both groups expanded from 1959 to 1969. Tables 5.18 
and 5.19, reproduced as graphs 6.13 and 6.14, show that, in nominal terms, 
this expansion was quite uneven. In the case of Roan Selection Trust, gross 
and net investment expenditure fell sharply from 196S' to 1968, whilst for the 
Zambian Anglo American group net investment was weak in the years 1964 to 
1966. To this extent there was a post-Independence fall in investment. 
The tables and graphs do show that the picture is not unzimbiguous. For 
instance, the Zambian Anglo American group's net investment, even in nominal 
terms, fell sharply after 1963, but, as can be seen from Table 5.21 and graph 
6.14, this was largely caused by an increase in the provision for 
replacements, the figures for gross expen-diture wer'e considerably higher in 
1967 and 1968 than in 1963. Mordover, the fall in expenditure on replacements 
in 1969 meant that a relatively small increase in gross expenditure looked 
like a very sharp increase in net investment. 
6.5.2 Problems in using a suitable deflator to arrive at real investment 
Another problem with the investment picture is- that of choosing a 
suitable deflator to arrive at figures for real investment. One way to do 
this is to deflate the capital stock of the companies by the same priý: e index 
- whether the GDP deflator or some index of the price of investment goods. In 
one study, the current value of the capital stock was indeed deflated by the 
implicit GDP deflator adjusted for changes in the terms of trade 
38/ 
. 
38/ DANIEL, P. Africanisation, Nationalisation and Inequality, Cambridge, 
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To show the difference, that the use of various deflators can make, we have 
deflated in Table 6.3 the total for net fixed assets of the Roan Selection 
Trust/Roan Consolidated Mines and Zamanglo/Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines 
trade after 
groups by the GDP deflator, this deflator adjusted for changes in the terms of/ 
1964 and by the wholesale price index for goods for fixed central formation 
for the period 1966 to 1981 and before that by the index for the wholesale 
prices of all building materials (henceforth this index will be called that of 
the price of investment goods). 
The first very obvious fact is that enormous difference result from the 
use of different indicators. For the first period, 1960-1969, the index for 
t, he price of investment goods gave almost the same results as-did the GDP 
deflator, adjusted for changes in the terms of trade, and showed Roan 
Selection Trust's capital stock increasing by over 40 per cent and Zambian 
Anglo American's by over 6 per cent. The simple GDP deflator, though, showed 
a fall of about 4 per cent in Roan Selection Trust's capital stock and of 
almost 30 per cent in Zambian Anglo American's. 
For the post-1970 period, it was the simple GDP deflator which showed the 
figures in their most favourablý-, light, yielding increases of 43 and 15 per 
cent for Roan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
respectively. The GDP deflator adjusted for changes in the terms of trade 
produced a slight increase in Roan Consolidated Mines' capi-Eal stock and an 18 
per cent decline in Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 's. The index for 
the price of investment goods painted the most depressing picture -- the 
capital stock of ýach of the two groups fell by over 40 and 50' per cent 
respectively. 
For the sake of comparison, Roan Selection Trust's copper production in 
1968/69 was 51 per cent higher than in 1959/60 and Roan Consolidated Mines' 
production in 1980/81 68 per cent that of 1969/70,92 per cent that of 
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Table 6.3 Net fixe. d assets of the two grou ps, 
deflated by different indices 
RST/RCM Group: Zaman glo/NCCM 
Wholesale GDPh/ GDP WholesaleA/ GDPY GDP 
YearA/ Indexa/ adjS/ Index adjS/ 
1960 99.0 110.5 103.8 226.4 252.8 237.6 
1961 114.9 134.4 124.7 239.0 279.7 259.4 
1962 126.5 146.9 138.1 247.3 287.0 269.9 
1963 128.0 147.3 138.4 -255.4 293.9 276,2 
1964 134.0 157.2 147.8 245.9 288.5 271.1 
1965 139.9 158.8 149.2 235.2 267.0 251.0 
1966 135.2 133.1 148.2 221.8 218.3 243.1 
1967 135.8 130.3 144.0 220.5 211.6 233.8 
1968 134.3 119.7 133.8 222.4 198.2 221.6 
1969 141.4 106.4 150.3 240.1 180.6 255.1 
1970a/ 152.4-13/ 130.81/ 150.51/ 259.4 222.7 256.2 
1971 166.7 166.7 166.7 273.2 273.2 273.2 
1972 180.5 190.3 186.9 279.1 296.3 289.1 
1973 189.3 177.9 198.7 304.7 286.4 319.9 
1974 177.9 170.2 183.0 315.9 302.1 324.9 
1975 163.9 222.2 188.0 290.7 394.2 33M 
1976 137-. 7 218.7 177.0 233.0 370.1 299.5 
1977 127.6 234-. 3 183.4 188.2 345.5 270.5 
1978 112.3 240.1 186.5 148.1 316.6) 245.9) 
1978 - - - 149.0 318.5) 247.4) 
1979 100.3 195.6 169.6 126.1 245.9 213.3 
1979 99.1 193.3 167.7 - - - 
1980 90.9 178.0 155.2 119.1 233.2 203.4 
1981 89.5 187.5 153.9 122.3 256.4 210.4 
Memorandum (percentages) 
1969/1960 ---142.8 96.3 14-4.8 106.1 71.4 107.4 
1981/1970 58.7 143.3 102.3 47.1 115.1 82.1 
a/ Wholesale price index of goods for fixed capital formation 1966-1981, and 
the whqlesale price index for all building materials 1960-1965. 
GDP deflator, unadjusted for changes in the terms of trade. 
C/ GDP deflator, unadjusted for changes in the terms of trade 1960-1964, 
adjusted fcxr changes in the terms of trade 1965-1981. 
d/ June 30th (corresponding to K140.5 in Table 5.16) 
Source: As for Tables 5.16 and 5.17. 
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1970/71, the year of the Mufulira disaster. Zambian-Anglo American's production 
increased by 8 per cent between 1959/60 and 1968/69, and Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines' fell by 11.1 per cent between 1971/72 and 1980/81.39/ 
6.5.3 A measu*re of the net capital stock in real terms 
As Mentioned earlier, though, in Chapter 5.5.3, deflating any figure for the . 
companies' assets by any deflator presents problems simply because of the fact 
that these assets were not revalued each year to take account of price changes. 
Increases in net fixed assets showed inqreases in their earning, i. e., productive 
capacity. If the assets' productive capacity had remained the same, then the 
figure for net fixed assets should not have moved. 
For this reason, to construct figures for the companies' net fixed assets in 
real terms, we have taken in Table 6.4 the nominal figures for 1959 as the base 
and have increased or decreased them by the annual figures for net investment, 
deflated by the price index for investment goods. 
As the investment goods' index rose more quickýly than did the GDP deflators 
after 1970 we have also given in brackets the figures for the capital stock using 
the GDP defla. tor, adjusted for changes in the terms of trade. It can be se-en 
that very little difference would have resulted if this index, rather than the 
investment goods' index had been used before 1970, -but that this index does 
39/ Even if 4/5 of the productioh for the financial ye'ar ending on March 31st 
1971 were given as the figure for 
- 
1970 (i. e. 395.9 thousand tonnes) 
production could stil have fallen by 10 per cent. 
a 
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Table 6.4 The neLa/ capital stock of the two mininq qroups (K million) 
RST/RCM Zaman qlo/NCCM 
Mining _ - 
Properties Total Without With 
Only Broken Hill 
1959 63.78- 63.78 134.22 150.66 
1960 68.40 68.40 139.08 156.50 
1961 76.78 79.52 141.71 165.53 
1962 72.44 87.79 146.56 171.71 
1963 75.05 90.17 154.77 179.93 
1964 82.27 98.53 156.45 181.61 
1965 90.41 107.77 158.66 183.82 
1966 92.70 111.57 160.93 186.37 
1967 93.25 116.24 167.09 192.37 
1968 95.61 115.53 170.17 194.41 
1969 101.52 121.54 185.04 208.35 
199.08h/ 222.39b/c/ 
1970 (128.48) 127.17 (223.75)h/ 222.39b/c/ 
1971 (143.33) 142.76 (246.22) 245.97 
1972 (162.47) 162.14 (266.22) 266.23 
1973 (176.77) 176.43 (296.66) 296.64 
1974 (184.27) 184.08 (328.35) 329.17 
1975 (197.50) 196.18 (351.94) 350.55 
1976 (209.58) 206.04 (363.84) 360.27 
1977 (227.40) 219.05 (367.71) 363.09 
1978 (242.06) 228.31 (370.14) 364.62 
1978 - (371.08) 365.22 
1979 (247.59) 231.73 (370.71) 364.99 
1979' (246.30) 230.94 - 
1980 (248.78) 232.47 (377.78) 379.10 
1981 (256.59) 237.23 (393.78) 379.10 
Memorandum items (percentages) 
1969/1960 159.2 190.6 137.9 138.3 
1981/1970 186.5 - 170.5 
1981/1970 (199.7) (176.0) 
a/ For an explanation of the deflator, 
_ 
see Chapter 6.5.3. The figures in 
brackets are those for when the GDP deflator, adjusted for changes in the 
terms of trade,, is used. 
b/ As of Ist January 1970. ' 
C/ The previous figure for the copper companies and Broken Hill, K208.35 
million, has been augmented by the increase in the copper companies, fixed 
assets, of K14.04, derived from the previous column, in order to reach the 
total for Ist January 1970. 
Source: As for Tables 5.16,5.17. 
i 
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paint a more favourable picture of the capital stock after 1970 and,, in 
particular, after 1976. 
Table 6.4 does show that the capital stock of both groups increased 
substantially between 1960 and 1969 - by 59 per cent in the case of the mining 
priorities of Roan Selection Trust and almost 91 per cent in the Trust 's mining 
and exploration companies. With or without Broken Hill, the Zambian 
Anglo-American group's next fixed asets increased by almost 40 per cent. 
6.5.4 Sotne pre-nationalization investment projects 
These i6creases in the capital stock did reflect decisions to invest in 
capacity. In the case of the Roan Selection Trust group, after the Mufulira West 
expansion programme had been completed in 1962, it announced that it was going to 
open up the Chambishi deposit as its only open-pit mineýLo/ at a cost of E7.5 
million. The open pit would have an ultimate depth of 600 feet-! 
/ 
and would 
remove 15 million short tons of ore. Deeper sections of the ore body were to be 
removed by underground methods. Full production was expected to be 25,100 tons 
of copper per annum and to start in 1967. 
Another deposit that the Trust decided to develop was Kalengwa. Its 
discovery had been announced in 1964 and, in 1966, the decision to go ahead with 
its exploitation was announced. ýL2/ It was a small. but high grade deposit and 
so at a capital cost of only E1.5 million, a- production of 12,800 tons of copper 
a year, starting in 196B and extending for-only six years, was expected. - 
40/ Announcement by Chambishi Mines Ltd. on- 21st May 1962 and Comments made 
to the Press on -21st May 1962, by Sir Ronald L. Prain, mimeographed RST 
documents. 
41/ "Chambishi - Copperbelt's new mine recovers first copper from oxide 
ores", Mining World, June 1965, page 30. 
42/ RST Group of Companies "Statement by the Chairman, Sir Ronald L. Prain 
OBER to accompany Annual Report 1966. 
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After the Zambian mines returned to full production in June 1967, after 
eight months' reductions caused by fuel shortages, the companies announced 
plans to expand capacity at an estimated cost, in 1967/68, of E30 million. 
Nchanga alone planned to spend E10 million, as opposed to E5.6 million in 
1966/67, to boost monthly ore production from 540,000 to 780,000 short tons 
and to increase smelter capacity to enable production to be raised from 
. 
13/ 
190,000 tonnes of copper a year to 254,000 tonnes 
6.5.5 Investment as shown by the development work completed 
We mentioned in Chapter 5.5.4 that the amount of physical work being 
undertaken at. the mines could be gauged from the development work undertaken. - 
Tables 5.21 and 5.22 gave figures for the various mines. The totals for the 
two groups are given in Graph 6.15. 
The figures for Chibuluma showed a fall in the years after 1963 with 
there being a recovery from 1966, the year of a major inflow of water, as the 
mine was rehabilitated. The Luanshya mine showed clear signs of exhaustion in 
the 1960s and development work reached its maximum in 1965. Mufulirals 
expansion was underway in the early 1960s and. after its completion, in 1962, 
development did fall off. For the Roan Selection Trust group as a whole, the 
development work completed in 1969, of 114.6 thousand metres, was only 65 per 
cent of that in 1960 and 80 per cent that of 1964-, the year of IndependeEce. 
To this extent, then, it can be said that there was a fall-off in 
physical work on the Trust's mines. Two explanations suggest themselves - the 
first being that the companies were ignoring the long-term future of their 
properties and were simply pulling as much ore as possible out of the ground. 
43/ Wall Street Journal, August 24,1967, page 24 and Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd. "Review by the Chairman, Mr. H. J. Oppenheimer" to 
accompany Annual Report 1967. 
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This argument would appear to be refuted by the fact that the grades of ore 
mined dropped over time, whereas such a short run policy of output and profit 
maximization would normally have been accompanied by a policy of high-grading 
-- i. e., extracting only the high grade ore. The other explanation could be 
the difficulties in maintaining work on the mines caused by the aftermath of 
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the problems arising 
from the transition to Independence. 
The difficulty in reaching firm conclusions from the figures for 
development work is well illustrated by the figures for the Zambian Anglo 
American mines of which only Konkola was a wholly underground mine. 
Development work for the group's- mines was at its lowest point in 1964 the 
year of Independence, at 149 thousand metres, after which there was an 
increase. In 1969 development work bompleted, of 210 thousand metres was 4 
per cent greater than in 1960. For Zambia as a whole, development work 
completed in 1969,324.8 thousand metres, was 86 per cent that of 1960, but 11 
per cent greater than that of 1964. The figures for the country as a whole do 
not, -then, lend support to the contention that after Independence the 
companies neglected their properties, which might have been suggested by the 
figures for the Roan Selection Trust's mines. 
6.6 FinanciFg investment before nationalization 
Investment in capacity at the mines during the last years of private 
ownership was primarily financed by internal resources. As can be seen from 
Table 5.30, the total debts of the companies were quite manageable during the 
1960s. Those of Roan Selection Trust fell in nominal terms and also as a 
percentage of shareholders' funds. The total debt of the Zambian Anglo 
American companies was lower in 1968 than in 1960, but then doubled to 
K36 million in 1969. This increase was caused by the arrangements the Nchanga 
Company concluded in 1968 with the Japanese companies, Mitsui and Co. Ltd. and 
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Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd., its principal customers, to receive a loan of 
$42 million and a credit facility of $28 million for the purchase of Japanese 
plant and equipment to help it expand its mining and milling treatment rate. 
The Zambian Anglo American companies agreed in return for the loan to supply 
100,000 tonnes of copper per annum over a ten-year period to the two firms 
and, as a guarantee of the loan's repayment, Nchanga pledged its holding of 
the Bancroft company's preference and ordinary shares±4-/. Even with this 
loan, the ratio of the Zambian Anglo American's group's total borrowings to 
its shareholders funds was less than 13 per cent. The figures for share 
capital and share premiums in Tables 5.24,5.26 and 5.28 show that important 
issues of shares were not made during the 1960s. The increase Jn Roan 
Selection Trust's share capi ta 1 in 1969 was achieved through the 
capitalization of the company's capital and general reserves and part of the 
share premium account and by a bonus issue of shares 
4 S/ 
__ it did not 
represent a fresh. injection of capital. 
6.7 Exploration begun before 1970 
In Table 5.31 we gave figures for the amounts spent on exploration 
campaigns that began before 1970. Of the total of K62.9 million, more than 
half, K37.8 million was accounted for by exploration started by the two major 
groups before 1970 but which continued -after nationalization. Another K3.6. 
milli(: Vn- was-accounted for by programmes by the two groups that ended before 
1970 (Kasempa Minerals, Barotseland Exploration and Kadola Mines Ltd. ) 
The main work of exploration before 1970 was, then, undertaken by the 
mining companies themselves, which was hardly surprising as exploration was a 
form of investment for their future. Indeed, most mining companies will 
devote a certain amount of their income to exploration, and indeed a figure of 
44/ Mining Journal, April 19th, 1968 pages 307-308. 
45/ Roan Selection Trust Ltd. Annual Report 1969, page 6. 
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6ne per cent of revenue was-given in 1969 as the amount a major mining company 
should spend on exploration. . 
16/ 
In Zambia, the two groups had the added 
advantage of being able to pick the most promising areas for their own 
prospecting-and hold them as exclusive prospecting co ncessions. We will now 
outline briefly their work of exploration. 
6.7.1 Roan Selection Trost's Work of Exploration 
After the Second Morld War, the Roan Selection Trust tied up all the 
ground underlain by strata of the Lower Roan group of rocks with a view to 
examining it by modern geophysical techniques in the hope of locating hidden 
copper concentrations. 
Three of the companies it set up - Mwinilunga, Kadola and Chisangwa - 
were to explore areas that were continuations to the west of the Copperbelt. 
The fourth company, the Luapala Company, was to investigate an area running 
alongside the Congo border in the eastern part of the country. Pre-war 
exploration there had revealed copper, lead and zinc in the Fort Rosebery 
. 
17/ 
district and copper on the east shore of Lake Mkeru and so further 
exploration appeared justified. 
The areas to be explored covered a total of 35,000 square miles in the 
most promising mineral areas of the country and, in the early years, the Trust 
was optimistic of -success in the large campaign of exploration it was 
undertakingis/ Unfortunately, this early optimism was to be largely 
disappointed. 
46/ Kruger, F. G. "Mining -a Business for Professionals Only" Mininq 
Engineering. September 1969 page 87. 
47/ Cf. GUERNSEY, T. D. A Prospector's Guide to Mineral Occurrences in 
Northern Rhodesia, Salisbury, BSA Company, 1951, and THIEME, H. G. 
"Explanation of Degree Sheet 1128, parts of N. W. Quarter and N. E. 
Quarter", Report No. 26 of the Geological Survey of Zambia, Lusaka, 1970. 
48/ Cf. PRAIN, Sir R. L. "The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt", New 
Commonwealth, December 1953. Re-printed in 
i 
Selected Papers, Volume I, 
1953-1957, London, Rhodesian Selection Trust, 1958. 
a 
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The Luapala Company was dissolved in 1961 and the Trust did not spend any 
more time in the area. The only mineral that proved to be worth mining in the 
area was manganese which was extracted at a profit by smaller companies 
between 1953 and 1961. However, it was not worth-while for the - large copper 
companies to use their geological staff in investigating such deposits when 
they could have been put to better use in searching for copper deposits or in 
examining existing copper mines with a view to increasing known reserves. 
The Trust was equally unsuccessful in the 4,000 square miles of the 
Kadola company. In 1969, after 16 years of unfruitful work, the company Qas 
wound up and the area abandoned. The failure here was more significant than 
that at Luapala because of its proximity to the Copperbelt. 
The Trust had more success in the Chisangwa. and Mwinilunga areas where, 
apart from the Copperbelt and Kapiri Mposhi and Mpik*a, its 60 professionally 
qualified geologists, geophysicists and geochemists and 300 other 
49/ 50/ 
employees had concentrated their efforts by 1969 . 
In the Mwinilunga area, two deposits, Kalengwa and Lumwana, were 
discovered. The former was found after aerial photography had, in 1956, 
identified clearings - possibly caused by the presence of copper in the soil - 
in the area. The most- significant vegetation was a narrow-leaved mauve-white 
flower which grew in abundance and which, on examination, was seen to contain 
1,000 to 4,500 parts per million of copper, whereas an average plant contains 
20. Because of the area's inaccessibility, it was only after a track had been 
cut in 1963 that a methodical examination, using geochemical methods, 
trenching ana, finally, drilling revealed the small, but high grade, 
49/ Roan Selection Trust Ap]2endices to Explanatory Statement of Roan 
Selection Trust for Meetinqs of Share-holders to be held on 6 Auqust 
1970,30 June 1970, page 1-1. 
50/ Vide LEE-PO7TER, J. "Prospecting by RST" Horizon, September 1969, Figure 




. Its discovery was announced in 1964 together with that of 
Lumwana, located in 1960 by drainage reconnaissance which had come across 
brightly coloured copper-stained rocks on the banks of the Lumwana river 
52/ 
6.7.2 The exploration conducted by the Zambian Anýlo American Grour 
The Zambian Anglo American group's exploration campaign was different 
from that of Roan Selection Trust in starting later, in being spread over a 
larger area and in ultimately being less successful. The Zambian Anglo 
American group had already examined the areas underlain by the Loan Roan group 
strata before the Second World War and was sceptical of the kind of 
re-examination undertaken by the Roan Selection Trust Group after the war. 
Their. chief geologist, Dr. Bancroft, thought that his own work had been 
"sufficiently intensive and thorough to ensure that no further copper 
discoveries would be made" and that only intensive diamond drilling rather 
53/ 
than electrical geophysical methods would prove successful. - 
The most important of Zambian Anglo-American's exploration companies, 
Chartered Exploration Ltd., was formed in June 1955 by the Chartered Company, 
in which the Anglo American Corporation had a substantial interest. The 
Chartered Company had every' incentive to find new mines as, in 1950, its 
rights to mineral royalties had been limited to 1986. Zambian Anglo American 
paýr ticipated in the new company which had been formed to re-evaluate, by means 
of the most modern prospecting methods, the areas that it hi-d investigated 
before the war using only visual aids and traverses on foot. 
51/ Accounts of the discovery of Kalengwa are found in ELLIS and McGREGOR 2P. 
cit., LITTLEFORD, D. H. and MAYCOCK, A. R. "Kalengwa Copper Mine is 
Zambia's Mighty Midget" World Minina (U. S. Edition) June 1972, pages 
32-33 and World Mining (U. S. Edition) September 1966, page 39. 
52/ Information on the Lumwana Depos'it is from McGREGOR, J. A. The Lumwana 
Copper Deposit in Zambia, Ph. D. Thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa, 
Y964. 
53/ FREEMAN, P. V., History of 'kining and Exploration in Zambia, undated 
mimeographed document supplied by Zambia Appointments Ltd. 
The prospecting operations followed a logical pattern. In the first 
place, existing data - reports, maps and aerial photos - were examined and 
various portions of the 120,000 square miles 
54/ 
over which the company had 
obtained concessions were chosen for airborne surveys. Another method for 
surveying large areas was geochemical stream sediment sampling which was 
perfected and refined as work progressed. Finally, reconnaissance geochemical 
soil sampling was used to choose areas for closer study. 
After analyzing the results of this work, target areas were chosen and 
intensive investigation by geochemical and geophysical surveys and by pitting, 
trenching, crosscutting and, finally, -drilling followed. The search was not 
just for copper as spectrographic analysis was made for 15 to 24 elements. 
Naturally, not every trace of mineralization was followed up but, as 
experience in using the new methods of exploration was built up, certain areas 
covered by earlier, less refined methods were re-appraised. In the event, 
after dropping grouncr in 1960,1962 and 1964, the concessions held by the 
company were reduced to approximately 28,000 square miles in 1965. 
ý_5/ 
, and, 
after the passage of the Mines and Minerals Act of 1969, further ground was 
dropped, resulting in 13 concession areas totalling 4,500 square miles being 
retained. 
No exploration effort is totally wasted as it always produces new 
information which-can be used by later_explorers, ýL7/ if only to let them 
know where not to prospect, but the results of Chartered Exploration Ltd. 's 
work were not 6ncouraging. In spite of the expenditure, by 1975, of over 
54/ Rhodesian Anglo American Annual_Report, 1961, page 8. 
55/ Zambian Anglo American Ltd. Annual Report, 1965, page 9. 
56/ Zambian Anglo American Ltd. Annual Report, 1970, Dage 14. 
57/ In fact, the two groups made available to outside interests information 
on the areas they relinquished in 1970, and answered their inquiries in 
detail (DftYSDALL, A. "Prospecting and Mining Activity 1895-1970" in 
BOSTOCK, M. and HARVEY, C. Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, New 
York, Praeger 19,72, page 82). 
- 166 - 
K 15 million on field operations and the employment, at its peak, of 77 
professionally qualified personnel and 500 other employees, only a few small 
finds were made, such as a small gypsum deposit near Monze which was operated 
at a loss from 1966 to 1969. They were turned over to Mindeco Small Mines 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Mindeco the Zambian Government's mining agency. In 
1975, the company, renamed Zamanglo Exploration Ltd., had reduced its 
exploratory activities to such an extent as to make it no longer economical to 
maintain its extensive Lusaka headquarters. Accordingly, Mindeco was allowed 
to acquire a large part of them. 
58/ 
Chartered Exploration Ltd. 's personnel also worked for another smaller 
company, Kasempa Minerals -Ltd., which was incorporated in 1957 and liquidated 
in 1967, after nothing of value had been found in the 1,800 square. mile 
concession it had near Kasempa. -ý-9/ 
The smallest Zamanglo exploration company, Kalindini Exploration Ltd. , 
-formed in October 1957, operated within the Copperbelt and investigated nine 
exclusive prospecting areas totalling 293 square miles after an airborne 
survey, completed in 1956 and using a magnetometer and scintillation counter, 
had revealed anomalies in these areas. 
The company was financed by Rhokana and Nchanga, which contributed 45 per 
cent each of its capital, the Chartered Company contributing the other 10 per 
cent. It was li(ýUidated in March 1963 and five areas of interest were 
converted to special grants. 
60/ 
By 1970, though , only one, Fitula, had been 
found to be worth retaining. The result of Kalindini Exploration's work, 
58/ Standard Chartered Review, April 1975, pages 10-11. 
59/ Rhodesian (Zambian) Anglo-American Ltd. Annual Report, 1962, page 27; 
1963, page 24; 1967, page 4. 
60/ Rhodesian (Zambian) Anglo-American Ltd. Annual Report, 1963, page 24. 
- 167 - 
then, was the addition of 4 million tons of ore to Nchanga's reserves, no 
greater than the yearly additions that have characterized the growth of the 
mine's gross reserves. 
In sum, although much effort was put into exploration by the Zambian 
Anglo American group and many different mineral deposits examined, it did not 
have the success of the Roan Selection Trust group in discovering totally new 
deposits. 
As Table 5.31 showed, the two copper groups were not the only private or 
public bodies to undertake exploration in Zambia after the war. Other private 
firms, in particular Minerals Search of Africa, part of the Rio Tinto group, 
Frobishers and de Beers, also conducted prospecting operations. However, 
nothing important has been found by any of these companies yet. 
6.7.3 The work of the Geological Survey 
The public body to undertake exploration was the Geological Survey 
Department. -E-1/ Founded in 1950, it was one of the last Colonial Geological 
Surveys set up, probably reflecting the great role the copper companies and 
the Chartered Company had played in geological mapping and also the British 
Government's limited interest in the country's development. 
The initial establishment was I chief geologist and 3 geologists and, by 
the time of Independence in 1964, had grown to 18 professionals. Post- 
- Independence growth was rapid, the establishment reaching 38 professionals in 
1966, and 41 in 1971. 
61/ For the history of the Geological Survey Department vide DIXEY, F. 
wColonial Geological Surveys, '1947-1956", Bulletin Supplemen 
't 
No. 2 to 
Colonial Geology and Mineral Resources, London, HMSO, 1957, pages 44-48, 
DRYSDALL, A. R. "The Geological Survey of Zambia" Records of Geological 
Survey, Volume XII, Lusaka, 1972, and "The Geological Survey of Zambia: 
its role in the social and economic development of the country" 
Occasional Paper No. 70 of the Geological Survey of Zambia, 1974, and op. 
cit., pages 62-63. 
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The Survey's work was intended to complement rather than overlap the 
field of interest of the mining companies and so, apart from mapping areas 
that the latter had not concentrated upon, it looked for mineral occurrences 
of importance to the country's industrial development or to small operators. 
In 1962, an Economic Unit was established to perform these functions, 
and, in 1965, it began an urgent re-assessment of the country's coal resources 
with favourable results. Coal deposits were opened up in the Zambezi valley, 
where in fact coal had been outlined in 1907 
62/ 
and again in 1949-50 by a 
team orgdnized by Mark C. Malamphy and Company for the Government of Northern 
Rhodesia. -ý-3/ What made the search for coal especially urgent after 1965 was 
the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Government's 
desire to limit the country's reliance on coal supplies from the Wankie 
colliery in Southern Rhodesia. Coal from Zambia was of a higher cost than 
Wankie coal and, until the commissioning of a washing plant in 1970, less 
suitable for use in the smelters. 
1-4/ 
In fact, it was-even reported that 
65/ 
Sinazongwe coal was so rock-like that it actually put smelter fires out. - 
6.7.4 Exploration at the time of nationalization 
From the foregoing description of exploration in Zambia until the time of 
nationali zation, it can be seen that the major part of the work was undertaken 
by the companies themselves. They had been active in the field since the end 
of the Second World War but as time went on they tended to concentrate their- 
efforts on those areas that were the most promising geologically or wherL- 
62/ W. H. REEVE The Geology and Mineral Resources of Northern Rhodesia, 
Bulletin of Geological Survey of Northern Rhodesia, No. 3,1963. 
63/ Mark C. Malamphy & Co. Ltd. Investigation of the 'Coal Resources of 
Northern Rhodesia Summary Report, October 1949 to July 1950 by Miller W. 
Ellis., 1950. 
64/ BOSTOCK M. "The Background to Participation" in BOSTOCK and HARVEY op. 
cit., page 119. 
65/ Information supplied by R. H. Hobson of Zambia Appointments Ltd. 
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deposits, if found, would be relatively cheap to develop. This in effect 
meant that by the time of nationalization both groups, but especially the 
Anglo American Corporation, were concentrating their efforts on the 
Copperbelt. 
66/ 
It could, then, be argued that a fillip was needed to encourage 
exploration outside the Copperbelt and exploration for other minerals than 
copper in the- country. This could have been provided by opening up the 
country to new exploration companies. However, it is difficult to come to any 
conclusion as to whether the work of the existing copper compapies could hav e 
been bettered. There is no indication that the present writer has seen in the 
literature that they were anything but energetic and innovative in the work of 
exploration, that they did not search for all possible economic minerals or 
that they did not maintain their interest in exploration right up to the time 
of nationalization.. A simple test of the success of their work of exploration 
would be whether they discovered as much copper as they withdrew' from the 
reserves. In Table 6.5, the published reserves of the Zambian mines are given 
for the years - 1930,1960,1969 and 1982. It can be seen that ore reserves, 
expressed in terms of contained copper, were actually greater in 1960 than in 
1930 when production was first getting underway, being 26.5 million tonnes of 
copper as against 20.26 million tonnes. By 1969, reserves of contained copper 
had dropped slightly to 25.2 million tonnes. However, all of this fall can be 
accounted for by the_ fall in Baluba's reserves caused. by technical factors: 
the deposit was not exploited between 1960 and 1969. 
This increase in reserves did, though, come about through additions' to 
known ore bodies and resulted from drilling programmes at existing mines as 
part of their forward planning, rather than from campaigns of prospecting. 
12/ DRYSDALL A. in BOSTOCK M. & HARVEY C. op. cit., pages 71-72. 
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Table 6.5 















1930 Grade 1960 Grade 1969 Grade 1982 Grade 
(%) (%) M 
- 
(%) 
98.0 3.44 85.8 3.04 69.6 2.87 51.0 2.44 
105.2 4.41 162.2 3.35 145.5 3.28 103.0 3.05 
23.7 3.46 31.8 3.37 29.7 3.08 28.8 2.81 
19A/ 3.47 101.612/ 2.41 59.7h/ 2.71 57.9 2.52 
- 8.9 4.89 5.8 5.12 7.2 3.71 
0.80 13.73 ex ex 
112.5 3.85 109.2 3.07 116.3 2.61 110.0 2.32 
130.5 4.66 163.3 4.65 225.8 4.02 -268.3 3.16 
- - 95.2 3.73 84.0 3.49 207.2 3.72 
7.3 4.15 c/ 6.81/ 3.44 26.3 3.10 
2.2 3.94 5.9ýl/ 3.00 0.2 3.40 
497.4 4.07 758.0 3.50 749.9 3.36 859.9 3.08 
20.26 - 26.49 - 25.16 - 26.47 - 
ex = mine exhausted 
Source: Company reports, Mining. Year Books, -various years. 
a/ Figures for 1931. 
b/ Although the Baluba mine*was not exploited between 1960 and 1969 a 
closer examination of the deposit led to the downward revision of the reserves. 
c/ Kansanshi was flooded in 1957 and no figures for res-erves (i. e. 
exploitable ores) were given in 1960. 
d/ Figures for 1971. 
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6.8 Summary: the period before nationalization 
From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that the years before 
nationalization were ones in which the copper industry had to face many 
challenges - first of attempting to stabilize the copper market, then of 
adjusting to Independence and, a year later, to Southern Rhodesialy Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence. The partial nationalization of 1969 took place 
at a time when the industry had returned to near-normality after the several 
shocks it had faced. The companies were at that time planning to spend 
substantial sums on new capital programmes. 
We have examined the industry's performance in many different fields and 
it would be difficult to say that nationalization was the necessary and 
obvious solution to- a persistent problem in the industry. Perhaps the most 
conclusive evidence for this - is that the nationalization announcement took the 
industry by surprise 
ý7/ 
-and was thought by some observers to be a dubiou S 
68/ 
move- The press commentary at the time tended to dwell more on tribal 
tensions, political considerations and opposition to capitalism than on any 
alleged poor performance of the industry under private ownership. The 
unexpectedness of its timing does not, though, mean that the 1969 partial 
nationalization was in no way justified or that no thought had gone into 
whether or not the de-cision should be taken. Before the decision was taken, 
and for some time afterwards, the industry's performance had been criticized 
and arguments were advanced that nationalization would be beneficial to it. 
67/ Cf. PRAIN, Sir Ronald Reflections on an Era Metal Bulletin Books, London 
T981, page 176. 
68/ Cf. Mining Journal August 15th 1969, page 133. 
- 172 - 
In the next chapter, we will give the various criticisms raised against the 
industry. This will show us which aspects of the industry's performance to 
conc entrate on when subsequently analyzing the performance of the industry 
after nationalization. 
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Chapter 7 
REASONS GIVEN FOR 
THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE ZAMBIAN COPPER MINING IOUSTRY 
In this chapter, we will discuss the economic justifications advanced at 
the time for the Zambian Government's 51 per cent take-over of the copper 
mining industry in 1969 and for its subsequent abrogation, in 1973, of the 
management contracts it signed with the former private owners. We will not be 
asking whether there was any validity then or later in the justifications it 
advanced. As we saw in chapter 2, a private company can be seen from a 
country's point of view to be exploiting too rapidly or too slowly a mineral 
deposit. - To investigate the consequences of a nationalization it is, then, 
useful to see what the Government hoped to achieve by these measures. 
7.1 Zambia not having an independent Ministry of Mines 
At the time of Independence and certainly until nationalization, the 
people who ran and knew all about the workings of the copper industry were the 
executives of the mining companies. During the period of colonial 
administration,. the companies had been left- with a free hand to run the 
industry. No effort was made to establish- an independent Ministry of Mines 
that could have provided the Government with independent advice. This was 
perhaps understandable given the colonial- administration's generally laissez- 
faire attitude. At the time of Independence, then, there was no established 
gr6up of expert advice that the Government could rely upon for its new 
relationship with the copper industry. Instead, it relied on the advice of 
imported advisers from outside, who were generally treated with contempt by 
the mining companies executives, -! 
/ 
and whose advice was often 'more in the 
1/ For instance, F. T. Ostrander of Amax thought that the Zambian 
Government had received a considerable amount of bad advice from"Ieconomic 
carpet baggers' who hang around and peddle their so-called expertise" (Quoted 
in STOEVER, W. A. Renegotiations in International Business Transactions, 
Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath, 1981, page 72. 
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form of words in the President's ear than formal documents such as British 
Parliamentary Papers. There is, then, no large published collection of 
studies from -a Ministry of Mines that would enable us to see the steps leading 
up to nationalization. 
7.2 Reasons given for the 1969 51 per cent nationalization 
The decisions to "invite" Roan Selection Trust and Zambian Anglo-American 
to offer a 51 per cent shareholding in their companies to the Government and 
later to cancel the management contracts were taken and announced in two 
speeches by the President of Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, without prior 
discussions with the parties involved. Although it can be argued how much the 
companies had expected such moves, the announcements did take them by 
surprise. In the case of the August 1969 speech at Matero, the surprise was 
such that many journalists thought that pressures on the President were 
reaching breaking point, with tribally motivated internal dissension, growing 
unemployment, the failure of his agrarian policies and the recent resignation 
2/ 
of the Chief Justice, and that nationalization of the mines won him enough 
political support to ride out the crisis. There was much truth in this 
assessment, but as The Economist also put it "Nationalization satisfies 
(Kaunda's) cabinet's fundamental opposition to capitalism". 
3/ 
The account 
of these events by Andrew Martin comes to a similar conclusion, that NwhiLe 
short-term political factors must have influenced the decision, it is not 
necessary to assume that they were the main cause Of it".. 
Y 
Finally it is 
only necessary to refer back to Dr. Kaunda's party's views of 1962, that "One 
2/ Cf The Economist July 26th, page 43, and August 16th, page 21. 
3/ Ibid. August 16th, page 21. 
4/ MARTIN A. Minding Their Own Business: Zambia's Struqqle Aqainst 
Western Control London, Hutchinson, 1972, page 162. 
- 175 - 
of the objectives of economic policy is to encourage and attract capital from 
abroad ... we believe that nationalization of the mines would lead to 
political and economic upheavals and uncertainties to investors abroad 
. 5/ to see that Zambia's philosophy concerning foreign investment had 
changed in the intervening years. 
Whilst the 1969 nationalization must he understood in the context of 
political pressures and a steady drift towards state capitalism, it was 
nevertheless expected to yield positive benefits to the country. 
The President's speech of August 1969, perhaps understandably, did not 
detail precisely the expected results of nationalization. However# it, 
together with recommendations of a United Nations survey team in March 1964, 
and a paper by Michael Faber, A senior economist and Under-Secretary in the 
Zambian Government, give us a reasonable idea of what was expected from the 
measures. We will deal with them consecutively. 
7.2.1 The Analysis and Recommendation of the Seers Mission 
The United Nations study, -ý/ frequently referred to 'as the Seers Report 
after its leader, was intended to help the future pos t- independence Government 
form its economic policy. From 1953 until the end of 1963, Zambia, known then 
as Northern Rhodesia, was part of the Central Africa Federation which included 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). Indepeftdence in October 
5/ Cited by OSTRANDER, F. T. in "The Role of Foreign Capitaln in DAVIS, 
John A, and BAKER, James K. (eds. ) Southern Africa in Transition New York, 
Praeger, 1966, page 348. 
6/ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Food and Agriculure 
Organization, Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia 
Ndola, 1964. 
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1964 thus brought it not only majority government but the freedom to correct 
its economy from the distortions introduced by a Federation which had largely 
benefited Southern Rhodesia. 
2/ 
- The Survey Mission saw that the main target of economic policy should be 
to increase employment.. 
V 
Employment at the mines was not expected to 
incre'ase significantly because "when a mineral industry, such as copper, 
reaches a certain size, it does not provide much further employment itself, 
because of the scope for mechanization. ". 
2/ 
The incomes generated in copper 
were to be used to provide employment by enabling the other sectors of the 
economy to develop. It would do this by providing increasing revenues for the 
Government which in turn would increase expenditure on services such as 
education and on construction, leading, through the multiplier effect, to, an 
expansion. of incomes. ýLo/ Although the Mission thought - that 
*the 
country's 
development programme over the following six years, until 1970, would not 
necesar'ily rely on any net flow of capital from overseas, 
Ll/ 
this was only 
in the light of rising earnings of foreign exchange from the copper 
industry. 12/ 
7/ Ibid. pages 9-11. 
S/ Ibid. page 13, paragraph 57- 
9/ Ibid. page 8, paragraph 15. 
10/ Ibid. page 14, paragraph 76. 
ll/ Ibid. page 21, paragraph 116. 
12/ Ibid. page 27, paragraph 2. 
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However, the Mission stated, and we will quote from the original text at 
length, . 
13/ 
that "There is no guarantee that capacity will be expanded 
adequately. The companies may, from their own point of view, have perfectly 
good reasons for not developing their concessions vigorously; their 
controlling interests may prefer that profits should be reinvested elsewhere, 
so as to spread their risks. This is, however, a matter of the nation's vital 
interests. " The Mission argued in favour of an agreed solution in these 
terms: OThe Government could coerce the companies into expanding output. it 
could adopt a system of taxation that heavily penalized them if they failed to 
expand. It could be arranged for the exchange control authorities to exercise 
a strict control over the industry's remittances of dividends and its capital 
transactions. But there is a great deal to be said for trying to work out 
copper policy in co-operation., rather than in a running fight ... The main 
interest of the companies (a safe and growing body of profits) is not 
incompatible with the chief concern of the -Government (to be able to rely on 
an upward trend in revenue to finance its development plans) ... -Antagonism 
would harm industry and Government, and if relations deteriorated to the point 
of nationalization, both would suffer. " 
The Mission's recommendations were, then, for a formal agreement to cover 
'"the period until (say) 1980: ... (1) On the side of the companies, [this] 
could include the following guarantees: to expand capacity on a certain 
specified schedule (which would include at least 875 thousand tons for 1970); 
to aim at 825 thousand tons of output (barring what the insurance companies 
know as "acts of God"); ... to give the Government all the technical information 
. 
13/ The quotations are from. ibid. pages 27-30. 
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it requires (where necessary on a confidential basis); to appoint Africans to 
the higher jobs on an agreed time schedule ... 
"The Government, for its part, could guarantee not to nationalize 
producing companies in these fifteen years, withý", Jegal safeguards; not to 
raise taxes during this period above a specified fraction of profits; and to 
consult the two groups on any matters that affected them both ... 
. "The degree of co-operation would be closer and. more secure if the 
Government held an equity interest in the companies with its nominees on the 
company boards. " 
The mission suggested that the equity interest could be acquired in lieu 
of royalty payments or export tax payments. 'At that time, royalties were 
actually being paid to a private company, the British South Africa Company, 
that had been founded by Cecil Rhodes in 1889 and owned the country's mineral 
r igh ts. As the Mission correctly foresaw, this situation could not last after 
Independence and indeed the first achievement of the new Government was to 
gain control over this source of income. Export taxes on copper did not exist 
in 1964. The Mission envisaged the companies issuing the Government with 
shares which would yield it dividends about equal to the royalty income. This 
would help the companies by transferring certain items from "cos. ts" to. "share 
of profits", thus reducing their financial liability. The Mission saw dangers 
involved in this policy and warned that the Government's "part of the 
industry's proceeds would become more volatile, although against this 
disadvantage one must set the fact that it would be able to influence the 
industry's operations directly. " 
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7.2.2 From the Seers Mission to Mulungushi 
In th e even t, the Government acted on surpr is ingly few of the 
recommendations of the Seers Report in so far as it affected mining. The 
Mission had recommended the creation of a separate Ministry of Mines that 
would be able to give the Government facts and advice and then enable it to 
play a more active role in the mining sector and to come to the kind of 
agreement it had envisaged between itself and the companies. It was very slow 
to adopt this suggestion. -1-41 The Government also ruled out any idea of 
taking a shareholding in the companies, and no such agreement as the 
Seers Mission had envisaged was reached. Some of the Mission's 
recommendations were accepted. In particular, an export tax was introduced in 
1966, but no drastic overhaul of the taxation system was undertaken. 
In April 1968, the President started along the path of coercion that 
Seers had foreseen if any amicable agreement were not reached, by announcing 
the imposition of exchange controls at a speech at Mulungushi. 
16/ 
In 
future, the companies would only be able to remit abroad a maximum of 50 per 
cent of their profits or 30 per cent of their equity capital. The President's 
justification for this step was the "virtual lack of mining development since 
. 
14/ MARTIN o. cit., pages 132-133 22 
15/ The Economist December 12th 1964. 
16/ KAUNDA, K. "Towards Economic Independenc e" Mulungushi Speech April 
19,1968, Lusaka: Zambia Information Services 1968, cited in The Economist 
April 27th 1968. 
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Independence" for, whereas the mining companies "could have embarked upon 
further expansion if they chose to devote part of their profits for this 
purpose. Instead of re-investment they (had) been distributing over 80 per 
cent of their profits every year as dividends". In the same speech, the 
President announced that certain companies would be invited to offer the 
Government a 51 per cent interest in their enterprises. 
These Mulungushi nationalizations did not include the copper industry, 
but the whole drift of Government policy was in the direction of state 
participation in the copper industry. This was especially the case in June 
1969 when President Frei of Chile announced the "agreed nationalization" of 
17/ 
the two operating companies belonging to Anaconda. - The basis of the deal 
was that Chile would acquire 51 per cent of the shares and pay for them at 
book value over twelve years at 6 per cent interest. It also had the option 
to acquire the remaining 49 per cent between 1973 and 1982, at a valuation 
based on earnings. Even before Frei had come to power in 1964, the smaller 
group in Chile, Kennecott, had offered the Government a 51 per cent interest 
in its El Teniente property. ýL/ - 
7.2.3 Mr. Faber's Arguments for Nationalization 
Zambia carefully watched developments in Chile and so by December 1968, 
when Mr. Michael Faber delivered his paper in Lusaka outlining a possible- 
17/ MARTIN 2p. cit. pages 158-159. 
18/ For an account of Chileanization see MORAN, T. Multinational 
Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1974. 
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scheme for the Government to acquire 51 per cent ownership in the mining 
companies he could begin by stating that "everybody knows that sooner or later 
the Government will take control of the industry. "ýL9/ 
Faber said that there was a "national need" to expand Zambia's future 
copper production by more than was at that time envisaged by the two major 
mining groups. He compared the plans for the expansion of the Zambian 
industry over the next five years with those of Chile, Peru, Canada and other 
countries. Capacity had to be increased to ensure that foreign exchange 
earnings would not fall if the copper price declined, as it was expected to in 
the early 1970s, and that employment in the mines was not cut back too 
sharply, thereby increasing the number of urbanized job seekers. 
The reasons that he' gave for why plans for future production were so 
modest were the companies' fears of world over-production and of a lower 
copper price, the. uncertainty that hovered over their fate and made them 
require a large prospective profit before undertaking investment, the royalty 
and export tax arrangements, the fear that the cost increases that had 
occurred - and those that might be forced on them thereafter - could render 
future mines at anticipated copper prices unprofitable or only marginally 
profitable and, to a lesser extent, the difficulty of raising new capital to 
finance any large expansion. 
In this latter connection, Faber argued that there appeared no likelihood 
that either of the main mining groups would be will . ing or able to raise fresh 
equity capital on acceptable terms to finance expansion; fears of 
nationalization had depressed share prices and increased yields, making new 
19/ FABER M. L. O. "A Future for Zambia's Copper industry" in FABER, 
M. L. O. and POTTER J. G., Towards Economic Independence, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1971, pages 126-134. 
- 182 - 
equity capital very expensive or impossible to raise. On the other hand, the 
companies were prepared to use retained profits, to the extent to which it was 
not possible to distribute them outside the country, and loans from other 
sources to finance expansion. 
Some of the factors inhibiting expansion, in particular the tax 
structure, could have been changed without nationalization and Mr. Faber's 
proposals indeed included a 40 per cent commutation of the combined export tax 
and royalty in exchange for the Government's acquiring 19 of its 51 per cent 
ownership of the properties. However, he saw nationalization as necessary 
because no promises from the Government not to nationalize the properties 
would affect the market's opinion of the companies' share, and therefore their 
ability to raise capital, in the face of the restrictions on the payment of 
dividends, the amendments, proposed in December 1968 and to be voted on in 
June 1969, to those constitutional clauses dealing with the acquisition of 
property, and a genuine feeling that important people in Government were 
dissatisf ied with the position and the performance of the companies. 
Furthermore, Faber commented that while the companies might be able to find 
finance to develop the mines when the copper price was high, this would not be 
the case when the price fell. 
7.2.4 The President's Reasons for Nationalization in 1969 
Within a year of Mr. - Faber's proposals, the President, in August 
1969201 announced that the Government would invite the companies to offer the 
20/ KAUNDA K. "Towards Complete Independence" The Matero Speech 
August 11,1969, Lusaka, Zambian Information Services, 1969. Extracts are 
given in FABER, M. L. O., and POTTER, J. G., oD. i. pages 127-134. -2ý-t 
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Government a 51 per cent shareholding in their properties and that it would 
pay for this share on the basis of the book value of the properties. He 
repeated the exact words that he had used at Mulungushi in 1968 about the 
companies' not expanding their properties. To further expansion, the system 
whereby the companies held mineral rights over large parts of the country in 
perpetuity without having any obligation to develop the minerals within them 
was abolished. Henceforth all the country's mineral rights reverted to the 
state and companies had to apply for exclusive prospecting and exploration 
licences which were valid for four and three years only and carried minimum 
expenditure Obligations. If a mineral were found within the areas, the 
Government could grant a 25 year exclusive mining licence over the property, 
which would give the State the right to obtain 51 per cent of the mining 
venture formed after it had paid its share of the pre-production costs. Those 
areas where no prospecting activity had taken place since Independence would 
revert to the State, and new investors were to be encouraged to look for 
minerals in the areas the companies would abandon. The President's intention 
was, clearly, to make the companies concentrate their exploration effort and 
to introduce competition. 
The change in the prospecting r4gime need not have implied the 
nationalization of the existing mines, and indeed did not come as much of a 
surprise. Nationalization was, though, a surprise. The President justified 
this as setting the "Nation well and truly towards its economic independence", 
which could not be achieved "without the Nation acquiring full control of the 
existing mines". 
The President made it clear that he could not follow Faber's plan and pay 
any money immediately for its shares or remit taxes as the revenues were needed 
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for the country's development programme. Payment was, then, to come from 
future dividends. Lastly, all the companies in which the Government would 
have control would be run on "strictly businesslike lines". 
7.3 The Cancellation of the Management Contracts 
Zambia was and is still clearly very dependent on its copper industry. 
In 1968, the year before nationalization, the industry contributed 39 per cent 
of net domestic product, 60 per cent of Government revenue and 96 per cent of 
exports. The future of the country was, then, dependent upon the 
decisions taken in the boardrooms of the mining companies and, to that extent, 
the country could be said to have lacked "economic independence". The 1969 
reform did, then, achieve economic independence in that the Government's 
nominees, the "A" directors, were in a majoritY of six to five on the boards 
of directors of the reconstituted companies. However, the former owners were 
given management contracts that allowed them to appoint the Managing Directors 
of the companies, made them responsible for providing technical services, 
including the provision of personnel, and for selling and marketing the copper 
produced. 
12-1 
Furthermore, the "B" directors, representing the 49 per cent 
private interest in the companies, had a veto in so far as all expansion plans 
and appropriations out of profits for capital expenditure or expenditure on 
21/ Zambian Mining Year Book 1973 Kitwe, page 20. 
22/ Details of the contracts with Roan Selection Trust are contained -in 
Anvendices to Exolanatorv Statement of Roan Selection Trust Ltd. for Meetinqs 
of Shareholders to be held on 6th August 1970,30th June 1970 and in BOSTOCK 
and HARVEY, C., Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, New York, Praeger, 
1972, Appendix A. 
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exploration or prospecting had to be approved by both the "A" and "B" voters 
separately. Moreover, these "B" directors were specifically required not to 
approve any undertaking for which the companies could not raise money on 
"commercially attractive terms". Also, all profits not appropriated for 
capital, prospecting or exploration spending or needed for working capital had 
to be paid out as dividends. The Government could not then devote mining 
profits (as distinct, of course, from its tax revenues from the mines) to 
non-mining activities. Finally, the Government undertook not to increase the 
rate of taxation on mining profits or to impose exchange controls as long as 
the bonds it had issued for its 51 per cent share in the mining properties 
were not redeemed. 
In return, though, the Zambian Government acquired the management 
services of the former owners who were to provide their services with the 
intention that the business affairs and operations of the new companies should 
"be maintained in a manner no less efficient and to an extent and standard no 
less than those before lst January 1970, and which shall be directed towards 
the optimisation of production and profit". 
Z3/ 
The contract could be 
cancelled by the Government-owned companies before the end of 1979 if they 
gave two years' notice and if the -management's performance of their duties 
should fall below the standard maintained during private ownership. 
? 4/ 
These management contracts did not last until 1980 for, in August 1973, 
the President redeemed the balance of the bonds, which Zambia had issued and 
cancelled the management contracts. He criticized them for the reasons given 
23/ Appendices to Explanatory Statement 2E. cit. page G-1. 
24/ Ibid. page G-3. 
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above, and also for the management fees being excessive and for there being no 
provision for the recruitment of Zambians into the industry. 
L5/ 
However, 
the companies insisted that they be compensated for their loss of earnings. 
They were in a strong position since, fearing some break of the 
nationalization agreements by the Government, they had insisted in 1970 that 
these stipulate that disputes be submitted to binding and conclusive 
arbitration by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes of the World Bank. If Zambia had not complied with the results of 
such arbitration, it would have automatically been denied further Bank loans. 
It was only after a year of dispute and in the face of the threat from Amax of 
being brought before the Centre that at the end of 1974 the Government agreed 
to pay Anglo American $52 million and Amax $34 million. 
26/ 
These payments were an unanticipated cost of cancelling these 
agreements. Leaving aside any effects on business confidence, the other cost 
of doing so was that the Government used part of a $150 million loan it had 
25/ Wall Street Journal, 4th September 1973, page 3. For a detailed 
criticism from the Zambian point of view, of the management contracts, vide 
USHEWOKUNZE C. M. "The Legal Framework of Copper Production in Zambia" and 
SIMWINGA G. K. "The Multinational Corporations and a Third World Host 
Government in a Mixed Enterprise: the quest for control in the copper mining 
industry of Zambia", in SEIDMAN A. (ed) Natural Resources and National 
Welfare: the case of Copper Praeger, New York, 1975. 
26/ However, as the operating companies and not the Zambian Government 
were to pay the compensation, Amax and Anglo American wefe in effect 
contributing to their own compensation (Mining Journal September 13,1974, 
page 229). 
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earlier raised at 13 per cent on the Eurodollar market, on the understanding 
that the funds were to go towards expanding capacity, to repay the balance of 
$210 million at 6 per cent that it owed Amax and Anglo-American. 
27/ 
It was though, henceforth able to raise taxes and impose exchange 
controls. Moreover, it gained further control of the industry with the 
establishment of a Metal Marketing Company, wholly owned by the Government, 
and charged with handling all the metals sales of the Zambian industry. 
once again, the Government claimed that the private owners of the mines 
were not expanding capacity sufficiently rapidly-, because the companies were 
reluctant to plough their profits back into expansion, mining activity had 
been "almost brought to a haltN, according to the ministry of Planning's 
Economic Report for 1973.28/ 
7.4 An Assessment of the Reasons for Nationalization 
7.4.1 The overall objectives 
This review of the events leading up to and following the 1969 
nationalization shows that, while reasons of national pride were paramount, 
economic factors played an important role in determining Government policy. 
Its position was clear- the private owners were not doing enough to expand 
27/ Cf Financial Times October 10th, 1973. 
28/ Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Planning and Finance, Econom ic 
Report 1973, Lusaka. Presented to the National Assembly, January 1974, page 
181. 
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production, increased production was necessary to increase Government revenues 
and these were needed for the country's development. As the Zambian 
Government is a price taker rather than maker, there was no possible conflict 
between a high level of production and high Government revenues; the Zambian 
Government could not behave like a monopolist and decrease production to boost 
the price of copper and therefore its own revenues. 
There were secondary issues involved, Zambianization being the most 
important one, and these will be examinedl but clearly the prime indicators of 
the industry's performance will be the revenue the Government obtained from 
the industry, and the scale of the expansion in production. 
7.4.2 Internal problems with the reasons for nationalization 
It must be pointed out that the reasons for the nationalization and the 
assumption of management control that we have discussed above do present some 
difficulties. 
. In the first place, the criticisms of the companies' performance, upon 
which so much of these measures' justification depended, were often vague and 
were particularly so in one respect-. they did not document the companies' 
reluctance to expand capacity by detailing which were the projects they could 
have embarked upon but which they declined to for the variety of reasons 
outlined above - fear of taking risks, reluctance to reinvest profits rather 
than repatriate them. Faber stated that "It is known that there are 
substantial ore-bodies which could be mined but which in present circumstances 
are not likely to be so ... " and said that the national need to expand 
production by more than was envisaged by the companies "can be argued but 
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29/ 
in this paper is taken as given". 
The companies consistently denied 
that they were anything but vigorous in developing the industry. Sir Ronald 
Prain was a persistent advocate of this position. In 1964, he said that the 
implication in the Seers Report that the companies had not developed their 
concessions as vigorously as they might have done was "entirely without 
foundation". ýLo/ He argued that if the royalty situation were corrected, 
then world economic conditions, the financial climate in Zambia and the 
prospects for the copper market would determine the amount of investment that 
could be generated to put extra deposits to work. He repeated this view even 
after the nationalization in 1969 when he stated that "our policy of expansion 
has been fully pursued during the years since Independence and ... no mining 
development has been inhibited through lack of finance, or affected by 
previous dividend policy, but only by the time-consuming process of technical 
study and appraisal of viability and, of course, by -the constraints imposed by 
the royalty and export tax formulae". 
31/ 
29/ FABER 2p. 
-iLit. 
pages 62,63. 
30/ PRAIN, SIR RONALD Selected Papers Volume IV 1964-1967 London, RST 
_Group 
1968, page 10. 
31/ PRAIN, SIR RONALD "State Participation in the Zambian Mining 
Industry" August 22,1969. Appendix to Roan Selection Trust, nStatement by 
the Chairman" to accompany Annual Report 1969. Page B. 
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Independent observers supported Sir Ronald's claim as to the performance 
of his group. The Mining Journal wrote in November 1968 that the achievements 
of the copper industry since Independence had been "remarkable" and that the 
increased rate of activity had been due to "vigorous expansion programmes" 
32/ 
undertaken by the two groups. 
By introducing this argument about the companies' lack of interest in 
developing their properties without adequately supporting it, the Seers Report 
can be said to have helped advance the action which it said it wished to 
forestall - namely the nationalization of the industry. Charges and 
counter-charges as to the companies' policies helped prevent them and the 
Government from sitting down and working out the type of agreement that the 
Mission proposed. 
The Seers Report was a cautious document in that it saw the dangers 
inherent in nationalization, both on the performance of the industry and also 
on Government revenues which-would become more volatile if they came from an 
equity interest rather than from such taxes as royalties. Moreover, the 
Report argued that not much could be done to change the level of employment in 
the industry. 
Mr. Faber, on the other hand, argued the need to increase production so 
as to maintain employment. However, these increases in production would, as 
he correctly saw, be coming on the market when it would already be 
over-supplied. He did not address the problem of whether increasing capacity 
at the end of the 1960s was really justified - whether, in fact, the Zambians 
would find themselves within a few years with excess capacity on their hands 
32/ Mining Journal November 22,1968, page 393. 
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because of their adherence to a future agreement with other producers to cut 
back production in order to maintain prices. Anti-trust legislation would 
have prevented the private companies from entering into a formal agreement 
with other producers to cut production, but if the industry were nationalized, 
this inhibition would have been removed. 
Mr. Faber had argued in favour of creating conditions that allowed future 
production to be "maximized".! -3/ The management agreements, though, 
specified that the companies should operate their properties with a view 
towards an "optimisationn of production and profit. This could be a semantic 
difference, but in chapter 2 we saw how the maximization of future production 
is not the correct objective for the owners of a mining property, or rather 
not a sufficiently clear description of it. "Optimisation", which would 
suggest that the reserves are exploited to yield the maximum net present value 
over time, is a preferable description of what the owners should aim for. 
Indeed it is one that the companies themselves used. 
14/ 
In using this term and in specifying that the companies should continue 
to operate the properties as efficiently as before nationalization, the 
Gover'nment appeared to support the companies' view that they had followed the 
correct policy before nationalization. Moreover, the President said that the 
new companies would be run along strictly businesslike lines. If indeed 
strictly business considerations - for instance the fear of adding to an 
impending copper surplus, which Mr. Faber suggested was one of the reasons thd 
. 
23/ FABER 2p. cit. page 62. 
34/ PRAIN, SIR RONALD "Mining and the public interest" Address to the 
Mining and Metallurgical Society of America, New York, April 29th, 1958. 
Reprinted in Selected Papers, Volume 11,1958-1960 London, RST Group, 1961, 
page 3. 
- 192 - 
Zambian producers were hesitant about enlarging their own capacit 
35 
- were 
to continue to apply, then it is difficult to see how the pre- and 
post-nationalization performances of the industry could be expected to differ, 
and, therefore, why the Government was so critical of the performance of the 
industry under private ownership. 
This apparent difficulty would have been resolved if the Government had 
thought that it was expropriating the companies' assets. In this case, even 
though the performance of the industry might not have changed, the Government 
would still have been making a net gain in recovering, without payment, all 
the rents and normal profits from the mines. However, the Zambian Government 
never advanced this as a reason for nationalization and always claimed that it 
paid the companies adequate compensation. Furthermore, one of the arguments 
in favour of state participation was that it would actually help the companies 
by removing uncertainty and, after the nationalization actually took place, it 
was claimed that the companies were reasonably happy about the deal they 
obtained. 
361 
7.5 The way in which nationalization took place 
This issue of whether the companies were satisfied by the nationalization 
is an important one, as it will help answer whether any real change in the 
industry was effected by it, and, therefore, whether the industry's 
performance could be expected to be different. 
The possibility of State partibipation was certainly something that the 
companies had long been aware of. In his 1981 account, Sir Ronald Prain 
showed how the group considered that the attainment of political independence 
35/ FABER op. cit. page 63. 
36/ Cf BOSTOCK M. and HARVEY C., a. cit., page 178 and POTTER J. G. "The 
51 per cent Nationalization of the Zambian Copper Mines" in FABER and POTTER 
op. cit., pages 118,125. 
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by Zambia would involve some degree of State ownership of the mines. . 
27/ 
Both Roan Selection Trust and the Zambian Anglo American group had accepted 
the Seers recommendations that the Government acquire a stake in the 
industry. 
1-8/ 
Roan Selection Trust at that time h. ad thought of the State 
acquiring a 20 per cent interest immediately and increasing this over a period 
of time to 40 per cent, but with other countries, and particularly Chile under 
President Frei, taking over majority ownership of their mines, it became clear 
that the Zambian Government would eventually do the same. Sir Ronald Prain 
felt that it would be better if this were accomplished by negotiation and in 
an amicable atmosphere and that a long delay would allow political pressures 
to build up that might result in a much worse deal for the private 
shareholders. Accordingly, about 18 months before the August 1969 takeover, 
he approached the Zambian Government privately and offered to negotiate 51 per 
cent Government ownership with it. American Metal Climax had to be convinced 
of the wisdom of this offer, but finally accepted Sir Ronald's arguments. The 
Anglo-American group did not go along with this proposal. 
As nationalization was not arrived at as a result of a private 
negotiation, it is impossible for us to compare what happened in 1969 with 
what might have happened in 1967 or 1968. However, it is clear that the 
arrangement finally arrived at was not the kind of one that Roan Selection 
Trust, at least, would have welcomed as removing uncertainty. 
Evidence for this came from the testimony under oath of the senior 
directors of the Trust in a court case in the United States in 1970 over the 
terms under which Amax proposed to buy out the public shareholders of Roan 
37/ PRAIN 2p. cit. (1981) pages 172,223. 
ý-8/ PRAIN 22. cit. (1968), page 11. The rest of this paragraph is based 
upon interviews with senior executives of Roan Selection Trust. 
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Selection Trust. 
39/ 
They argued, and the judge, Thomas Masterson, allowed 
their testimony to stand, that they did not believe the consideration to be 
paid by the Government was fair compensation, that they would never have 
chosen book value, which the Government offered to pay, as a basis for 
39/ SKLAR R. L. Corporate Power in an African State: the Political 
Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia. Berkeley, University of 
California Press. 1975. 
Pages 49-50 contain an account of the end of Roan Selection Trust as an 
independent company that is more readily accessible - and shorter - than the 
court documents referred to. Af ter the acquisition of 51 per cent of Roan 
Selection Trust's mining properties by the Zambian Government, its other 
assets could have been transferred out of the country as Zambian Anglo 
American's assets had been transferred to a new -company, Zambia Copper 
Investments, incorporated in Bermuda in November 1969. The board of Roan 
Selection Trust, meeting without Amax representatives, favoured regenerating 
the Trust as an international mining house domiciled in Luxembourg or the 
United States but eventually found this idea impractical. This, according to 
Philadelphia District Court Judge, Thomas Masterson, put Amax in a position of 
strength when it set about acquiring the 57.7 per cent interest in Roan 
Selection Trust it did not own. He concluded that Sir Ronald Prain was 
"bargaining from a position of weakness in a situation which was inherently 
coercive to him and the public shareholders of Roan Selection Trust" while the 
Amax directors "were able to drive a hard bargain to" w; ýsh out the public 
shareholders as cheaply as possible while securing for Amax unique 
high-yielding assets. " (Kohn v. American Metal Climax Inc. and Roan Selection 
Trust Ltd. (D. C. Civil No. 70-933), Joint Appendix, pages 2,218 ff; and Wall 
Street Journal, November 27,1970, page 4). Masterson said Amax was 
interested in acquiring Roan so that it could use its cash for financing its 
own foreign investments, but he decided that it had violated the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 in that an explanatory statement sent to Roan 
shareholders contained "materially misleading information" and omitted other 
vital data. 
It should be noted that the dispute was between Amax and dissident Roan 
shareholders and not between Amax and the Zambian Government. In fact, when, 
after a shareholders' meeting in Lusaka, 85.5 per cent of all Roan 
shareholders other than Amax approved the acquisition of Roan by Amax (Wall 
Street Journal, August 7,1970, page 14) and the High Court of Zambia upheld 
the terms of the amalgamation as being just and equitable t& all shareholders, 
the Federal Appeals Court had to conclude that the underlying fairness of 
Amax's acquisition could no longer be questioned (ibid, April 3,1972, page 
6). In the opinion of the present writer, Sir Ronald Prain and the other 
non-Amax board members of Roan Selection Trust obtained an extremely good deal 
froin Amax for the non-Amax Roan shareholders -a deal that, at no time after 
1970, would ever have been offered by Amax. 
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ccxnpensation and that the consent of the Trust's management and Board to the 
agreement was not in any real sense voluntary. -IO/ The management contracts, 
which were thought by some observers to be very generous, ýLi/ were thought by 
many members of the Board of Amax to be insufficiently' remunerative. 
42/ 
It can, then, be concluded that the nationalization of 1969 and the 
subsequent cancellation of the management contracts produced a very different 
result from that which would have been arrived at by completely free 
negotiations. In that case, the Government would have had a large and 
probably even majority, shareholding in the existing companies, the management 
would have been more independent of the State, although this is not to say 
that it would not have included many Zambian citizens. As was clear to those 
involved in advising the Zambian companies in 1969, the management contracts 
did not give the companies the same control over operations as they had 
enjoyed before. Without a majority on the board, the companies no longer had 
4 
the last word. 
ý-3/ 
As Ian MacGregor, then Chairman of ý. max, stated "we were 
facing a new and completely untried situation. Our management were now going 
to be under the control of a foreign government. When things pass into the 
40/ Kohn v. American Metal Climax Inc. and Roan Selection Trust Ltd., 
op. cit., Testimony of Robert Page and Sir Ronald Prain and Findings of Fact, 
Opinion, Conclusions of Law and Order of Judge Masterson, November 25,1970. 
'Joint Appendix pages 340a-341a, 1280a and 2177a. 
41/ Cf Financial Times October 10,1973. 
42/ Interview with a senior director of Amax. 
43/ Testimony of Morris Wright in Harold E. Kohn v. Amax. 2p. ! Lit. page 
507a. 
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hands of government operation, they are not necessarily as efficient as they 
were before". 
44/ 
It can be seen, then, that to those involved at the time the change in 
1969 was a very important one. 
7.6 Reasons that were not given for Nationalization 
Transnational corporations have frequently been the object of much 
criticism for unethical business practices or for meddling in the affairs of 
the host country. 
In the case of the nationalization of the Zambian copper mines, such 
issues did not arise. The two major companies, Zambian Anglo-American and 
Roan-Selection Trust, were registered in Zambia, as were all their mining 
company s ubsidiaries. Their books were audited by Deloitte, Pender, 
Griffiths, Annan and Co. which, as Deloitte, Hawkins and Sells, continues to 
audit the books of the nationalized mining industry. 
The Zambian companies did make payments for services incurred abroad, but 
this was inevitable in the case of large mining companies serving consumers 
world-wide. There has, as far as the present writer is aware, not been any 
_criticism 
of the companies for using excessive head office expenses or 
payments to subsidiaries to transfer profits out of the country. Furthermore, 
the possibility -of using transfer prices to distort the true picture of their 
operations was very limited in the case of the Zambian copper mining industry 
44/ Testimony of Ian MacGregor ibid page 327a. 
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which produced refined copper, whose price is publicly quoted, and whose 
inputs of capital equipment and stores could in most cases be accurately 
costed. 
As regards the companies' political activi ties, by the time of 
nationalization, Zambia had been independent for five years and almost fifteen 
years had passed since the first major steps had been taken on the way to 
African advancement in the industry. 
Moreover, the Zambian Government, as the Government of the country in 
which the companies were registered and in which they had their assets, had 
all the means at its disposal to force them to obey the laws of the land and 
to avoid illegal political activities. The possibilities of conflicts oi 
interest existed. For instance, if Roan Selection Trust, in which the 
American Metal Climax and American shareholders held the majority of shares, 
had registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United 
States, as Amax had wanted it to, this would have meant that the company would 
have had to refer to the political and economic problems of Zambia in its 
reports. At the time of the Rhodesia Unilateral Declaration of independence 
in 1965 when there was a threat of a cut-off of transport lines and power 
supplies, the Trust's directors thought it would have been very -difficult to 
_have 
given a full report of the situation that did not embarrass the 
Government of Zambia. This was one of the reasons they refused to register 
the company. . 
15/ 
Similarly, the Trust refused Amax's instructions not to 
45/ Testimony of Sir Ronald Prain in ibid page 1267a. 
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sell cobalt to communist countries, arguing that only the Government of Zambia 
could issue such instructions. 
A6/ 
The present writer has not seen evidence 
of similar possible conflicts of interest being resolved at the expense of 
Zambia. 
The foregoing does not imply that the Zambian Government was happy about 
the way that the companies conducted their business - simply that it did not 
accuse them of acting improperly or illegally. As we saw, it thought that the 
companies were expatriating too much of their profits and that they were not 
expanding production sufficiently rapidly, and later, that their management 
fees were excessive. However, these and other aspects of the companies' 
operations did not involve any question of illegality. 
They really revolve around the economic question of comparing the 
consequences of having an industry run by private foreign capital - such as 
adherence to commercial principles as the companies understand them, the need 
to pay out dividends to attract capital, and to pay at or even above the 
market rate for management services - with the consequences, including those 
to efficiency and profitability, of having it run under Government ownership. 
In the next chapters, we will be analyzing whether in the Zambian case the 
change from private to Government control did affect the efficiency of 
operations and, more generally, whether it allowed the Government to attain 
the development goals it set itself. 
46. / lbid page 1290a. 
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7.7 Summary 
There is little doubt that the main reason for the nationalization of the 
Zambian copper industry was one of economic nationalism - the feeling that 
Zambia should exercise her permanent sovereignty over her natural resources. 
However, economic reasons were given for the desirability of nationalization. 
It was argued that the companies were not increasing production and opening up 
new mines sufficiently rapidly, that under them employment would probably 
decline and that their investment performance waS poor. 
The nationalization of 1969 gave the Zambian Government majority 
ovwnership but not management control of the industry and these arrangements 
were criticized. In particular, it was argued that the minority shareholders 
had a veto on expansion plans, and on the use of unappropriated profits, that 
the management fees were excessive and that there had been no provision for 
the recruitment of Zambians into the industry. The cancellation of these 
contracts allowed the Government to assume complete control of the industry 
and to be totally responsible for its development. 
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Chapter 8 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE INDUSTRY AFTER NATIONALIZATION 
From the preceding analysis, it can be seen that nationalization was 
expected to bring about an improvement, or at least. no deterioration, in the 
performance of the industry as assessed by the variables examined in Chapter 
6. We will go through its performance under each heading, as in that chapter, 
trying to give explanations for any difference in performance except for those 
specifically dealt with in the following Chapter, 9, namely the changes in the 
copper market and the effects of the struggle with the minority r4gime in 
Southern Rhodesia and the attempt to develop new routes for Zambia's trade 
that did not pass through its minority-ruled southern neighbours. 
8.1 Production after nationalization 
Table 5.2 and Graph 6.1 showed that one of the prime objectives of 
nationalization, namely an increase in the production of copper, was never 
attained and even at the present time shows little sign of being attained 
copper production did not increase. By 1983, production, at 515.2 thousand 
tonnes was below the total of 719.5 thousand tonnes reached in 1969 or of 
576.4 thousand tonnes reached in 1960. As Graph 6.1 showed, the fall in 
Zambian production has been fairly steady since 1976. Moreover, Zambia's 
shares in world, the market economies' and the developing countries' 
production have all fallen steadily. It was-not the case, then, thý`t- Zambian 
production has fallen because it joined other producers in limiting production 
to stabilize the market, as happened in the early 19601s. 
8.1.1 The effects of the Mufulira disaster on production 
In the early years of nationalization, the disaster that struck the 
Mufulira mine in September 1970 can explain some of fall in production. In 
this disaster, 89 men were killed by a cave-in and inrush of mud into the 
underground workings which reduced the mine's capacity drastically. 
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Production, in terms of recoverable copper, which had been 165,507 tonnes in 
1969/1970, the financial year before the disaster, was only 71,769 tonnes in 
1970/1971. -! 
/ 
By the end of 1976, the rehabilitation of the mine was 
completed and the mine's production was about 130,000 tonnes a year. In 
1977, production rose to 142,000 tonnes of recoverable copper. -2/ 
At the time of the disaster there had been plans to increase the capacity 
4/ 
of the Mufulira mine from 165,000 tonnes per year to 190,000 tonnes- , and 
to expand the mine's smelter capacity from 178,000 tonnes a year to 230,000 
tonnes to take care, not just of the mine's own expansion, but also Of 
increased production from other mines in the Roan Selection Trust group. -V 
The expansions in smelter capacity could only come iri large blocks - as whole 
new furnaces would have to be added. In ? 4ufulirals case, the expansion in 
smelter capacity could only have been up to 230,000 tonnes, for by then there 
would have been very little room left in the central plant for additional 
equipmen t6/. To this exte-fft 230,000 tonnes was the natural maximum capacity 
of the mine's plant. As a result of the accident, though, the Mufulira mine's 
rate of production was permanently reduced to a maximum of 160,000 tonnes of 
Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1971, page 22. 
Zambia Mining Yearbook 1976, page 8. 
3/ Roan Consolidated Mines, "Statement by the- Chairman" to accompany Annual 
Report 1980, page 3. 
4/ Roan Selection Trust 'ýStatement by the Chairman, 
. 
Sir Ronald L. Prain, 
OBE" to accompany Annual Report 1968. 
5/ RST Group of Companies "Statement by the Chairman, Sir Ronald L. Prain, 
OBE, " to accompany Annual Report 1969. 
6/ Interview with Sir Ronald Prain, August 1983. 
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copper. Instead of the cheaper block-caving methods that were being used at 
the time of the disaster, more expensive sandfill methods had to be resorted 
to as a result of the disaster. 
7/ 
The effects of the Mufulira disaster were, then, to limit the feasible 
production from the mine to the levels of production reached before the 
disaster. In the early years after the disaster, too, the energies of Roan 
Consolidated Mines were diverted from possible expansion programmes elsewhere 
to the rehabilitation of the mine. By 1976, though, rehabilitation was 
largely over and so after this year the company's production could have been 
expected to have been at roughly the level of 1969/70 and to have risen 
subsequently. However, as Table 5.3 showed, the company's production never 
reached the levels of 1969/70 and indeed fell after 1974/1975. 
The effect of the Mufulira diasaster on costs can best be appreciated 
from Table 5.12. Mining costs per tonne rose from K 2.98 in 1970 to K 4.77 in 
1911-. However, these costs fell after 1971 and by 1973 were lower than those 
at Luanshya, just as they had been before the disaster. Even though they rose 
subsequently they still remained below Luanshya's costs. It should be borne 
in mind that the later figures for Luanshya included Baluba and so they did 
not simply reflect the increasing costs as the old Roan Antelope mine 
approached exhaustion. In sum, given that Mufulira accounted for about 20 per 
c5int of Zambian copper production in the late 1970s, and that its mining costs 
were 
_below 
those at Luanshya, it would be difficult to maintain that the 
diasaster and the need to resort to sand-fill methods of mining could be 
responsible for all the increase in costs that might have occurred in Zambia. 
7/ Roan Consolidated Mines. Annual Report 1978, page 34. 
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Although the Mufulira disaster can be held partly responsible for the 
fall in the Roan Consolidated Mines' output, at least in the early years, it 
should have had no effect on Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines' output. The 
Nchanga Company's production did indeed rise to a maximum in 1972/73 of 440 
thousand tonnes. After that year, though, it declined, on the whole steadily, 
to reach 356.5 thousand tonnes in 1980/81. There was, then, not a marked 
difference in the performance of the two companies, at least after the 
mid-1970s: production of both fell away. 
8.1.2 The effects of the switch towards cobalt on production 
Another factor that may have influenced the fall in copper production was 
the Zambians' decision to boost cobalt production. The primary reason for an 
increase in production of cobalt was that cobalt ores were found in the mines 
being developed or at existing mines. One of the largest cobalt producers was 
Baluba which had been discovered before the war but whose development was 
delayed until the other properties, including Chibuluma and Chambishi, had 
been opened up. Its capital costs in relation to expected output were not as 
favourable as for other properties, 
i/ 
and cobalt prices were not high enough 
to justify development. Eventually, Baluba was opened up after 1969 to 
repiace rather than to add to declining production at Luanshya. Production 
started in 1973. Baluba's ores contain about 0.14 per cent cobalt and the 
cobalt from this mine, together with that from Chibuluma, is treated at the 
Chambishi roast leach electrowinning plant. 
In the Zambian Anglo American group, Nkana had long been a cobalt 
producer. However, in 1979, cobalt ores were also found in the Nchanga Lower 
Orebody underground and production commenced in early 1980. 
8/ vide CUNNINGIMM, S. J. , The Copper Industry in Zambia, New York, Praeger, 
1981, pages 104-106. 
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At this time, producers were optimistic about cobalt. In May 1978, the 
Shaba province of Zaire was invaded by irregulars from Angola and it was 
feared that the country's cobalt output would take a long time to recover and 
that supplies on the world market would be further tightened. A situation of 
tight supplies was expected to last until at least 1983. -21 
Investment in cobalt facilities must be seen against this background. 
Also, rather than go directly into projects to expand copper production from 
new or existing mines, investment in the 1970's increasingly tended to go 
towards projects designed to cut costs, to obtain copper from previously-mined 
material, and to boost the output of cobalt. Thus, at the same time, in 1979, 
that Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. was pursuing a policy of 
restricting capital expenditure, 
1-0 / 
it was planning to invest in expanding 
the production of cobalt 
II/ 
whose producer price in February of that year 
stood at $25 per lb., as opposed to $6.85 in the previous May. 
2: 2/ 
By 1980, 
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines had arranged for finance, amounting to K108 
million, for its cobalt projects, ýL3 
/ 
of which the most important was a roast 
leach-electrowin cobalt plant at Rokana. Similarly, in 1976 construction 
started on expanding the leach plant at Chambishi to increase the company's 
copper output and its cobalt production from 500 tonnes a year to 2,400 by 
9/ Mining Annual Review, 1979, page 81. 
. 
10/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1979, page 17. 
Il/ Ibid., page 6-7. 
12/ Ibid, page 15. 
13/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1980, page 17. 
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1978. This occurred at a time when Roan Consolidated Mines was striving to 
otherwise reduce its capital expenditures. 
14/ 
The cobalt projects did lead to a rise in Zambian production of cobalt, 
from 2,052 tonnes in 1970 to 3,309 tonnes in 1980, and to an increase in the 
gross revenue from this metal from K4.52 million to K141.7 million between 
those two years. In the same period, the value of copper production rose from 
K648.0 million to K955.4, so it can be seen that the increase in the value of 
cobalt production equalled 45 per cent of the increase in the value of copper 
production. 
15/ 
Any such comparison is, of course, dependent upon the sales prices of 
copper and cobalt. In 1978/79 when Roan Consolidated Mines was hoping to 
produce 2,400 tonnes of cobalt which would provide a net benefit to the gross 
profit on sales of K70 million, it thought that "for a number of years demand 
for cobalt will exceed supply and consequently high prices will 
prevail. " 
16/ 
However, the assumptions on which these fOriýcasts were based 
were soon belied by events. In particular, production in Zaire was hardly 
affected by the 1978 invasion. By 1982, the free market price of cobalt had 
reached an all time low in real levels of $3.50 per pound and, Zambia 
deliberately curtailed its production. 
L7-/ 
In the financial year, 1982/83, 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines' cobalt sales amounted to only K49.8 million 
as against electrolytic copper sales of K867.8 million. 
LB-/- 
14/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Re22rt 1976, page 2. 
15/ All figures from Republic of Zambia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, 
Central Statistical Office, Lusaka. 
16/ Roan Consolidated Mines "Statement by the Chairman" Annual Report 1978, 
page 6. 
17/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
. 
1983 Annual Report; pages 13 and 6. 
18/ Ibid, page 12. 
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From the preceding account, it can be seen that Zambia seriously started 
expanding cobalt production in the late 1970's, when its copper production was 
already slipping. Cobalt production was expected to add extra revenue, rather 
than to actually replace copper production. Investment in copper operations 
was being cut back, but the intention was still to maintain production. The 
fall in copper production cannot then be explained by the increase in cobalt 
production. In any case, after 1980, cobalt production fell and was only 
2,407 tonnes in 1983. 
8.2 Productivity and efficiency 
8.2.1 The relationship between productivity and production 
As Table 5.3, and graphs 6.3 and 6.4 showed, productivity -both in terms 
of copper and ore output per employee and per local employee fell off sharply 
after 1969. The graphs showed that productivity tended to follow the trend in 
production - this was particularly noticeable in the case of productivity in 
terms of ore production. In th-e pre-nationalization period, though, 
production was on a generally rising trend and so falls in production that 
took place in 1961,1962 and 1966 were reflected by falls in productivity as 
the mines did not adjust their labour forces for such temporary shortfalls. 
However, since 1972 copper production, and, since 1974, ore output have been 
falling fairly steadily and the mines have not adjusted their labour forces to 
take account of this trend. Indeed, as Graph 6.10 makes clear, whereas the 
private companies had reduced their labour forces somewhat in years of falling 
production, 1961 and 1962, and after 1967, it was only in 1977 that the 
Zambian mines' labour force began to decline. Moreover, as Graph 6.4 
indicates, the productivity problem can be said to have become serious in 1972 
for although it was the peak productivity year of the post-nationalization 
years, it was not the year of peak ore production: productivity began to 
decline even before ore output did. 
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8.2.2 Productivity and the decline in grades 
The Zambian mines have been getting deeper and ore grades have been 
falling, which would make it more difficult to maintain production and 
productivity. In the period before nationalization, the grade of ore milled 
fell from 2.98 per cent in 1960 to 2.70 per cent in 1969, although it was only 
after 1965 that the decline was clearly evident. Grades continued to decline 
after nationalization, from 2.67 per cent in 1970 to 2.25 per cent in 1981, 
with the fall becoming most pronounced after 1975. The fall in grades after 
nationalization was, then, greater than the fall before. This will affect 
productivity expressed in terms of finished copper per employee rather than 
productivity expressed in terms of ore 6utput per employee, which -is, of 
course, not directly affected by the grade of ore extracted. 
8.2.3 Productivity and mining methods 
There is no single explanation for why the decline in grades before 1970 
was accompanied by a rise in productivity in terms of ore output and why the 
decline after 1970 was accompanied by a decline. Some of the mines, 
particularly Luanshya, were becoming more difficult to work, but new mining 
methods were being introduced to help compensate. In particular, the 
companies made progress towards mechanization in the years after 
Independence. For example, after November 1964 Mufulira introduced -a new 
method of miffing - cascade mining - into one section of its lower ore body as 
part of its mechanization programme. This method was expected not only to 
increase labour productivity but also to reduce to a minimum the pillars, that 
themselves contained ore, that were left between sections of the ore body 
after extraction in order to prevent caving: total ore recovery as a result 
increased from 70 to 84 per cent. 
19/ 
19/ World Mining (U. S. Edition), June 1966, page 14-15. 
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Just as mechanization tended to contain the increase in costs so, other 
things being equal, did the initial trend towards open pit operations. Open 
pits usually have the advantage over underground mines of enabling the 
material to be brought to the surface at considerably lower capital and 
current cost, since the costs of constructing underground workings, of 
ventilation, dust extraction and the prevention of caving are avoided. Their 
disadvantage is that overburden as well as ore has to brought to the surface 
and when the open pit becomes deep and the stripping ratios (i. e., the ratio 
of overburden to ore extracted) rise the cost of mining a ton of ore from an 
open pit can exceed the cost of extraction from underground workings. 
Table 8.1 shows that the percentage of ore production from open pits had 
risen from 10.8 per cent and zero in 1960 for the Zambian Anglo American and 
Roan Selection Trust groups respectively to 35.5 per cent and 11.6 per cent in 
1969. After 1969 the percentage of ore coming from open pit mines increased 
in the case of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. to reach a maximum of 
51.7 in 1979/80. The increase was proportionately smaller than that of the 
1960s. 
Only one mine, Chambishi, in the Roan Consolidated group was operated as 
an open pit, but after 1978/1979 the open pitwas closed and all ore came from 
the underground sections. --The maximum that the ore production from the 
group's open pits reached as a percentage of total ore production was only 
14.6 per cent, in 1971/72. 
Unfortunately figures on productivity, or production costs which can be 
used as a proxy, from open pit as opposed to underground workings are not 
readily available for Zambia. No production costs were given for the mines of 
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, which produced the greatest amount of ore 
from their open pits, particularly from Chingola. Also, no division was 
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Table 8.1 Zambian ore production by method of extraction 
(million tonnes and percentages) 
zamanglo/ Roan Selection Trust/ 
NCCM A/ Roan Consolidated h/ 
Total ore Percentage Total ore Percentage 
production from open production from open 
Year (mn tonnes pits (mn tonnes) pits 
1960 10.318 10.8 11.005 0.0 
1969 15.337 35.5 16.537 11.6 
1970 --c/ -- 16.148 9.6 
1971 21.1'ýA/ 41.9 12.849 13.8 
1972 17.989 42.9 14.189 14.6 
1973 18.371 43.9 15.794 14.1 
1974 18.235 42.4 16.983 11.7 
1975 19.028 44.9 15.982 9.2 
1976 17.786 45.8 15.831 10.6 
1977 17.330 46.0 15.325 8.3 
1978 16.532 48.4 14.798 8.8 
1979 17.153 50.7 15.497 8.4 
1980 16.880 51.7 11.079 0.0 
1981 16.523 51.5 13.579 0.0 
1982 15.939 n. a. 14.116 0.0 
1983 15.911 42.5 15.171 0.0 
1984 15.413 43.9 13.082 0.0 
Source: Roan Selection Trust, Roan Consolidated Mines, Bancroft 
Copper Mines Ltd., Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Rhokana 
Corporation, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Annual Reports. 
a/ Years ending March 31st, except for Bancroft 1960 and Rhokana 1960 
and 1969 when years ending- June 30th. Bwana Mkubwa and Kansanshi mines are 
included. After 1981, figures are for the Chingola, Konkola and Rokana 
divisions of ZCCM. 
b/ Years ending June 30th. After 1981, figures for for the Luanshya, 
Mufulira and Kalulushi divisions of ZCCM. 
c/ Omitted because of incompatible financial years. 
I/ For fifteen months ending March 31st 1971. 
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operated entirely by open pit methods and so it is not possible to judge costs 
by simply comparing, for example, the manpower/production ratios of different 
divisions. 
Mining costs were, though, given for Roan Consolidated Mines' properties 
until 1976/77 and those for Chambishi are given in Table 8.2. The costs of 
extracting a tonne of ore from the Chambishi open pit were multiplied by the 
ratio of total material extracted to ore extracted (1+stripping ratio) to 
arrive at the figure for the cost of mining one tonne of ore. The tonnage of 
material removed from the open pit is also given, as well as the costs of 
mining a tonne of ore by underground methods. 
It can be seen by comparing - the figures for the costs of producing a 
tonne of ore from the Chambishi open pit with the figures given in Table 5.12 
for the mining costs per tonne of ore from the other underground mines in the 
Roan Consolidated Mines Group that open pit mining was not necessarily a 
cheaper mining method than underground mining. The large underground mines, 
Luanshya and Mufulira, frequently had mining costs lower than did Chambishi's 
open pit. Moreover from Table 8.2 it can be seen that costs rose quite 
sharply after 1973 as the tonnage extracted from the open pit mine declined 
until, by 1977, costs were higher than at the underground sections. 
While no definite conclusions can be made just on the--basis of this 
revi&w of one mine, it would appear that the trend towards open pit operations 
did generally add to productivity in the 1960s as new mines were being opened 
up by the Zamanglo group, but that in the 1970s the impact was smaller. In 
the f irst place, the trend towards open pit operations slowed down, and, in 
the second place, the open pits themselves were becoming more mature, deeper 
properties where difficulties in ore extraction began to mount, leading to 
increasing costs. 
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Table 8.2 Chambishi Mine: Open pit and underground costs 1970-1977 
(Kwacha per tonne) 
Open Pit Open pit Underground 
Mining costs Mining Costs Stripping production mining costs per 
per tonne of per tonne of Ratio of material tonne of ore 
matdrial ore (mn tonnes) 
1970 0.53 3.58 5.76 9.08 
1971 0.55 4.22 6.68 12.75 
1972 0.52 3.62 5.96 12.74 
1973 0.46 3.25 6.07 13.58 
1974 0.59 4.07 5.90 12.42 
1975 0.73 6.59 8.02 11.10 
1976 1.15 6.88 4.98 8.67 




Source: Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Reports. 
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Even so, . open pit operations were still more efficient than underground 
mines if we are to judge by production costs. The figures for Chambishi 
showed that only in 1977, the year before the open pit closed, were production 
costs there higher than in the underground workings. Moreover, in 1978, of 
the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines divisions only Chingola, the division 
with the largest open pit production, was profitable. 
zo/ 
Finally, as in the 
1970's the trend towards open pit operations was slowed down rather than 
reversed, it is difficult to see how this could have led to a reversal in the 
productivity trend, from an increasing to a decreasing trend. 
8.2.4 Efficiency in the treatment plant 
The increasing amounts of ore removed from the Chingola open pit and the 
change in the ores extracted from that mine towards oxide ores meant that 
recoveries at the Nchanga Treatment plant went down, as shown in Table 5.8. 
The fall in the recovery rate does not, then, represent a fall in efficiency 
but rather the attempt to extract as much copper as possible from the material 
being brought to the surface. That there was no collapse in the efficiency of 
the Zambian treatment plants can be seen from the figures for the other mines, 
especially the underground mines, which treated predominantly sulphide ores. 
The total changes in the recovery rates between 1969 and 1983 were normally of 
the order of one percentage point. There were fluctuations from year to year 
of more than this, but these were often due to changes in the ores being 
treated. The TORCO plant was of much less importance than the other treatment 
plant as it treated about 100,000 tonnes of ore a year rather than the 4 
million or more tonnes of ore treated by the concentrator for Nkana's 
underground ore. As it was a new process, the relatively poor results at that 
plant are no reflection on the overall high levels of recovery at the other 
treatment plants. 
20/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report, 1978, page 3. 
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8.2.5 The accident rates 
The safety record of the Zambian mines after nationalization was, on the 
whole, good. The first year, 1970, was marred by the Mufulira disaster which 
led to a drastic increase in the fatalities. Howevert it was purely 
coincidental that the accident took place after nationalization as its genesis 
can be traced back to 1933 when concentrator tailings started to be poured 
into the depressions on the hangingwall side of the orebody. 
21/ 
Events were 
to prove that putting tailings over the orebody was an unsafe practice, for it 
was through a sinkhole, that developed beneath the surface accumulation of 
tailing that a million tonnes of tailing, rock and soil poured into the mine. 
With hindsight, it can be-said that, as the Zambian miners were hard rock 
miners, they should have sought advice from outside about soft materials 
behaviour. There were some worries about the tailings. Even before the 
disaster, doubts had been raised about the practice for after the Aberfan 
accident in Wales, in October 1966, Sir Ronald Prain wrote to 'Muffulira mine's 
management to obtain an assurance that there would be no slippage of the 
tailings.! -2/ It would, then, be unfair to attribute the Mufulira disaster 
to any slackness in safety precautions that followed nationalization. 
From 1969 until 1979, the accid. ent rates went down quite considerably as 
shown in Graph 6.5. However, in 1980, all three accident rates increased 
quite markedly. This was attributed "to the prevailing--difficulties in 
obta in ing qual if ied and experienced staff as well as equipment and 
spares. " 
23/ 
We argued in the previous chapter that the stabilization of the 
21/ Roan Consolidated Mines, "Statement by the Chairman, Mr. Dominic C. 
Mulaisho, to accompany Annual Report 1971, page 1. 
22/ Information from a conversation with Sir Ronald Prain in August 1983. 
23/ Zambia Mining Yearbook 1980, Kitwe, Zambia, 1981. 
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labour force caused by Zambianization helped the safety record. Now, 
apparently the wheel had gone full circle and problems were coming from the 
lack of experience of the other component of the labour force, expatriates. 
Also the economic difficulties the industry was suffering from were finally 
taking their toll on safety. 
8.3 The costs of production 
8.3.1 Nominal costs f. o. r. mine 
The nationalization of the industry was accompanied by the abolition of 
two taxes that were levied on production rather than profits -- mineral 
royal-ties and export taxes, the latter having been introduced in 1966. This 
has been taken into account in Table 5.10. The first column showed costs free 
on rail (f. o. r. ) at the mine-, and its break-down, which was not given in the 
years before nationalization, was shown in Table 5.11. The cost of sales was 
given in the last column of Table 5.16. - Both these figures were from the 
company reports. The difference between them was the sub-total made up of 
transport to an African port, handling and freight charges and administration 
and selling charges. I 
It can be seen from these figures that in absolute and percentage terms 
the greatest increase in costs came from costs f. o. r. mine. Between 1970 and 
1981, these increased by K1040 per t6nne or by 306 per cen't. Other costs 
increased by K193 per tonne or by 156 per_cent. As a result total costs of 
sales increased by K1233 or by 266 per cent. This last increase is much 
greater than that which occurred between 1960 and 1969, of 39 per cent. 
In the 1960's, the costs f. o. r. mine and cost of sales had sometimes 
fallen from one year to the other, and had only definitely established 
themselves at a much higher level than at the beginning bf the decade in 1967. 
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However, after nationalization, costs rose steadily. There was a sharp 
increase in 1971. This was partly due to the Mufulira disaster, but also to 
the change in accounting procedures described in 5.5.1. The figures for 1971 
were not, then, strictly comparable to those for. 1970. 
Only between 1977 and 1978 did the increase in costs appear to have been 
slowed down. In November. 1977, a commission of enquiry was appointed by the 
President of Zambia to look into the copper industry and recommend how 
production costs might be reduced. -Z-4/ At that time, the country was 
encountering grave difficulties and was on the point of applying for a Standby 
Agreement from the International Monetary Fund (see above 4.2.3). As a result 
of the economy drive, capital and operating exýenditures were cut down at all 
divisions of Roan Consolidated Mines. Some employees were redeployed, others 
took early retirement, overtime payments were reduced, materials usage was 
lowered and the use of contractors restricted. -L5/ The Kalengwa mine was 
closed as well as 'th-e Geological Research and Prospecting Departments of Roan 
Consolidated Mines' Geol6gical Services at Kalulushi. 
26/ 
Over the long run such a drastic cut back could not be maintained. 
Indeed, Table 5.11 showed that costs excluding depreciation rose between 
1976/77 and 1977/78 from K765 per tonne to K777 per tonne and it was only 
because of the reduction in depreciation expenditure that costs f. o. r. mine 
fell by K3 betweYn those two years. After 1978, costs rose again to reach 
K1380 f. o. r. mine in 1980/81. Part of the reason for this was the 10 per cent 
L4/ Mining Annual Review 1978, page 481 and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines 
Ltd. Annual Report 1978, page 3. 
15/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1978, page 4. 
26/ Zambia Mining Year Book 1977, page 17. 
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devaluation of the Kwacha that was part of the International Monetary Fund's 
package, and part also was the increase in the cost of petroleum fuel. 
8.3.2 Deflated costs of production 1970-1981 
There was a very rapid increase in global inflation in the 1970s and this 
was taken account of in Table 6.1 and Graph 6.7. The deflated figures show 
that Kwacha costs in Zambia did not rise consistently more quickly than the 
unit values of the exports of manufactured goods from the developed market 
economies, which we have used as a deflator to express the rise in world 
prices. Instead the trend was very erratic. The deflated figures do, though, 
show that costs were con-tained quite well after 1977, but that they began to 
get out of control again in 1980. Because of their great variation, a trend 
rate of growth has little meaning but for the period 1970-1981, costs f. o. r. 
rose by 1.6 per cent per annum, when the dollar index is. used, and by 1.9 per 
cent per annum when the Special Drawings Rights Index was used. (This rate of 
growth being calculated' as the' slope of a regression line through the 
figures). In the period 1961-1969 the trend rate of growth was higher at 2.8 
per cent. When the trend in the cost of sales less royalties and export taxes 
is calculated, similar results were obtained. In the period 1960-1969, this 
rate of growth was again 2.8 per cent, and, in the -period 1970-1981, it was 
2.1 per cent if the dollar index was used, and 2.6 per cent if the SDR index 
_was 
used. 
Another indication that costs were kept under control comparatively well 
in Zambia is that they are still not drastically out of line with those of 
other producers. In 1983, it was estimated that the weighted average 
production cost of copper in the market economies (with this cost being 
defined as total operating costs, net of by-/co-product credits and including 
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depreciation, interest and other charges) was 72 cents/lb. Zambian costs were 
81 cents per pound, but were lower than those of some other major producers, 
such as the United States (84.5 cents/lb); Australia and Canada (84 cents/lb) 
and Zaire (83 cents/lb). They were, though, higher than new producers such as 
Papua New Guinea (35 cents/lb), South Africa (66 cents/lb), Mexico (68 
cents/lb) and Peru (69 cents/lb). The only long established producer with 
lower costs than Zambia was Chile at 49 cents/lb. -L7/ 
We have not made comparisons in this study with the performance of other 
copper producing nations, because of the difficulties in accounting for 
exchange rate movements and, also, because of differences in geological 
structures, but these figures do not indicate any drastic. deterioration in 
Zambia's cost position in relaticm to other producers' since nationalization. 
Even before nationalization, it was calculated that Zambian costs, were "about 
level with the world average'. -L8/ Since 1960, it had been recognized that 
Zambia was not a low costproducer in terms of the world 4; LV=LQIJ=. 
29/ 
it 
should be pointed out though, that at that time, Zambian costs of production 
included royalties so they were higher than they would have appeared after 
1969. 
27/ Figures from Mining Journal August 17,1984 page 106, based on studies by 
Brook Hunt and Associates Ltd. of London (jbid August 24th 1984 page 122). 
28/ PRAIN, Sir Ronald "The Copper Industry" (Address to Zambia Association 
for National Affairs", Lusaka, December llth 1964, reprinted in Selected 
Papers Volume IV (1964-1967) RST Group London 1968, page 5. 
29/ PRAIN, Sir Ronald "The World Copper Industryff: Address to the Rhodesian 
Economic Society, Salisbury, October llth 1960 reprinted in Selected 
Papers Volume 11 (1958-1960) Rhodesian Selection Trust Group, London, 
1961 pages 147-148. 
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8.3.3 Efficiency in the use of fuel 
Reference was made earlier to the effect of the increasing cost of 
petroleum on mining costs. We now deal with the energy question. Fuel is a 
very large input into treatment processes, particularly mining, concentrating 
and smelting, rather than refining which operates on electricity that in 
Zambia is provided from hydro-electricity, the cheapest form of energy. Table 
5.12 showed that there was a sharp rise in all these costs of treatment 
between 1973 and 1975, reflecting the increase in fuel prices in international 
markets. 
Unfortunately, such a cost break-down is not available for years after 
1976/77. However, we have given in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 some of the relevant 
statistics for Zambia's fuel picture which should facilitate our discussion of 
the mining industry's use of fuel. In earlier years, before the oil price 
rise of 1973ý1974, such detailed figures were not given. It can be seen from 
Table 8-. 3 that hydro-electric power provided over half of the country's enercjj 
needs, and that coal and coke, most of it from local sources, provided about 
15 per cent, although this declined as oil's contribution, all imported, 
increased slightly, from 26.1 per cent in 1974 to 27.4 per cent in 1981. 
The Zambian mining industry's share of the total consumption of energy in 
the country declined over time and the industry increased its consumption of 
the cheapest fuel, electricity. It can be seen from Table 8.4 that electr-ical 
energy's cost actually declined during the 1970's whilst the cost of oil_ 
imports increased rapidly. in particular, between 1978 and 1981 the value of 
oil imports f. o. b. went up by 172 per cent, whilst their volume actually fell 
by 4 per cent. 
We have seen no figures for the annual consumption of oil by the mining 
industry but steps were taken to substitute electricity for this fuel. For 
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Table 8.3 The Zambian Mining Industry's Consumption of Energy in the 
National Context - 1974-1981 
Percentage of Zambian Energy From*. Percentage consumed by 
Hy2r-o Coal and oil Oth er Mining Industry 
CoK-e- 
1974 55.5 18.2 26.1 0.2 61.6 
1975 54.8 18.0 27.0 0.2 61.4 
1976 56.4 16.7 26.6 0.3 61.3 
1977 57.7 16.5 25.4 0.4 62.1 
1978 58.2 14.6 25.8 2.0 59.4 
1979 58.2 13.9 26.8 1.5 45.9 
1980 58.1 14.5 26.4 1.5 53.8 
1981 57.7 12.7 27.4 2.4 48.5 
So ur ce *. Bank of Zambia Annual Report various years. 
Table 8.4 Zambia's Oil and Energy Needs. Selected figures 1970-1981 
Zambia's Cost of Oil 
Imports Imports f. o. b. 
of Oil Kmn 
(tonnes) 
Electricity (From 
Supplied to Copper be 1t 
Mining Industry generators 
(GWh) (GWh )) 
Wholesale Mining 
Price Index Industry's 
for electri- consumption 
pity (1970= of coal 
100) (tonnes) 
1970 3 324 334 100.0 
1971 3 567 285 95.5 
1972 478 500a/ 11.5 3 '828 236 97.8 
1973 852 137L/ 16.6 4 058 223 92.9 
1974 808 950 46.0 4 416 251 89.4 
1975 852 073 49.2 4 466 290 87.8 
1976 907 615 63.5 4 588 149 90.8 
1977 776 929 67.4 4 504 139 87.3 
1978 780 154 68.1 4 490 ill 83.3 
1979 699 328 97.1 4 554 58 82.7 
ISý80 761 882 154.0 4 685 77 80.9 
1981 750 543 185.0 81.6 
673 078 
654 999 









Source-. Bank of Zanbia Annual Report, various years, Zambia ýIining Year Book, 
various years. 
a/ Refined expressed in (: -: rude oil equivalents. 
b/ Includes imports of crude oil as well as exports of refined products. 
Figures are expressed in crude oil equivalents. 
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instance, at the Nchanga Open Pit 120-tonne trucks now use an electrically 
opeerated trolley assist which not only increases their speed, but also saves 
40 litres of fuel per trip. -LO/ Most of the electricity consumed by the 
mines comes from hydro-electricity, although there are scxne thermal stations 
on the Copperbelt operated on coal. Coal is also used for metallurgical 
purposes. The figures show that the electricity provided from the 
Copperbelt's generators declined over time from 334 GWR in 1970 bo 77 GWR in 
1980, and that coal consumption fell from 673,000 tonnes to 228,000 tonnes. 
Part of the reason for the decline in the consumption of fuel by the 
Zambian mining industry does lie with the fall in production. Even so, the 
figures all- show that the industry's fuel consumption and the fuel- balance 
adjusted to changing fuel prices in the 1970s: the overall consumption of fuel 
fell and that of the cheapest available fuelf electricity, rose. 
8.3.4 The cost of labour 
In Chapter 6.4.2, we argued that the award of the Brown Commission in 
1966 had added substantially to costs but had preserved industrial peace in 
the industry. Table 5.13 showed týat the cost of labour as a percentage of 
cost of sales reached a maximum in 1966 and 1967, of 37 per cent. By 1980, it 
had declined to 22 per cent. The reason for this was- not a rise in the 
contribution of the other identified item - transport costs - to the cost of 
sales for these in fact fell, but rather a rise in other costs - from 48 per 
cent of cost of sales in 1967 to 70 per cent in 1980. 
The Brown award brought real wages, in terms of wages deflated by the 
appropriate consumer price indices, to the highest level they were to attain 
in the period under examination (table 5.15 and graph 6.9). Although, nominal 
30/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1983, page 16. 
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wage rates did increase in 1970, in 1973 and in subsequent years, inflation 
still kept real wages below their levels of 1966. Moreover, after 1973, no 
wage award allowed the workers to recover their real wage levels of 1970. 
Real wages in the first year of nationalization were, then, on the whole at 
the highest level they were to reach. By 1981 they were substantially below 
their levels of that year for all the categories of local workers we have 
examined. 
There was apparently some movement towards reducing wage differentials 
between the higher and lower paid workers. Comparing the mid-points in the 
nominal wage rates of 1981 with those of 1970, the Pl workers nominal wages 
increased by 108 per cent, those of the P5 worker by 107 per cent, but those 
of the Pll workers by 65.6 per cent. Even so, the latter's wages were 270 per 
cent higher than those of a Pl in 1981, whilst in 1970 they had been 366 per 
cent higher. 
The reduction in real wages after 1973 can be viewed as a positive 
achievement by the industry as the fall in copper prices made it necessary to 
contain costs, including those of labour. 
8.3.5 The progress of Zambianization 
In chapter 6.4.3, we looked at the process of Zambianization in terms of 
replacement bf expatriates by Zambians. After nationalization, the 
prqcess continued, with the annual expansion in the Zambian labour force 
reaching a maximum of 3449 people in 1974 when the expatriate labour force 
fell by 113 people (see Table 6.2). As we say in Chapter 7.3, when cancelling 
the 1970 management contracts in 1973, the President had complained that these 
contracts contained no provision for Zambianization. The 1974 figures can 
then be taken as a vindication of his criticisms, although the displacement 
ratio for that year, as for 1973, was very high. Moreover, there was no 
escaping retrenchment when the economic crisis arrived and the Zambian labour 
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force was cut back sharply in 1978 and 1979 and in 1982 and 1983. Over the 
whole decade 1970-1980, the size of the Zambian labour force increased in 
absolute terms by 75 per cent more than it had in the previous period, 
1960-1969. On the other hand, although there were sharp cutbacks in the 
expatriate labour force, particularly after 1975, the average displacement 
ratio was higher than it had been in the 1960s. This was, to the same extent, 
to have been expected because the more expatriates were replaced, the more 
those remaining would tend to be in the higher level posts whose replacement 
would be more difficult. It was only in 1982/83 that a Zambian, 
E. K. Shamutete, became an acting manager of a mining division (Konkola). 
In the early days, 7tambianization had affected non-technical areas such 
as Administration and Personnel, with Personnel being rapidly Zambianized. 
However, in 1983 there were 22 Zambians at assistant underground managerial 
-level and above, 23 Zambian geologists and 46 mining graduates at various 
stages of development. In metallurgy, there were 17 Zambians at plant 
metallurgist level and above, and 66 other Zambian metallurgical graduates. 
There were 38 chemists, 41 Zambians at section engineer level and above, and 
107 other Zambian graduate engineers.! -1/ 
The achievements of the Zambianization programme can not be ignored, but 
the fact remains that this programme was begun under the private companies 
before nationalization and would have been pursued by thew. Moreover, the 
manpower problems within the industry were often caused by a shortage of 
skilled expatriate workers, and, it was sometimes suggested, by a decline in 
the qual ty]2/ of those employed. In mid-1979, the mines were relying on 
31/ Figures from Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1983, 
pages 14-15. 
32/ New African, May 1978, page 246. 
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the services of less than 100 senior engineers, about one sixth of the number 
required, and the total expatriate skilled work force was about two thirds of 
formal establ shment 
33/ 
and its turnover rate very high - 32 per cent as 
opposed to 23 per cent, still a dangerously high level, in 196B, the year 
before nationalization. By 1980, the turnover rate bad been reduced to 25 per 
cent. 
With the deteriorating security situation in Zambia, largely caused by 
the Rhodesian war, which ended in 1979 and the worsening living conditions 
caused by the country's economic problems, it would in all events have been 
difficult to have retained the services of top-level expatriate staff. 
However, questions can be raised as to whether the Zambian Government's 
nationalization of the industry and cancellation of the management contracts 
improved or worsened matters. The first action was bound to affect adversely 
the "esprit de corps" amongst the expatriate staff that came from working for 
companies of the international standirig-of Roan Selection Trust and Zambian 
Anglo American and to lower expatriate morale. The second action would appear 
to have further diminished the Government's ability to attract top quality 
personnel. These personnel normally prefer employment with large 
international mining houses which can provide them with varied opportunities 
to advance in their careers and, of course, with greater security of tenure 
Z- - 34/ than can a nationalized industry- in a developing country- that, 
understandably, would like to see its own_ nationals occupy the most important 
positions. 
33/ Mining Annual Review, 1979, page 482 and mindeco Mining Year Book of 
Zambia, 1970, Kitwe, 1971, page 44. 
34/ Cf. Testimony of Sir Ronald Prain in United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit Harold E. Kohn v.; American Metal Climax Inc. and Roan 
Selection Trust Ltd. (D. C. Civil No. 70-933) Joi, Unt Appendix 1404a. 
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The two large international mining houses which were in the best position 
- and had the greatest incentive - to supply such personnel to Zambia were the 
Anglo American Corporation and Amax Inc. Even before nationalization, they 
had tried to ensure that Zambia was supplied with such people in spite of the 
great difficulties involved. The former had persuaded some of its top-level 
staff to go to Zambia by assuring them that a few years' service there would 
help advance their careers elsewhere in the group. 
35/ 
Indeed, the present 
chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, Mr. Gavin Relly, was deputy 
chairman of Zambian Anglo American from July 1965. Roan Selection Trust was 
not part of any similar group system, but the problems of attracting and 
retaining skilled personnel to run the mines had made Amax's chairman, Mr. Ian 
MacGregor, consider in 1965 or 1966 coming to some form of pooling 
arrangements with the Trust so as to assure its executives that "Amax was in 
their future". . 
26/ 
After nationalliation, the Anglo American group could continue supplying 
executives as before. For Roan Selection Trust, though, matters were very 
different as the management, and also Amax, realized that continuing as an 
independent Zambian company "owning [henceforth] 37 per cent in the operating 
company just [made] an entirely different problem in recruiting and holding 
top ... and intermediate executive people". 
'-7/ 
The eventual solution -to 
this and., to othef-problems was the acquisition by Amax of Roan Selection Trust. 
35/ Testimony of Mr. Ian MacGregor ibid. page 287a. 
36/ Ibid. page 288a. 
37/ Testimony of Mr. Morris H. Wright, ibid. page 451a, and of Mr. Ian 
MacGregor, ibid. page 303a. 
The figure of 37 per cent (actually 36.75 per cent) is given because the 
49 per cent private interest in Roan Consolidated Mines would have been 
split between Roan Selection Trust and the Anglo American Corporation 3: 1. 
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Although this necessitated for it an unwelcome increase in its investment in 
Zambia! -B/, it was felt to be the best way to retain the services of Roan's 
expatriate management without which Amax's investment in Zambia would have 
been worth considerably less. ýL9/ 
In view of all the above considerations, it would be difficult to say 
that the Zambianization programme would not have been pursued vigorously if 
the mines had remained under private ownership and control. The companies 
had, in any case, every incentive to pursue Zambianization as, where skills 
are anywhere near equal, the Zambian worker is much cheaper than the 
expatriate because of the latter's employment overheads. Moreover, the 
Government's overall objectives were to operate the mines efficiently, which 
required a ready availability of the most skilled workers. It would be 
difficult to argue that the nationalization and the cancellation of the 
management contracts helped achieve that particular objective. 
38/ With a 42 per cent interest in Roan Selection Trust, Amax would have 
received 15.5 per cent (. 42 x . 367) of Roan Consolidated Mines on a pro 
rata distribution of shares. The Zambian Government had, however, 
stipulated that the obligatory share in Roan Consolidated Mines of the 
party owning the management contract should be 20 per cent (it had 
originally stipulated 24 per cent but the Roan negotiators had bargained 
it down to the lower figure) so Amax had to increase its interest in Roan 
Consolidated Mines by 4.5 per cent. Its final interest in Roan 
Consolidated Mines was 20.4 per cent. The large share-holder interests 
in Amax, the_Hochschilds and Selection Trust, were opposed to almost any 
form '-Of acquisition by Amax of Roan Selection Trust, and Mr. Harold 
Hochschild would not have objected to Roan Selection Trust's buying out 
Amax. (Testimony of Mr. Harold Hochschild, Chairman of Amax, 1947-1957, 
ibid. page 1779a. ) 
39/ Indeed, after the cancellation of the management contracts between Amax 
and Roan Consolidated Mines, the former wrote down its 20.4 per cent 
investment in the latter from $34.9 million to $4.3 million. (Economist 
Intelligence Unit Quarterly Economic Review: Zambia, No. 11,1978, page 
10). In 1984, Amax sold all its interests in Zambian copper to ITM 
International (Mining Journal, July 6,1984, page 15). 
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8.3.6 Stability in management 
Another consideration concerning high level management is that of its 
stability. Whether the senior managers are at any one time expatriates or 
Zambians is a separate issue from how long they have been in their posts. 
The evidence is that the management of the state-owned companies was 
unstable in the early years of nationalization. 
In Table 8.5, we give the Chairmen, Zambian managing directors and the 
Zambian-appointed directors and alternate directors of the two companies. For 
the most part, the same people served on the Boards of each of the companies. 
It can be seen that, until J. Mapoma took over, there was little continuity in 
the Chairmanship. This was not the case for Roan Selection Trust, where Sir 
Ronald Prain was Chief Executive from 1943 to 1968 and Chairman from 1950 to 
after nationalization; or for the Zamanglo Group, where Harry Oppenheimer was 
Chairman from 1957. These two had served on the boards before becoming 
Chairman whereas it can be seen that only Dominic Mulaisho had been a director 
before becoming Chairman. Moreover, he was the only Chairman to serve on the 
boards of the companies after hisIrelinquishing the Chairmanship. 
The position of managing director, once it was in Zambian hands, was 
stable after 1975. David Phiri, Managing Director of Roan Consolidated Mines 
had, though, ý, made his previous career with the Zamanglo and Nchaii-ga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Group, of which he had been an alternate director. 
F. H. Kaunda, the managing director of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, took 
over and has remained in the Chairmanship of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines 
Ltd., providing very necessary stability. 
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Table 8.5 The Zambian directors of RCM/NCCM-a/ 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Chairmen 
A. Sardanis C X 
D. Mulaisho X CCX X X X X X 
H. Mulemba C 
E. Kash ita C 
A. Soko C C 
G. Chink ul i 
J. Maporna C C C C 
Managing Directors 
RCM D. Phiri X X X X X X X X 
NCCM F. H. Kaunda X X X X X X X 
NCCM W. Chakulya X 
Directors 
P. H. Brownrigg ýX XXX X X X X X X X 
E. G. Kasonde X XXX 
I. Muchangwe X XXX 
F. Sumbwe X XXX X X X X X X X 
L. Lishomwa X X X 
L. Wananshiku X X 
E. Walusiku X X- X 
Ir. Sichilongo N N N X X X 
F. Kazunga X 
L. Muuka AAA A A A A A A A X 
J. Masaninga Xb/ 
D. Phiri N NNN 
P. Chiwenda A 
D. Kaona N 
K. Nyirenda N N 
A. Chitulangoma A 
Source: Company reports. 
Keyt C= Chairman 
X= Director'l'ý'o f both companies 
A= Alternate director of both companies 
N= Alternate director of NCCM only 
Notet a/ Because of the different fin ancial years and the fact that directors or 
ýhairmen did no t necessarily ser ve calendar years, these entries can only b e 
approximate. 
b/ NCCM only. 
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The first Zambian Chairman (A. S. Sardanis beeing a Cypriot) was Dominic 
Mulaisho and he was widely respected in the copper industry and was thought to 
be favourable to private enterprise - indeed in 1972 he had said that it would 
be "pointless and even suicidal for Zambia to expropriate or nationalize the 
present operations while the country needed more companies to go to Zambia to 
develop mining and associated industries. " 
10/ 
His dismissal as Chairman in 
September 1973 and as a director in February 1974 ushered in four years of 
instability both in the Chairmanship and the Directorate. Indeed Table 8.5 
shows that only two full directors kept their posts from 1974, the year when 
Zambia assumed- management control of the companies, to 1978, when drastic 
economy measures were imposed. 
Mr. Mulaisho's successor as Chairman, Mr. H. Mulemba, only lasted until 
February 1974. He was replaced by Mr. Andrew Kashita who was acknowledged as 
having a good grasp of the copper industry. Mr. Kashita was, however, 
dismissed in January 1975 from the Government and the Chairmanship of the 
companies in favour of Mr. Ackson* Soko who was described by the Mining Journal 
as a NUNIP stalwart with a proven political record but no background or 
experience in mining". ýLl/ In turn, he was dismissed in April 1977, accused 
40/ Speech to the"ýNew York Section of the American Institute of Mining 
Engineers reported in Mining Journal September 29,1972, page 248. 
. 
11/ ibid. January 31st 1975, page 82. 
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of engaging in the activities of the banned opposition United Progressive 
Party.. 
L2/ 
The new Chairman, General Kingsley Chinkuli, had formerly been 
head of the Zambian Army. He only remained until June 1978 but it was under 
his Chairmanship that the necessity for rationalisation and cost-cutting was 
fully realized, and economy measures mentioned above put in place: the 
retirement of miners was accelerated and over 4,700 workers employed by 
sub-contractors for the two large copper companies were made redundant and 
their duties were absorbed by the existing work force. . 
13/ 
Moreover, at the 
same time as General Chinkuli was appointed, Dominic Mulaisho returned to the 
Board, replacing Mr. Lishomwa who -had taken his seat on the Boards in February 
1974. Mr. Mulaisho's return, coming at a time when commercial considerations 
and the reality of the market were forcing the companies to adopt policies 
which the private owners would almost certainly have instituted, was an 
indication that the objectives and outlook of the companies had- f"inally 
returned to ones very similar to those held and pursued by the former private 
owners. 
("'r 
42/ ibid. April 29th 1977, page 323. 
43/ ibid. April 21st 1978, page 297. 
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8.4 The performance of investment 
Because of the criticism directed against the private companies for not 
investing enough in their properties, we will examine carefully the 
performance of investment after nationalization.. 
8.4.1 The rise in the capital stocks 
Graph' 6.11 and 6.12, drawn from Tables 5.16 and 5.17 showed that the 
capital stocks of both groups, measured in nominal terms, did increase after 
nationalization. The net assets of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., in 
particular, showed a sharp increase after nationalization. 
In chapter 6 we discussed the difficulties in estimating the net fixed 
assets of the companies in real terms and in Table 6.3 gave estimates usi-ng 
different deflators. Only one deflator, the GDP deflator, unadjusted for 
changes in the terms of trade, showed an increase for the two groups betweeri 
1970 and 1981. The GDP deflator adjusted for changes in the terms of trade 
gave a slight increase for Roan Consolidated Mini-s between those years and an 
18 per cent drop for Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. The use of" the 
wholesale price index of goods for fixed capiial formation, which had given 
favourable results for the pre-nationalization period, led to falls of 41 and 
53 per cent for Roan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines 
respectively. 
What all the. indices did indicate, though-o, was that at some time in the 
mid 1970s - between 1973 and 1975 when the wholesale price index or the 
adjusted GDP deflator was used, and in 1976 or 1978 when the simple GDP 
deflator was used, - the real net capital stock of the companies reached a 
maximum. 
We also gave, in Table 6.4, a measure of the real capital stock which 
reflected the definitions used in the company reports but which was so 
calculated that it did not show any decline over time. Even so, this 
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measure showed that the real assets of the two ' companies did grow rapidly 
between 1970 and 1977 or 1978 after which, partly no doubt because of the 
change in accounting procedures, the rate of increase. 'slowed down considerably. 
This brings out that two important determinants of the calculated value 
of real fixed assets are (1) the deflator used, which can vary, and (2) 
-the 
treatment of replacements or depreciation expenditure. The company accounts 
only give one figure for the amount of gross capital expenditure that went on 
replacements rather than on building up new assets and any recalculation by us 
would be entirely arbitrary. However, the figures themselves show that the 
treatment of replacements'-ýT-- was of critical importance to a calculation of the 
net capital stock. 
8.4.2 The ratio of re2lacements to total expenditure 
In 1970, there was a change in the treatment of replacements, as 
described in 5.5.1. Part of this expenditure was cha-Iged to operating costs. 
and th is amount was usually not given. Thus total and replacements 
expenditure, as shown in the fixed assets figures, would have appeared smaller 
after 1970 than before, although net expenditure would have remained. the 
same. Also the ratio of replacements to total expenditure would have 
declined, as can be seen in Graphs 8.1 and 8.2. 
8.4.3 Investment expenditure in nominal terms after nationalization 
Leaving aside the difficulties in making comparisons between total 
capital expenditure before and after nationalization, it can be seen from 
graphs 6.13 and 6.14 that there was a sharp increase in gross and net 
expenditure between 1970 and 1973 in the case of Roan Consolidated 
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Mines and between 1970 and 1974 in that of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines 
Ltd. 
For the Nchanga company, 1974 was the year in which nominal capital 
expenditure peaked before rising sharply again in 1980. After 1974, 
expenditure on its major projects, the tailings' leach plant at Chingola (see 
5.2.2), the gas collection and third acid plant at Rokana (designed to collect 
sulphur gases from the converters and turn them into sulphuric acid to be used 
for leaching the group's ores) and the Waelz Kilns at Broken Hill (designed to 
treat the dumps of residues and arisings of refractory material at that mine) 
started to tail off. 
In the case of Roan Consolidated mines, investment expenditure peaked in 
1972 and also, at a higher nominal level, in 1977. This was because the 
company undertook four major projects the expansion of the underground 
workings at Chambishi; the Luanshya/Baluba expansion (Stage II); the expansion 
of production at the western end of Chibuluma; and an extension of the 
Chambishi leach plant to increase cobalt as well as copper'production. 
In 1971, plans were made to increase Chambishils output to about 48,000 
tonnes a year and pgoduction from the underground workings began in 
1972. i-4'1 By June 1973, work on the Baluba extension project had started. 





of the new shaft at Chibuluma, which was the major 
. 
16/ 
part of that mine's expansion, began in 1974. In 1975/76, Roan 
Consolidated Mines decided to begin the Chambishi plant extension which, as 
previously mentioned, it hoped to commission in early 1978. 
E/ 
In 1977, the 
final capital costs of the projects were estimated at K63 million for the 
44/ Zambia Mining Year Book 1975, page 7. 
45/ Roan consolidated Mines Annual Report 1973, page 5. 
46/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1976, page 10. 
47/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1976, page 10., 
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Chambishi mine expansion of which K49 million had been spent by June 1977; at 
K76 million for Baluba, of which K25 million had already been spent; at K30 
million for the Chibuluma expansion of which K13 million had been spent; and 
at K26 million for the Chamb ishi plant extension. However, in that year, 
1977, as part of the economy drive, capital expenditures were held back as far 
as possible although it was felt that expenditures on these development 
projects were essential if current levels of output were to be maintained into 
the future. ýL9/ Thus in the next financial year, a total of K43 million was 
50/ 
still spent on development projects. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines' 
was also taking steps in 1978 to cut back its capital expenditure 
programmes. 
51/ 
This policy of cutting back wherever possible on expenditures has 
continued as the crisis in the copper industry has deepened. By 1983, the 
Chairman of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. explained that "the Company 
now has a considerable backlog of expenditure which must- big undertaken in 
order, firstly, to replace the plant and equipment, which has already reached 
the end of its economic working life (our italics) and, secondly, to finance 
new projects Capital expenditure during the year under review (which was 
N52/ K252 million) was again substantially below requirements. In 1984, the 
Chairman was able to report that the programme to rehabilitate the mines would 
cost about $300 million, and would be largely financed by--the World Bank, the 
European Economic Community and the African Development Bank. 
53/ 
48/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 
ý9/ ibid., page'8. 
ý-O/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 
3-1/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd 
. 
22/ Zimbia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
53/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
1977, page 9. 
1978, page 11. 
Annual Report 1978, page 10. 
1983 Annual Report, page S. 
1984 Annual Report, page 4. 
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8.4.4 Real replacements expenditure after nationalization 
That the mines needed to be rehabilitated can also be appreciated from 
the data available on replacements expenditure. In graphs 8.3 and 8.4 
deflated capital expenditure is given. It can be seen that real replacements 
expenditure after 1975 did fall off and was at a much lower level by the time 
the change was made to a depreciation basis of accounting than in 1970 or 
during the time of private ownership. As the company accounts indicate that 
net investment was positive and so the size of -the assets was increasing, we 
would have expected real replacements expenditure also to be increasing, as 
happened in the period of private ownership. When the amounts charged to 
operating costs given by Roan Conklidated Mines are deflated and added to the 
deflated amounts written off, as in Table 5.20, the totals declined from K 7.34. 
million in 1976 to K 3.69 million in 1979, a level considerably below the real 
replacements expenditure of Roan Selection Trust. After the groups had 
changed to a depreciation basis of accounting, real replacements expenditure 
was still 'generally at a lower level than during the time of private 
ownership, as can be seen from graphs 8.3 and 8.4. 
8.4.5 The overall picture of investment after nationalization 
The overall picture at the end of the 1980s, then, was that of an 
industry whose capital stock was not in such -good a shape as it was at the 
time of nationalization. The production achieved by these assets was at a 
much lower rate and part of the explanation was too low a level of 
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Chairman of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines explained in 1981. ." In 
assessing this (minimum level necessary for capital expenditure) the low 
investment of the past five years, due to financial stringencies, must be 
taken into account. In those years, capital expenditure on improvements and 
replacements was deferred, thus endangering the future production plans of the 
company. 1154/ 
At the time of nationalization, there is every evidence that the mining 
assets were in good shape. The industry had gone through a difficult time 
with the dislocations caused by Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence. However, production had been rising and considerable sums were 
tieing spent on replacements. 
The figures for the development work completed support this conclusion. 
Graph 6.15 showed that there was a decline in the amount of development work 
completed" after 1962 but that from 1964 the trend was generally upward. In 
the first years of nationalization, until 1974, the amount of development work 
was maintained at the pre-nationalization level,. but after that year it 
tapered off. There was a recovery in 1980, but in that year the total, of 
253.4 thousand metres was still below that of the 1960s minimum of 292.3, 
attained in 1964. The figures taken from the company Annual Reports rather 
than the Mining Yearbooks, show the 1980 level of development work, of just 
over 250,000 metres per year, being at least maintained in 1982 and 1983, but 
as falling off in 1984. 
The figures for the individual mines given in Tables 5.22 and 5.23 are 
also important. In the case of the mines that were throughout operated only 
by underground methods - Baluba/Luanshya, Mufulira, and Konkola - only the 
first saw development work after 1980 above its level of 1969. In the case of 
this mining complex, the development of Baluba largely accounts for 
54/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1981, page 
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the increase in development work there between 1969 and 1973, the year in 
which development work reached a maximuml Stage I of Baluba was commissioned 
in January 1973 on schedule. 
ý-5/ 
Development work at. Mufulira was at a level 
of about 50,000 metres per year in the latter part of the 1960s, after the 
increase in the early 1960s caused by the development of the Mufulira West 
orebody, which opened up in 1962. It fell to 38.7 thousand metres in 1971, 
and then rose to nearly 45 thousand metres in 1974, after which it declined 
to a level of 30,000 metres in the early 1980s. 
Konkola's development work, of about 55 thousand metres per year before 
nationalization, was maintained in the first years after nationalization but 
an unmistakable downward trend can be seen after 1977. 
Of the underground/open pit mines, only Chambishi saw an increase in 
underground development work, but this was, of course, due to the closing down 
of the open-pit (which finally took place in December 1978) and the opening up 
of the underground sections, which had first come into production in 1972. Of 
the two present underground/open pit mines, Nkana (Rokana) and Chingola, 
Rokanals underground development work fell steadily from 1969 to 1980 and 
since has recovered to about 50,000 metres per year, half the rate of 1969. 
On the other hand, undergr. ound production fell from 5 1/4 million tonnes at 
the time of Independence (when about all the mine's ore came from underground 
workings) to just over 4 million tonnes 
-in 
the early 1980s. Chingola's 
underground production went from just below 3 million tonnes a year before 
nationalization to just over 2 million tonnes in 1979/80. -6/ However, by 
1983, underground production was up to 3.34 million tonnes, which exceeded 
55/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1973, page 5. 
56/ Nchanga Consolidated copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1980, page 37. 
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the previous record of 3.25 million tonnes achieved in 1960/61. -27/ The 
picture, then, of Chingola's underground development is not unambiguous. Its 
rate was maintained quite well until 1978, when a decline set in. During this 
period, the rate of underground production fell,. but recovered at a time when 
underground development, although lower than earlier levels, was described in 
1982 as being on schedule-L8/ and, in 1983, as being "Just below the 
target%ý-9/ In 1983/84, however, production and develoýment again fell back. 
8.5 Financing investment in the mines 
Fixed assets were only one of the companies' assets that could be built 
up by the in-jection of capital. However, as tables 5.25 and 5.27, which give 
the asset side- of the balance sheets showed, it was the build up in fixed 
assets that led to the overall increase in assets between 1970 and 1981. Roan 
Consolidated Mines' assets wint up by K390 million, of which K320 million came 
from the increase in net fixed assets; the comparable figures for Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. were K481 million o the increase in total r 
assets and K408 for the increase in net fixed assets. 
Tables 5.24 and 5.26 showed how the increase in assets, primarily mining 
properties, was financed. " The issue of shares made little contribution. The 
total increase in the issued share capital and share premiums. was, for Roan 
Consolidated -Mines, 
_K4.0 
million between 1970 and lj8l and, for Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., K61 million. '_ Moreover, these increases 
reflected the capitalization of the companies' debt to-the government, 
57/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1983, page 33. 
58/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. ýnnual Report 1982, page 35. 
59/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
lAnnual 
Report 1983, page 33. 
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effected in July 1979 for Roan Consolidated Minesý-O/ and in October 1978 for 
61/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
The companies built up their reserves substantially between 1970 and 1981 
- by K280 million in the case of Roan Consolidated Mines and by K330 in that 
of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
Reserves and share capital can be considered on an equal footing in that 
reserves can be capitalized and new shares issued to existing shareholders. 
This happened in March 1982, but with retroactive effect from lst April 1981 
when Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. was merged with Roan Consolidated 
mines to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. As part of the 
arrangements, a total of K226 million (K32 million from -share premiums and 
K194 million from general reserves) was capitalized and issued to existing 
shareholders. 
62/ 
The other source of finance apart from shareholders' funds (shares, share 
premiums and reserves) is borr6w-ing. Long. (repayable after five years) and 
medium (repayable between one and five years) term indebtedness are usually 
treated separately from short term indebtedness (repayable within one year). 
They are added to shareholders' funds as sources of finance for fixed assets, 
investments and loans and net current assets (i. e. current assets less current 
liabilities, including short term debt and current matu rities of medium and 
long term debt). The ratio-of long and medium term debt to shareholders' 
funds gives a good indication of the financial strength of a company; of 
whether it has built up its assets by borrowing or by ploughing back 
shareholders' funds. Table 5.30 gave this ratio in its last columns. It also 
60/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1979, page 6. 
II/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1979, page 11. 
62/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1982, page 5. 
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gave the total of short, medium and long term debt and the ratio of this 
amount to shareholders' funds. 
Quite a close control was kept on borrowing in the years of private 
management until 1974 during which time, as we saw in Chapter 7.3, the 
minority directors of the new companies representing the former owners were 
required not to apýrove any undertaking for which the. companies could not 
raise money on commercially attractive terms. These years were also ones of 
very heavy nominal and real investment in the industry. However, after 1974, 
total borrowing rose rapidly so that in 1977 it equalled about two thirds of 
the shareholders' funds of each of the companies. In 1978, it came to fully 
92 per cent of Roan Consolidated Mines' shareholders' capital. In that year 
long and medium term loans alone were equal to almost 66 per cent of the 
company's shareholders' funds. In that year, too, long and medium term debt 
was 38 per cent (35 per cent under the new accounting system) of Nchanga 
Consolidafied Copper Mines' shareholders' funds. Such rates were never 
approached in the time of private ownership. Roan Selection Trust's total 
borrowings were always below 16 per cent of shareholdersý funds in the 1960s 
and the Zambian Anglo American companies' as a group were below 13 per centý 
As the companies' auditors, Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, made clear in 
1978, the companies could only be considered financially viable if much of 
their --indebtedness were to be capitalized. They added this caveat to their 
statements. that the accounts fairly presented the picture of the state of 
affairs of the companies that year. -ý-3'1 In the case of Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd., the auditors added the extra caveat that the future profits 
of the company should be sufficient 'to enable it to make appropriations to 
63/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1978, page 15, Nchanga Consolidated 
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capital expenditure reserve to take account of the eventual need to repaY 
loans and other borrowings which have been used for investment in fixed 
assets". 
In 1982, as previously mentioned, the two companies were merged with 
retroactive effect to April 1981. In Table 8.6 we have given the figures for 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines assets and liabilities and also, in the first 
row, the simple addition of the separate figures for Roan Consolidated Mines 
and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. The reserves fell rapidly and long 
and medium term liabilities rose as losses mounted. As a result, the ratios 
of total and long term borrowing to shareholders' funds rose rapidly between 
1981 and 1984. In 1982, the accountants had to add the caveat that the 
financial statements had been made "on the basis of the Group maintaining its 
operations" which depended inter alia on "the successful renegotiation of 
certain terms in loan agreements and the conclusion of arrangements with the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia for further funds to be made available 
from its agencies. "64/ 
8.6 Exploration after nationalization 
The last aspect of the industry's performance that we will discuss is the 
progress of exploration. By the most simple measure - whether exploration led 
to sufficient new ore reserves being found to compensate for the fall in 
reserves caused by their extrac'tion - the Zambian copper mining industry 
performed well after nationalization. The total volume of reserves rose froin 
750 million tonnes in 1969 to 860 million tonnes in 1982, largely through the 
expansion of Konkola's and Chingola's reserves (see Table 6.5). These 
increases more than compensated for the fall in Luanshya's reserves, as the 
64/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1983, page 13. 
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mine approached exha. ustion, and Mufulirals. However, the average grade of ore 
fell from 3.36 per cent copper in 1969 to 3.08 per cent in 1982 and so the 
amount of copper contained in the ore only rose marginally, from 25.16 million 
tonnes in 1969 to 26.47 million Itonnes in 1982. 
In 1969, the industry was operating at a profit, but in 1982 its pre-tax 
loss was K141.7 million, which only fell to X123 million in 1983. -i-5-1 As the 
definition of ore reserves is mater. ial that can be worked to produce the 
finished metal at a profit, we would have to question just how much ore 
reserves, or distinct from copper-containing material, Zambia in fact has. 
Profit and loss figures are not given for each division, but it is indicative 
of the unprofitability of various divisions that, as previously mentioned, in 
1978, Chingola was the only one of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines' 
16/ divisions that was operating at a profit. 
However, Zambia does have reserves which are of sufficiently high grade 
to render their owner a profit if efficiently worked and if the world copper 
price were to be at a level to allow the average producer to operate at a 
healthy profit. 
Zambia's object in nationalizing the industry and opening up the country 
to new prospectors was not simply to add to the reserves of existing mines but 
also to introduce competition, as argued in Chapter 7.2.4. The state was not 
to involve itself in the risks involved in exploration but instead it had the 
right to acquire a 51 per cent interest in a property when it was at the 
production stage. 
Things did not exactly work out. as expected. As Table 5.31 shows, only 
two bodies exploring before 1970, de Beers and the Geological Sur. vey of 
65/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1983, page 20. 
66/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Report 1978, page 3. 
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Zambia, a government organization, were still continuing their operations in- 
1982. The exploration organizations of the private companies, Zamanglo 
Exploration, Mwinilunga, Chisangwa and Lusaka East, had all ceased their 
operations by 1975. 
The nationalized companies, Roan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. continued their country wide exploration after 
nationalization but this gradually decreased and ceased in 1978, because of 
economic difficulties. As we saw, Roan Consolidated Mines closed down its 
Geological Research and Prospecting Departments at that time. Exploration 
work on existing properties also suffered because of financial difficulties 
and such activities as well as development work were, by 1983, "reduced to an 
absolute minimumN. 
67/ 
There were new entrants after 1969, including, as Table 5.32 shows, 
ccnpanies from Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Italy, the United 
States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the uniced Nations. 
At first, there was a considerable amount of interest in exploration in Zambia 
when the private companies gave up 88 per cent of their concession areas. Yet 
to the enquiries of those interes, ýed in prospecting, the government's mining 
experts had to copcede that there were very few useful deposits left untouched 
and even those were only marginally economic. Furthermore, it was said in 
1970 that "most geologists believe that it unlikely that any large finds will 
be made. This is becoming obvious to newcomers. '-ý-8/ Indeed two_ companies 
that were among the first to have shown an interest in Zambia in 1970 - the 
67/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines *Ltd., Statement by Mr. F. K. Kaunda, 
Chairman and Chief Executive to accompany Annual Report 1983, page 3. 
68/ The Economist, February 21,1970. 
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Japanese Mitsui Company and the American Continental Ore Company - did not 
69/ take out a prospecting license in 1972 Being private companies, they 
were perhaps less likely to be moved to invest in the country for political 
considerations than in the case of groups from the socialist countries. 
The really interesting mineral for the newcomers turned out to be 
uranium, not copper. It was this mineral that attracted Saarberg-Interplan, 
AGIP and the Japanese. As Table 5.32 indicates, over half the identified 
exploration undertaken by post-nationalization new entrants, apart from 'state 
bodies, can be attributed to AGIP-Nucleare. 
These new companies did not so much discover uranium as re-examine 
previously discovered prospects. 
2-0/ 
In 1951 and 1952, the British -Atomic 
Energy Commission had sent a group out from- Harwell which, with a geiger 
counter in the front seat of a Land Rover, had discovered uranium by the 
Zambezi River. Rhodesian Selection Trust found the other major concentrations 
of uranium, around Solwezi, using a scintoil6meter in a Rapide airplane. The 
Trust arranged for a London firm to investigate the area, but rejected the 
uranium prospects as unpromising. The Geological Survey duplicated this work 
in its general country-wide, outcome magnetic and radiometric coverage, and 
AGIP went -over the same ground again. At the present time, the exploration 
work for uranium is continuing and so' it is too early to come to any 
conclusions as to its eventual results. 
The other significant mineral development since nationalization has been 
the discovery of emeralds near Luanshya. However, the large area of the 
. 
ý9/ Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Economic Review: Zambia, No. 2, 
1974, page 16. 
70/ This section on uranium is based on a talk with W. H. Ellis, formerly 
exploration superintendent of RST Technical Service ) 
in 1983. 
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deposits, about 1,000 km 
2, has made it difficult to -police operations and it 
is estimated that only 10 per cent of the output is marketed officially, the 
rest. being mined illegally. 
Some tentative conclusions can be reached from the post-nationalization 
period of exploration. The first is that no major new copper finds were made 
and no major new mines opened up. This would indicate that the private 
co mpanies had indeed been quite thorough in their work of exploration. The 
second is that a whole new era of intensified exploration did not begin after 
nationalization: the initial interest soon waned. The third is that the 
Government did not achieve what it had hoped to from the Mines and Minerals 
Act, namely costless participation in the succe'ssful exploration of others: 
instead, it found itself assuming some of the risks of exploration. In 
particular, it shared the risk of exploration with Noranda and Geomin. As can 
be seen from Table 5.32, the Government's two parastatal exploration agencies, 
Mindeco and Minex, had-spent by 1983 a total of K18 million, which was larger 
thaln that spent by any single outside exploration company and two-thirds of 
the total spent by these outside companies. Minex is exploring in the eastern 
part of the country which was previously closed to prospecting, and has 
located a new zinc occurrence, phosphates and the semi-precious metal 
tourmaline. It -is also evaluating the phosphate potential of the Nkombwa Hill* 
carbonatite at the t1orth of the Luangwa valley and gold deposits. 
The final conclusion is, * perhaps, not very * helpfýl: that much 
exploration remains to be done in Zambia. Yet this work will not be 
relatively cheap such as geological mapping and geophysical and geochemical 
sampling but rather will involve the drilling of anomalies that had been found 
earlier but had not been completely followed up. Only about 500,000 metres of 
drilling has been done outside the Copperbelt since prospecting commenced in 
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Zambia, which is a very minor amount compared to the amount of drilling done 
yearly in North America. 
2-1 
However, because the rocks in Zambia contain 
weak zones and are weathered, the drills have to be of a much wider diameter 
than those used in, for example, South Africa., where the rocks are harder. 
Whereas a drill hole in South Africa can start with a4 inch diameter, one in 
Zambia has to start at 12 inches. 
Z2/ 
Drilling will, then, be very expensive 
and clearly a very great incentive is needed to produce a new flurry of 
drilling in Zambia outside the Copperbelt. 
8.7 Conclusion: the performance of the industry after nationalization 
We have looked at tfie performance of the industry under different 
headings suggested both by economic theory and by the actual criticisms 
directed at the industry before nationalization. It was seen that, even after 
allowance was made for Mufulira, production did fall after nationalization. 
i-roductivity, in terms of ore and copper output per man, also fell. However 
the figures for accidents, except of course for 1970, the year of the Mufulira 
disaý; ter which could not be attributed to nationalization, showed that 
progress continued to. be made after nationalization. Figures for the recovery 
rates also illustrated that there was no drastic drop in technical performance 
at the mines after nationalization. 
21/ P. V. Freeman, "Minerals found in Zambia" Mining Mirror, 25 February, 
1983, page 7. 
72/ Horizon, September 1969, page 21. 
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The Zambian copper mining industry was, by world standards, not a low 
cost producer at the time of nationalization and the position did not improve 
afterwards. The nationalized companies finally acted in 1977 to try to get 
costs under control. They were helped in containing costs by a switch towards 
the use of electricity and by a fall in real wages at the rmines. The labour 
force employed at the mines continued to grow after nationalization in spite 
of the fall in output. Zambianization continued, but the new companies found 
it difficult to attract skilled expatriate labour and were not able to provide 
stability in ihe senior m. anagement. 
The investment picture was one of a spurt in activity just after 
nationalization that soon tapered off. By the end of the period examined, the 
industry's capital stock was not in as good a shape as at the time of 
nationalization. Moreover, the companies borrowed heavily after 
nationalization and their asset positions were considerably weaker in 1981 
than in 1970. 
Finally, we saw that the Government had to help finance much of the 
exploration that took place in Zambia after naticinalization whereas it had 
hoped to buy an interest in properties that had been discovered and were about 
to be developed. The new arrangements for exploration introduced atthe time 
of nationalization did produce a- new interest in exploration, but this soon 
diminished. In sum, it would be very. difficult to point to any clear 
improvement in the industry's performance after nationalization. 
Sur pr is ing ly, the one clear achievement of the post-nationalization management 
was to hold down real wages which had risen under the private owners. This 
was a worth-while accomplishment in that it helped to moderate costs, but it 
was not a reason given for nationalization nor was it an expected consequence. 
- 252 - 
On the whole, then, the years after nationalization have not been happy 
ones for the Zambian mining industry. In the next chapter we will outline the 
performance of the industry at the macro-level, rather than at the micro-level 
outlined in this chapter and will then see whether the disappointments can be 
largely attributed to two external factors - the troubles in Zimbabwe and the 
fall in the copper price that are often accorded considerable prominence. 
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Chapter 9 
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE POOR MACRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
OF THE ZAMBIAN COPPER MINING INDUSTRY 
9.1 The Broad Picture of the Industry's performance 
9.1.1 Its contribution to national output 
In Chapter 4, we gave tables for the place of the Zambian copper mining 
industry in the national economy. Table 4.3 showed how the industry's 
contribution to gross domestic product at market prices fell after 
nationalization. This contribution can be calculated from the income side, as 
the sum of the industry's operating surplus, the custom duties and indirect 
taxes it pays, the -compensation of its employees and the amount allowed for, 
the consumption of fixed capital. 
l/ 
It can also be -calculated from the output side as the value of its gross 
output - pýincipally exports, but also. its contribu_tion to capital formation, 
and the value of the change in its stocks less its inputs from other Zambian 
industries and from imports. 
2/ 
Clearly,. then, its contribution would change drastically if there were an 
adverse movement in the price of the industry's output. This can be brought 
out by looking at the contribution of the industry in real terms to the real 
gross domestic product. This is shown in Table 9.1. In this table which 
starts in 1971, the first year - for which such figures are available, the 
figures for GDP in constant prices of 1970 are given in the first column and 
the contribution of the metal mining industry, also in prices of 1970, in the 
third column. The ratio of the two is given in the fourth column and 
l/ Republic of Zambia Digest of Statistics Explanatory Notes 1965, page 13. 
2/ vide Republic of Zambia National Accounts and Input-Outp t Tables 1969 
May 1972 Table 16(a) and United Nations National Accounting Practices in 
Seventv Countries Volume. III (E. 79. XVII. 19) New York, 1979, page 195. 
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Table 9.1 




for Changes Con tr ib ution Contribution of Mining 
Total GDP in Terms of of Metal Industry to GDP 
Unadjusted Trade Mining Industr (percen tage) 
adjusted 
for changes 
in the terms 
unadjusted of trade 
1971 1269.3 1102.6 408.5 32.2 37.0 
1972 1386.4 1183.0 470.0 33.9 39.7 
1973 1361.1 1312.6 440.5 32.4 33.6 
1974 1473.9 1369.2 465.2 31.6 34.0 
1975 1435.5 1048.3 418.3 29.1 39.9 
1976 1519.4 1067.7 493.8 32.5 46.2 
1977 1446.5 983.8 462.5 32.0 47.0 
-1978 
1483.5 1004.7 487.3 32.8 48.5 
1979 1369.9 1033.0 384.3 '28.1 37.2 
1980 1417.8 1045.0 392.2 27.7 37.5 
1981 1484.0 1106.2 427.5 28.8 38.6 
1982 1453.7 960.6 427.2 29.4 44.5 
1983 1476.5 1045.9 464.1 31.1 44.4 
Sourcet Republic of Zarnbia monthly Digest of Statistics 
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shows it to have varied between 27.7 per cent, in 1980, and 33.9 per cent in 
1972. This ratio was still smaller than that of the nominal ratio of the 
1960s. 
The ratio is higher when Gross Domestic Product in constant prices is 
adjusted for changes in the terms of trade. This is done by deducting the 
current value of exports, deflated by the index of export prices, from the 
current value of imports of goods, deflated by the index of import prices. 
This series of Gross Domestic Product in constant prices adjusted for changes 
in the terms of trade is given in the second column. It can be seen that the 
terms of trade adjustment was always negative in that the series is always 
smaller than that for unadjusted Gross Domestic Product. There is no 
breakdown of this measure of Gross Domestic Product into its industrial 
components as the adjustment is applied directly to the final figure for real 
Gross Domestic Product. A considerable downward adjustment would have had to 
be- made to the figures for the mining industry because of its large 
contribution to exports and. its large absorption. of imports. We have not been 
able to do this, though, and so the figures given in the last column of Table 
9.1 for the ratio of the contributions of the mining industry to Gross 
Domestic Product in constant prices, adjusted for changes in the terms of 
trade, do give the maximum that the contribution of the mining industry can be 
considered to have made tO Gross Domestic Product. It can be seen that some 
of the values are not that different from those for the ratios of the 
industry's contribution to Gross Domestic Product in nominal terms in the 
1960s of about 45 per cent, as given in Table 4.3. They were considerably 
higher than those shown for this nominal contribution after nationalization - 
of less than 20 per cent after 1974. 
The preceding calculations do illustrate that the nominal figures for the 
contribution of the copper industry to the national econoomy exaggerate the 
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decline that took place. In real terms, the industry's absolute contribution 
to the national economy was greater after 1980 than it was in 1971, and by 
1983 was only 6 per cent below the maximum level it achieved after 1971, in 
1976. Moreover, even a fall in the share of the mining industry in the 
national economy is not unambiguous. If other industries, and particularly 
agriculture, had increased. their real contribution more quickly than did the 
mining industry, this would surely have to be considered a positive 
development. The problem with the Zambian economy is that these other sectors 
did not grow quickly enough to keep up with population growth with the result 
that real Gross Domestic Product per capita was, by 1982,20 per cent' lower 
than in 1970'. 
3/ 
9.1.2 The Industry's Contribution to Government Revenue 
The poor performance of the other sectors of the economy was linked to 
that of the mining industry in that the industry was not generating enough tax 
revenues to allow the Government to achieve its development objectives, nor 
enough foreign exchange to help finance the imports necessary for its own and 
other industries' develop! nent. 
The figure. s for the mining industry's contribution to government revenue 
were al-so given in Table 4.3, and show a drastic fall in its nominal and 
percentage contribution. We argued in Chapter 4 that this was largely due to 
the erosion in the profit position of the companies as shown in Table 4.4. 
However, it should be pointed out that the profit figures before and after 
1969 were not strictly comparable. In the first pýlace, the nationalized 
companies until 1974 had to pay for the administrative and other services 
pro vided by the former owners. In the second place, largely because of the 
Rhokana shareholding in Mufulira, the previous groups' pre-1968 interests in 
the Zambian mines were different from the nationalized groups'. 
3/ Calculated from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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Finally, the taxation system was changed after 1969 and, in particular, 
royalýy and export taxes which were previously charged to costs of sales were 
abolished and capital allowances were increased. Pre-tax income was 
henceforth larger by tht, amount of the difference. Roan Selection -Trust 
calculated what the pre-tax income of Roan Consolidated Mines would have been 
in the years after Independence, if the new fiscal regime had applied, and the 
figures are given in Table 9.2. Comparing these figures with those in Table 
4.4, it can be seen that, althc; ugh pre-tax income (column two) would have been 
slightly smaller if Roan Consolidated Mines, as later constituted, had existed 
frcxn 1965, the big difference was made by the change in royalty and export 
taxes. The management fees and increase in the capital allowances did not 
reduce pre-tax income by the. same order of magnitude (column four). In any 
event, it can be seen that the pre-1969 figures understated taxable income 
then and, therefore, that the decline in profitability after 1969 was even 
mor'e'serious than appears from Table 4.4. 
Table 9.2 
Theoretical Results of Pre-tax Income of Roan Consolidated Mines, 
1965-1969 (K mn) 
Mineral royalty 









1965 27.8 37.7 65.5 1.0 0.5 64.0 
1966 33.7 45.3 79.0 1.3 0.6 77.1 
1967 52.0 96.5 -1.2 O. 's 94.8 
1968 60.4 73.5 133.9 2.2 1.0 130.7 
-1969 64.9 99.8 164.6 2.9 1.3 160.4 
Source: Roan Selection Trust Appendices to the Explanatory Statement of 
Roan Selection Tr6st for meetings of shareholders to be held on 6th August 
1970,30th June 1970, page C-15. 
Furthermore, even in the years 1970 to 1973 when the industry was making 
substantial profits, its contribution to Government revenue was less than it 
would have been if the previous arrangements had been in existence. To return 
to our example of Roan Selection Trust, royalties, export taxes and income 
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Table 9.3 Tax payments by Roan Selection Trust (Roan Consolidated 
Mines), 1965-1974 (K mn) 
Profits before Royalties Zambian Total of Total payments 
royalties and and export income and -payments to Government as 
income taxes taxes mineral-a/ to govern- percentage of 
taxes ment taxable income- 
1965 ý4.8 22.5 18.1 40.6 62.7 
1966 85.8 34.8 22.7 57.5 67.0 
1967 100.5 52.0 21.2 73.2 72.8 
1968 140.8 60.4 29.1 91.8 65.2 
1969 170.4 64.9 37.7 103.3 60.6 
Dividends to 
Government 
1970b/ 108.7 7.7 69.9 77.6 71.4 
1971 85.8 11.2 36.1 47.3 55.1 
1972 53.7 10.5 10.7 21.2 39.5 
1973 75.7 15.8 28.5 44.3 58.5 
1974 222.5 22.6 144.1 166.7 74.9 
1975 41.1 3.3 9.9 13.2 32.1 
a/ Mineral taxes came into effect after 1970. 
b/ Six__months ended June 30,1970. 
Source: Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Reýort, Roan Selection Trus t Annual Report, 
various years. 
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taxes were taking something like 70 per cent of the available profits of the 
companies before nationalization as can be seen from Table 9.3. With the 
introduction of new tax allowances designed to'%, 
_encourage 
investment in 1970, 
income and mineral taxes paid fell very sharply as a percentage of taxable 
income. Even when the Government's 51 per centil, share of net dividends is 
added in, the Government was recovering a smaller proportion of income than in 
the days of private ownership. These- provisions were withdrawn with effect 
f rom 23rd September 1973, and the figures for 1973/1974 do show the 
Government's absolute and percentage take increasing substantially. After 
1974, the industry's pre-tax profits fell and in some years the companies were 
operating at a loss. The chance to recover such sums from the mining 
industry's operating surplus were not to re-occur. . 
9.1.3 The industry's contribution to the balance of payments 
Zambia could try to tap other sources of tax revenue to make up for what 
it was not obtaining from the mining industry. However, this was not the case 
for foreign exchange receipts where Zambia continued to rely upon the mining 
industry: in 1960, copper and cobalt exports came to 94 per cent of domestic 
exports f. o. r. and in 1980 to 96 per cent. 
A/ 
The mining industry also has to import many of its components, to make 
Iýaymýents in foreign exchange to expatriates and to pay for such services as 
transportation. The industry thus plays a crucial role in determining the 
different components of the current account balance. This balance is given in 
Table 9.4a which shows how Zambia has normally enjoyed a positive trade 
balance. Only in 1975 and 1982 did imports exceed exports. 1969, the last 
year of private ownership of the mines, saw the country enjoying a trade 
surplus of over K530 million which was never thereafter surpassed. This 
Figures from Mining Yearbooks. 
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Zambia Current Account Balance 
(Kmn) 
A B C D E F G H 
Trade Non-factor Investment Unrequited Current 
Exports Imports Balance services income transfers Net-b/ account 
f. o. b. f. o. b. (net) (net) (net) I nv is ibl es balanceS/ 
1964 330.3 142.9 187.4 -46.1 -69.1 3.4 -111.8 75.6 
1965 351.1 208.9 142.2 -31.6 -45.5 -3.5 -80.6 61.6 
1966 431.4 250.5 180.9 -60.6 -58.0 -9.6 -128.2 52.7 
1967 450.4 315.8 134.6 -75.7 -50.6 0.1 -126.2 8.4 
1968 534.0 356.7 177.3 -103.1 -52.1 -24.9 -180.1 -2.8 
1969 852.6 313.3 539.3 -102.5 -47.5 -51.0 -201.0 338.3 
1970 673.2 347.7 325.5 -110.6 -33.4 -104.5 -248.5 . 
77.0 
1971 479.2 401.3 77.9 -103.0 -43.6 -107.8 -254.4 -176.5 
1972 543.2 404.5 138.7 -117.3 -74.1 -96.1 -287.5 -148.8 
1973 733,. 5 349.4 384.1 -132.6 -82.9 -80.8 --! 296.3 87.8 
1974 898.2 509.1 389.1 -210.7 -86.9 -81.2 -378.8 10.3 
1975 516.2 609.6 -93.4 -218.4 -71.6 -81.8 -371.8 -465.2 
1976 742.4 482.3 260.1 -163.8 -105.8 -79.6 -349.2 -89.1 
1977 700.8 532.0 168.8 -220.2 -88.1 -68.6 -376.9 -208.1 
1978 665.1 494.8 170.3 -245.9 -100.4 -49.5 -395.8 -225.5 
1979 1116.6 595.6 521.0 -282.2 -119.6 -83.4 -485.2 35.8 
1980 1149.2 878.7 270.5 -393.7 -228.6 -138.5 -760.8 -490.3 
1981 866.3 926.4 60.1 -384.2 -97.9 -114.5 -596.6 -656.7 
1982 877.6 919.9 -42.3 -322.6 -227.6 - 36.4 -586.6 -628.9 
Memoranda: Average balances over the periods shown. 
1964 
-69 491.6 264.7 226.9 -69.9 -53.8 -14.3 -138.6 88.9 
1970 - 
-81 766.3 573.2 193.1 -223.4 -104.7 -86.4 -414.5 -221.4 
V Column A - Column B 
Y Columns (D+E+F) 
S/ Columns (C+G) 
Source-. Zambia monthly Digest of Statistics and International Monetary Fund 
International Financial Statistics various issues. 
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trade balance is primarily the balance between mineral, essentially copper, 
exports and imports. As can be seen from the figures, the value of imports 
has normally fluctuated from year to year much less than has that of exports 
leading to quite large year to year fluctuations in the trade balance. 
The deficit on invisibles has shown a more consistent trend, increasing, 
on the whole, steadily over time. The main payments are for transport 
(non-factor services), investment income (before 1969 largely dividend 
repatriation and after 1970 interest payments) and transfers that expatriates 
have made to their home countries (included in unrequited transfers). 
The figures show that there were two sharp increases in payments for 
non-factor services - between 1965 and 1966 and between 1973 and 1974. In 
both cases political events and Zambia's reaction to them, can help explain 
the increase: in the first case the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of 
independence in November 1965 and in the second the closure of the border with 
that country in January 1973. 
The bottom two rows in Table 9.4a give the average value of the different 
components of the current account for the periods 1964-1969 and 1970-1981. 
They bring out the deterioration of the invisible position as having been 
mainly responsible for changing Zambia's current account surplus. into a 
substantial deficitr The value of both imports and exports of goods rose and 
left the trade balance, in nominal terms, only slightly smaller. However, all 
components of the invisible balance deteriorated sharply with that of 
non-factor services, essentially payments for transport, showing the greatest 
absolute change, of K154 million, half the overall deterioration in the 
current account balance of K310 million. Outflows of investment income were 
on average about double their pre-1969 figures in the following years, which 
shows that nationalization did not stem the outflow of funds abroad. 
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Unrequited transfers were considerably greater after 1969 than before. The 
transfer of contract salaries and gratuities doubled between 1968 and 1971 and 
then remained steady at less than K50 million. 
In the early years of Independence, Zambia not only had a surplus on its 
current account but also was a net lender, with a net outflow in the 
non-monetary sector of the capital account (see Table 9.4b). After 1969, with 
the exception of 1973, she has had to receive inflows of funds. After taking 
into account errors and omissions the resulting overall balance has been 
negative from 1971, with the exception of 1974 and 1979. Initially this 
deficit was largely financed by running down foreign exchange holdings but 
after 1975 by increasing the foreign liabilities of the Central Bank and by 
going into arrears on external payments. The result of the fall in reserves 
and increase in external liabilities has been that the country moved from a 
position of having net foreign assets of K381 million at the end of 1970 to 
having net foreign liabilities of K682 million at the end of 1981.1/' 
In the 1970s, the rise in the pric. e of oil, the weakening of non-oil 
commodity prices, the slow growth of the developed market economices and, more 
recently, high interest rates have all caused severe problems for non-oil 
exporting developing countries. Zambia was clearly no exception. 
What has been exceptional has been the relative- deterioration- in her 
position. Before the increase in oil prices she often enjoyed a surplus on 
her current amount whereas in those years the net oil-importing developing 
countries as a group had. a current account deficit of over 10 per cent of 
their exports of goods and services. 
6/ 
By 1982, Zambia's current account 
5/ Bank of Zambia Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended 
December 31st 1981, page 106. 
6/ International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 1983, Washington, 
1983, page 64. 
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deficit was equivalent to 67 per cent- of her exports of goods and 
serviceswhereas the average figure for non-oil developing countries was 19 per 
cent and the median figure 40 per cent. 
1/ 
9.2 The Copper Market 4 
9.2.1 Trends in the nominal and real price of copper 
Exports did not make the contribution they could have to the trade and 
current account balances because of the fall in the volume and real price of 
copper. We give in Table 9.5 the price of copper on the London Metal Exchange 
in pounds sterling per metric ton. This was the price upon which Zambian 
selling prices were based except for the period January 1964 to April 1966 
when the Zambian producers tried to create greater stability in price by 
selling at a producer's price which was expected to change less frequently 
than did the London Metal Exchange Price. Beside this price is given the U. S. 
producers' price in cents per pound as given in Metals Week. 
We have calculated two indices to help'show the movement in real copper 
prices. The first, with 1970 as 100, shows the relative movement in the 
London Metal Exchange copper price compared to that of the prices of a large 
number of commodities, both being calculated in terms of dollars. Thus, for 
instance, by 1975 whereas the dollar price of copper was 81 per cent of its 
1970 level, the overall dollar price of commodities had risen by i74 per cent, 
makinq the relative movement a 50 per cent drop in the copper price (A. e. 
87/174). This index gives an idea of copper's relative price movements 
against other commodities. 
7/ International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 1984, Washington 1984 
page 193 and International Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics (for Zambian ratio). 
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Table 9.5 The nominal and real prices of copper 1960-1983. 
The nom inal price of Real price int4ices 
copper 1970=100 
E per cents/ Copper/ Copper/ Copper/ 
tonne. ý! / lbY CommoditiesS/ 14anufactur er sI Aluminium 
Year Export Prices. Y Price Ratioe/ 
1960 242.1 32.05 53.8 56.2 1.32 
1961 225.9 29.92 52.3 51.4 1.23 
1962 230.3 30.60 54.4 52.4 1.29 
1963 230.6 30.60 51.2 52.4 1.29 
1964 345.5 31.96 71.9 76.9 1.84 
1965 460.7 35.02 97.8 100.5 2.39 
1966 546.2 36.17 112.4 119.2 2.83 
1967 411.4 38.22 89.2 86.7 2.09 
1968 517.8 41.85 98.0 94.7 2.24 
1969 610.9 47.52 107.4 107.6 2.49 
1970 589.4 57.71 100.0 100.0 2.30 
1971 444.4 51.43 80.4 71.2 1.73 
1972 428.0 50.62 70.1 65.8 1.82 
1973 726.8 58.85 76.2 93.2 2.98 
1974 877.0 78.77 68.5 88.0 2.69 
1975 556.8 63.25 50.9 47.0 1.42 
1976 782.4 68.98 50.5 53.5 1.57 
1977 750.3 66.21 38.9 45.9- 1.15 
1978 710.5 65.81 42.2 41.6 1.03 
1979 934.1 92.21 52.8 53.3 1.23 
1980 941.8 101.31 53.6 52.8 1.23 
1981 865.6 84.21 49.9 44.5 1.39 
1982 846.1 72.80 48.3 38.7 1.49 
1983 1048.8 77.86 48.7 43.7 1.10 
Arithrretric 
Average 67.5 68.2 
Source: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, 
Metallgesellschaft-AG Metal Statistics, EWited Nations Monthly Digest Of 
Statistics, World Bureau of Metal Statistics World Metal Statistics 
1.76 
a/ The average London Metal Exchange Cash Settlement price of higher grade 
cathodes, and, prior to December 1981 wirebars. 
b/ 
C' 
U. S. producer cathodes, as quoted by Metals Week and, prior t 
The London Metal Exchange copper price movements compared to 
commodity prices, lines 76 axd and 76 c. d. in International 
Statistics. 
d/ The copper price in International Financial Statistics (76 c. d. ) compared to 
the United Nations' index 
, of unit values of exports 
ýf manufactures from the 
developed market economies. 
e/ The ratio of the London Metal Exchange copper price and the price in the 
United Kingdom of 99.5% aluminium ingots and, after 1979, the London Metal 
Exchange price for aluminium. 
o 1973, wirebars. 
movements in 
Financial 
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The other index we have used in a similar fashion is that of the dollar 
price of manufactured exports from the developed market economies. The 
movements in the dollar price of copper against this index give an idea of the 
relative movements in the price of copper against the prices of goods 
developing countries like Zambia have to import. We. have used it to help 
correct for the shifts in the commodity price index that would have occured 
because of the rise in the price of oil. 
The third column is simply the ratio of the London Metal Exchange price 
of copper to the price of aluminium. Aluminium, is a possible substitute for 
copper in many uses and their price ratio is a good indicator of the strength 
of the copper market for instance, if copper prices declined relative to 
commodity prices or the prices of manufactured exports, but still rose very 
strongly against aluminium, it could still be argued that the metal was being 
over-priced. 
All three indices do, though, paint a very similar picture. The real 
copper price was stable between 1960 and 1963, at about half its level of 
1970, and at a lower level than the average for the two decades. From 1964 to 
1969, the real price strengthened, reaching peaks in 1966, when the Zambian 
companies finally abandoned their attempts to control the 'London Metal 
txchange price and- again in 1969. The-real price declined steadily from 1969 
to reach a minimum in 1977 or 1978, depending upon which index is used, but 
even the subsequent recovery was weak and in no way restored the copper price 
to its levels of the early part of the decade, nor even of the early 1960s. 
Copper, which in 1969 was two and a half times as expensive per tonne as 
aluminium was by 1983, only ten per cent more expensive. In the meantime, the 
real cost of producing copper, measured, as in Table 6.1 by the Kwacha costs 
free on rail or cost of sales less royalties and export taxes, deflated by the 
unit value indices of the exports of manufactured goods from the developed 
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market economies increased by 47 and 33 per cent respectively. The result has 
been disastrous for the Zambian mining industry and for the Zambian economy. 
While it is clear, then, that the fall in the real price of copper did 
cause difficulties for the industry and prevented it from making such a 
contribution to the country as it had before nationalization, two questions 
must be addressed. The first is whether such a fall could have been 
an ticipated and the second is whether the Zambians could have done anything to 
have prevented or to have mitigated it. 
9.2.2 The copper market at the time of nationalization 
A fall in the real price of copper could have been anticipated. The 
restraint on copper prices that ended in 1966 was followed by a price-increase 
that encouraged investment 'in the industry. By 1969, it was clear that the 
prevailing high prices of copper were likely to fall. In his last Chairman's 
statement, Sir Ronald Prain reported that the Roan Selection Trust group's 
studies had indicated that refined copper consumption would increase at an 
average annual rate of 4.2 per cent over the following five years, whilst 
primary productive capacity would increase by over 6 per cent which "would 
appear- to indicate that the supply position may be expected to ease". . 
2/ 
As 
Chairman, Sir Ronald could hardly be expected to paint too pessimistic a 
picture and gave various reasons for expecting the market to be in balance. 
All in all, he argued, "it would be just as danger. ous to assume substantially 
lower prices as it would be to believe the present price level will be 
maintained or increased". 
Sir Ronald set out in greater detail the basis for his concern in two 
speeches, in 1970 and 1971. We have summarized these forecasts in Table 9.6. 
The first two columns give the estimates for world mine capacity that he made 
in 1970 and 1971 respectively. Capacity is different from production and 
Roan Selection Trust Group of Companies' "Statement by the Chairman, Sir 
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Sir Ronald used a factor of 93 per cent to make the conversion. Add ing in 
secondary refined and scrap made up the total of available supplies. It will 
be seen that, according to his 1970 estimates, capacity and supplies were to 
expand by 6-1/2 per cent per annum. The 1971 capacity estimates lowered the 
figures from 1974 and so the growth in capacity was expected to be only just 
over 5 per cent. Both figures were above the historic growth rate of copper 
consumption of 4.4 per cent. Indeed, in 1971, Sir Ronald estimated that the 
market economies' consumption 6f refined copper would rise from 6.5 million 
tonnes in 1972 to 7.7 million tonnes in 1976 and, after taking into account 
consumption of secondary copper and net exports to the socialist countries, 
that demand for primary mine production would rise from 5.6 million tonnes in 
1972 to 6.6 million tonnes in 1976. Comparing those estimates with the second 
column in Table 9.6 indicates just how serious the problem of excess capacity 
was expected to be. 
Table 9.6 also gives figures for the actual production and consumption of 
copper and the levels of refined stocks over the period which would have been 
used by the Chairman - of the nationalized companies to assess developments in 
the market. 
9.2.3 The copp er market after nationalization 
It was clear at the time the mines were nationalized that th7e market was 
in surplus and that the high price was unlikely to be maintained. Mr. A. S. 
Sardanis, Chairman of Roan Consolidated Mines stated that "the prospects for 
the coming year are unfortunately not so bright. The price of copper is 
unlikely to reach the levels it did during the year under review. In fact, it 
is almost certain to remain at substantially lower levels".. 
2/ In the 
following year, 1971, the new Chairman, Mr. Dominic C. Mulaisho argued that 
9/ Roan Corisolidated Mines, "Statement by the Chairman, Mr. A. S. Sardanis" 
to accompany Annual Report 1970 page 7. 
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"the possibility of a surplus in copper production capacity has been of 
concern to the industry for some years ... The surplus (in 1971) has arisen in 
10/ 
spite of various unplanned production curtailments". The copper surplus 
persisted into 1972 although the size of the surplus was described by Mr. 
Mulaisho as "modest".! "" Copper stocks only increased marginally. 
By 1973, copper prices began to move up again as the situation changed 
from a surplus to a deficit and as the world economy went through the last 
burst of economic activity before the onset of the recession that was partly 
caused by the increase in oil prices in the winter of 1973/74. This deficit 
in the copper market was also assisted by several world producers experiencing 
production difficulties. Commercial stocks fell sharply in the year. Copper 
prices reached a peak in April 1974, of E1270 per tonne on the London Metal 
Exchange, but by the end of the year had fallen to E554 per tonne, as the 
recession depressed demand. 
As production increased during that year, stocks expanded and continued 
to expand in 1975 and 1976, keeping prices depressed. The market did tighten 
somewhat in 1979 and commercial stocks of refined copper fell to 1090 thousand 
tonnes. Also, only in 1979 did nominal prices recover to their levels of 
1974, but in real terms they remained substantially below their levels of that 
year. After 1.979 or 1980, depending upon which index is used, the real pr-ice 
of copper fell as the increase in commercial stocks of refined copper showed 
that the industry was still facing a surplus in production. At the end of 
1983, these stocks still stood at over 1.5 million tonnes. 
10/ Roan Consolidated Mines "Statement by the Chairman, Mr. Dominic C. 
Mulaisho" to accompany Annual Report 1971, page 2. 
ll/ Roan Consolidated Mines "Statement by the Chairman, Mr. Dominic C. 
MulaishoH to accompany Annual Report 1972, page 1. 
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It is clear, then, that the Zambians invested very heavily in the 
industry at a time of excess capacity - the beginning of the 1970s. By i ts 
estimates of 1971, Zambian copper production in 1976 should have stood at 
12/- 
900,000 tonnes as compared to 645 thousand tonnes in 1971. This would 
have been a good tactic if the new capacity could have come into production at 
a time when the global production surplus had been removed. Yet this was not 
expected to happen: even in 1976, as we saw, there was expected to be a 
considerable excess of capacity over demand. 
In 1970 or 1971, it was, understandably, impossible to predict the 
1973-1974 oil shock and the subsequent slow-down in the pace of economic 
activity in the developed market economies. By 1975 it was clear, though, 
that the era of steady world growth, and therefore, of a steadily growing 
demand for metals, including copper, was at an end. Very considerable caution 
was needed by all producers in the industry and every effort should have been 
made to restore balance to the market. 
9.2.4 Attempts to control the market 
The Zambians did take part in two efforts to balance supply and demand. 
In November 1974, together with other CIPEC producers - Chile, Zaire and Peru 
they agreed to cut their exports by 10 per cent. In April 1975, the 
producers agreed to cut productkon by 15 per cent -for. the period until June 
1976, although Chile was unhappy with this decision. In December 1977, the 
CIPEC producers again agreed to a production cutback, also of 15 per cent, to 
be effectivq! from March 1978. 
These attempts to balance supply with demand had little apparent effect 
on the copper price and the Zambian producers, even at times of excess supply, 
have argued that they cannot cut production. The Chairman of Zambia 
12/ Republic of Zambia Second National Development Plan, January 
1972-December 1976, Ministry of Development Planning and National 
'Euidance, Lusaka, December 1971, page 86. 
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Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Mr. F. H. Kaunda, stated in 1983 that: 
"The Management critically examined the question of closure of some mines 
or sections thereof ... The study (concluded) that there would be no 
siqnificant benefit to the Company in the short-term from closure of 
mines. In the long-term, however, some savings would be realised but at 
the risk of some mines not being re-opened. The other notable point was 
that the Company's ability to earn foreign exchange would be seriously 
impaired, with virtually no substitute source of foreign exchange from 
other sectors of the Zambian economy at present. For these reasons, the 
Company could not, literally# afford to shut down a section of the 
Zambian economy". 13/ 
This argument against cutting production would seem to be at variance 
with the position of the Zambian Pr esident, Dr. K. K. Kaunda who, at the end 
of 1983, called on the major nationalized producers of copper to cut back 





P. H. Kaunda wrote that *it is inevitable that some of the mines 
will have to eventually close" -although he appeared to be talking of a long- 
15/ 
term perspective. - 
9.2.5 Reasons for Zambia's loss of control over the market 
By 1983, however, zambia had largely lost any influence it once had on 
the copper market. In the 1960s, the Zambians were able to exert considerable 
-influence on-the copper market. Roan Selection Trust, in particular, was the 
leader in many attempts to regulate the market. In October 1960, the Trust 
cut produc tion by 10 per cent and Rhodesian Anglo American cut sales by 10 per 
13/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines wStatement by Mr. F. H. Kaunda, Chairman 
and Chief Executive" to accompany Annual Report 1983 page 4. 
14/ Mining Journal November llth 1983, page 338. 
15/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines "Statement by Mr. F. H. Kaunda, Chairman 
and Chief Executive" to accompany Annual Report 1984, page 6. 
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cent at a time of excess supply. In July 1962, these cuts were increased to 
16/ 15 per cent, and other world producers. followed their lead. - However, all 
attempts to control the market were abýandoned in 1966, at a time of excess 
demand, when the Chileans broke ranks, and increased their producers' prices 
above that of the other producers. Since that year, the important world 
exporters have all used the London Metal Exchange price for their sales 
contracts. 
Even a threat by the Zambian producers to cut production did, in the 
past, influence the market. For instance, in July 1959, when it was producing 
at full capacity to make up for losses incurred in a previous strike, Roan 
Selection Trust threatened to cut production by 10 per cent as it felt 
production was out-stripping supply% the price quickly moved up by E17 to E226 
per tonne. 
17/ 
There would appear to be several reasons why the Zambians lost their 
former influence over the copper market. The first was that other producers 
are no longer prepared to follow them. In particular, the Chileans have 
insisted on maximizing their own output, arguing that they can do so as 
low-cost producers. -I. -8/ Another reason is that production decisons have not 
always been in the country's hands. When the country has acceded to 
-International Monetary Fund programmes, as in 1978 and 1981, these have set 
out inter alia specific targets for mineral producti.,.. 
19/ 
The whole question of the International Monetary Fund's adjustment 
policies is very complex and controversial; some of their stipulations, such 
that there be a devaluation, are made public, whilst other performance 
criteria are not set out publicly. However, there has been considerable 
16/ Economist July 7,1962 
77/ Economist July 27th 1959. 
18/ mining Journal November llth 1983, page 338, February 17,1984 page 102. T9/ 
_ning 
Journal October 7th 1983 page 254. 
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criticism that the Fund has been I encouraging over-production of minerals, both 
in its adjustment programmes which dictate that production should increase 
(and indeed Zambia was giving the highest priority to the expansion of 
minerals production after reaching an agreement with the IMF in March 
1983), 
20/ 
and in its Compensatory Financing Facility. This Facility can be 
drawn on by countries which are faced with shortfalls in export revenues 
beyond their control. Members of CIPEC, including Zambia and Chile, have used 
this Facility and it has been argued that the shortfalls in revenue are not 
really beyond their control but are indeed a direct result of their policies 
of over-production which have depressed prices. Insofar, then, as the 
International Monetary Fund has dictated Zambia's production policies,. this 
has weakened the country's influence over the world copper market. 
One of the ways to limit production is to shut down uneconomic mines. As 
just mentioned, this possibility has finally been raised in 1984. However, 
closing a mine down temporarily does involve costs, not only in terms of the 
social and economic effects of making some workers redundant. If a mine is to 
. 
be re-opened, work still has to be carried out to prevent collapse. Yet, the 
cost of this development work will not 1: ýe supported by current income. For 
these reasons, mines have rarely been closed down - the last time a mine has 
been temporarily closed was in 1958/59 when Bancroft (Konkola) was closed down 
at a time of low copper prices and mining difficulties. Development work 
amounting to El. 4 million continued during the year of its closure. 
21/ 
it 
has been said that the Zamanglo group subsequently regretted closing down the 
mine for this year. 
Restricting output need not necessarily mean the closure of mines and the 
laying-off of workers. Production can be reduced simply by devoting more 
20/ Mining Journal October 7,1983, page 255. 
21/ Bancroft Copper Mines Ltd., Annual Report, 1959. 
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effort to development work, to preparing the underground workings for future 
production. Yet, as Graph 6.15 showed, when the price of copper fell after 
1974, development work for both of the groups tailed off. 'By 1982, the 
reduction in development work had "rendered inflexible most mining operations 
Z2/ 
which (was) an undesirable feature in times of unscheduled events". it 
would then appear that Zambia could have made a virtue out of necessity by 
proclaiming it was going to cut production to balance supply with demand, and 
that it wanted other producers to follow suit. At the same time, it could 
have devoted more of its resources to development work. It is, of course, 
difficult to know what would 'have happened if Zambia had tried to resume its 
leading role in influencing the copper market, but it could hardly be argued 
that its not even attempting to play that role was beneficial to either the 
world copper industry or the Zambian industry. 
9.3, The Strugglewith Southern Rhodesia 
Any threat by Zambia to alter its production would only have carried 
weight in the world copper market if the country had enjoyed considerable 
freedom of manoeuvre. For instance, a threat to cut production by 15 per cent 
would have carried little weight if it was well known that production would 
fall by that amount anyway. Indeed, in 1978, when Zambia agreed with other 
world producers to cut production by 15 per cent, as previously mentioned, it 
had to declare force majeure on a further 15 per ce nt of its copper shipments 
in May of that year because of transport difficulties. 
23/ 
Such difficulties were largely a result of political factors: Zambia's 
response to the challenge from whiýe-ruled Southern Rhodesia and in particular 
her adherence to the policy of sanctions against that country that the 
22/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. "Statement by Mr. F. H. Kaunda, 
Chairman and Chief Executive" to accompany Annual Report 1982, page 3. ý 
23/ Mining Annual Review 1978, page 481. 
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international community endorsed. She paid the highest price of any country 
in adopting sanctions and was not fully compensated by the international 
community for the considerable costs incurred. 
24/ 
9.3.11 Stages in the struggle 
The main chronology of effects is that on November llth 1965, the crown 
colony of Southern Rhodesia (hereafter Rhodesia) unilaterally declared itself 
independent of Great Britain. The colony had self-government where the white 
minority. controlled all the levers of power. Zambia refused to accept 
anything but majority, i. e., black, rule in Rhodesia, even though it was clear 
that the costs to itself of opposing the Rhodesian regime would be larglý. Her 
whole economy had been dependent on links with the South. She relied upon 
Rhodesian Railways for her transport links, on the Wankie Colliery in Rhodesia 
for much of her coal supplies and on the hydroelectric station on the Southern 
Rhodesian side of the Kariba dam for her electricity supplies. some of these 
links she could not have cut at once, - in particular, her economy would have 
collapsed if the Kariba electric supplies, which in 1965 amounted to 68 per 
25/ 
cent of the country's- and 74 per cent of the Copperbelt's electric 
supplies, -1-6/ had been 
. 
interrupted. Yet Zambia was determined to cut her 
links with the South both to pressure the Rhodesian regime * into granting 
majority rule- and to reduce that regime's leverage on her-. it-was clearly 
unwise for her to have her economy so dependent upon a regime th-at was 
inherently hostile. There were costs involved in Zambia's action but, it must 
24/ United Nations Economic and Social Council Assistance to Zambia: 
Statement made bv the Co-ordinator of United Nations Assistance to Zambia 
on behalf of the Secretary-Gener 1, E/5867,27 July 1976, page 9. ýL 
25/ Republic of Zambia monthly Digest of Statistics, January/February 1968, 
page 15. 
. 
Z6/ Copperbelt of Zambia Mining Industry-Year Book 1968, page 49, Kitwe. 
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be stated, her policy was successful in that Rhodesia achieved majority rule 
in June 1979 under a government headed by Bishop Muzorew. a. This' was not 
acceptable to all parties and in September 1979 a conference took place in 
London to arrange the terms for legal independence In December 1979 the 
first stage of this was achieved with the arrival in Salisbury of a British 
governor, thereby ending the rebellion. Elections f6llowed and, in April 
1980, Rhodesia became independent as the Republic of Zimbabwe, with Robert 
Mugabe as Prime Minister. 
For Zambia, there were roughly three phases of the confrontation. The 
first was primarily economic and lasted until January 1973 when the Rhodesian 
authorities closed the border with Zambia. Although the Rhodesians were 
prepared to re-open it to Zambian traffic the Zambians kept the border 
closed. This border closing took place just after the armed struggle had 
begun in Rhodesia, in 1972. 
The Rhodesian regime initially retaliated by atýticks on camps of 
guerrillas in Zambia and by planýing land-mines along the Southern border. 
This phase, in which the Rhodesian forces pursued primarily military 
objectives inside Zambia, lasted until October 1979 when the Rhodesian 
goVernment, in an eff ort to force the Zambian Government to use its influence 
with the guerrillas at the conference in_London, resorted -to attacks upon 
bridges in Zambia and to barring the shipment of maize for Zambia through 
Rhodesia (in October 1978 because of economic difficulties, Zambia had 
re-opened the border with Rhodesia). This -third phase of the confrontation 
with Rhodesia, aimed at damaging the Zambian economy, ended in December 1979, 
but it took longer for the damage to be repaired. 
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9.3.2 The initial effects oi the conirontation'on-the Zambian''economy, ' 
1965-1972 
From the above, it can be seen that the struggle with Rhodesia involved 
ýonomic dislocation rather than a massive destruction of physical plants of 
sort that occurs. in a conventional war., attacks on guerrilla camps and 
laying of land-mines took place sufficiently far away from the Copper belt 
not to directly affect production there. Moreover, there were informal 
though still powerful limits to how far the Rhodesian authorities could go 
, inflicting economic damage on Zambia. In particular, the British explained 
, at they were prepared to take 
"whatever action was necessary" if Rhodesia 
ýt off power supplies to the Copperbelt. As the Rhodesians did not do 
the British never had to show what sort of action they meant. 
on the other-hand, the Rhodesians had it in their power to make life very 
, fficult for Zambia without actually having to resort to the type of action 
at would have forced the British into taking decisive military action 
ýainst them. This was soon shown. In December 1965 Britain acted to bar the 
. le or shipment of oil to Rhodesia 
by British firms and, in retaliation, 
ýodesia prohibited oil shipments through her territory to Zambia. An airlift 
a mounted by' Britain, Canada and the United States from then until May 1966 
keep Zambia supplied. In September 1968 the oil crisis was essentially 
ANGLIN D. G. and SHAW T. M. Zambia's Foreign Policy; Studies in 
Diplomacy and Dependency. Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1979, page 144. 
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over when a pipeline from Dar-es-Salaam opened. Also, after Zambia in April 
1966 had decided to block payments to the Rhodesian Railways' account in 
Bulawayo for costs in the Zambian section of the commonly-held railway, 
Rhodesia Railways demanded, in May, payment in adv ance from Zambia for any 
exports frogn Zambia. Zambia refused to make these payments. and, until the 
crisis was resolved at the end of -July, had to find alternative outlets for 
her copper, including the infamous "Hell Run", the 1200 mile road fr(xn central 
Zambia to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania which was totally inadequate for the 
volume of traffic it had to bear. Zambia also sought to develop her own 
supplies of coal so as not to have to rely on the Wankie Colliery after 
Rhodesia sought, in the event unsuccessfully, to impose a $5 a ton royalty on 
co al. By June 1966, production began at the Nkandabwe mine, and in December 
1968 the first supplies of coal from the higher grade Zambian mine of Maamba 
2 
were received on the Copperbelt. -L8/ In November 1971, imports from the 
Wankie Colliery- ended. Zambian coal was, though, initially difficult to use 
in existing plant and so for this reason, and also because of the increase in 
the price of Rhodesian coal, the costs of fuel-per metric ton of copper sold 
29/ increased from K6 in 1964/65 to K14 in 1968/69 . 
One cost of the break with Rhodesia that is har-d to quEintify was simply 
-thp! cost of 
inconvenience. The links between the two countries had been very 
strong; businessmen in Zambia who needed a spare part or other machinery 
simply telephoned to Salisbury or Bulawayo to obtain it. Breaking these 
connections was undoubtedly one of the greatest costs of Zambia's reaction to 
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. By about the time of 
28/ Copperbelt of Zambia Mining Industry_Year Book 1968, page 28. 
29/ BOSMCK M. and HARVEY C. (Eds. ) Economic Independence and Zambian Copper, 
Praeger, New York, 1972, pages 117-120. 
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nationalization, at the end of 1969, these and the other shocks caused by the 
Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence had largely been absorbed. 
De I iver ies to customers were virtually uninterrupted and the fuel and 
- ! ol 
- transport situation had improved. The progres s made by Zambia in 
de-linking its economy from Rhodesia can be seen from the trend in the value 
of imports from Rhodesia: from K71 million in 1965, equivalent to 33.7 per 
cent of total imports, they fell to K22.6 million in 1968, equivalent to 4.1 
per cent of imports, at which level they remained until 1972 when they fell 
31/ * sharply to under K12 million. 
9.3.3 The closure of the border January 1973-October 1978 
9.3.3.1 The importance of Rhodesia Railways 
The next drastic change in Zambia's relations with Rhodesia came with the 
closing of the border in January 1973 which reduced the percentage by weight 
of Zambia's exports and imports going through Rhodesia from 55 and 69 per cent_ 
respectively in 1972 to next to nothing. In Zambia's case, import tonnages 
are normally higher than export tonnages and the wagon capacity required for 
imports is about 2.3 times that needed for exports (see Table 9.7). 
L2/ 
A 
priori, then, the problems caused by the refusal of Zambia to use the 
Rhodesian Railways for her trade would have affected imports more than 
exports. As Table 9.7 shows, after the border closing in 1973, the tonnage of 
imports dropped sharply whilst that of exports did not. Indeed, in 1974, the 
30/ RST Group of Companies "Statement by the Chairman, Sir Ronald L. Prain 
OBE" to accompany Annual Report 1969, page 1. 
31/ Figures from Republic of Zambia Monthly Diqest of Statistics, various 
issues. 
32/ United Nations Economic and Social Council Assistance to Zambia, Report 
of the Secretary-General, 5 July 1978 (E/1978/114), Annex, page 14. 
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Table 9 .7 
a/ Trade routes for Zambia's foreign trade7 
(000 tons) 
Mozambique 
Tan- Rhodesia (direct or 
Benguela Tanzam zanian Railways/ th rough 
Railway Railways Roads Roads Malawi) Other Total Exports Imports 
1970 305 501 1,691 24 8 2,529 848 1,681 
1971 445 - 516 19438 38 9 2,446 798 1,684 
1972 314 - -412 1,331 46 8 2,111 854 1,257 
1973 807 - 484 40 150 191 1,672 813 859 
1974 947 - 590 - 135 234 1,906 924 982 
1975 566 115 660 - 235 85 1,661 782 879 
1976 135 675 571 - 212 64 1,657 898 759 
1977 132 937 337 - 68 69 1,543 871 672 
1978 98 856 226 136 104 51 1,471 
1979 53 452 305 637 67 33 1,517 
1980 46 517 365 712 8 23 1 -, 6 71 
1981 24 535 235 564 17 18 1,393 
Sour ce United Nations Assistance to Zambia, E/1978/114, (5 July 1978) 
Annex, page 13; A/35/208, (19 June 1980) Annex, page 12; A/37/133, 
(7 September 1982), Annex page 16. 
a/ Excluding direct trade with Zaire and oil imports which come through the 
Dar-es-Salaam pipeline. 
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export tonnage was 8 per cent greater than in 1972. Moreover, whereaS traffic 
on the other routes was balanced before 1973, it was the Rhodesian route which 
carried the excess of imports over exports. in 1972, for instance, it carried 
864,000 tons of Zambia's imports as against 467,000 tonnes of her exports, 
whereas the tota: l difference between imports and exports was 403,000 tonnes. 
9.3.3.2 The structure of exports and imports 
The vast bulk of Zambia's exports are minerals - 818,540 tonnes, in 1972, 
the year before the border closure, of which 708,824 were exports of 
copper.! -3/ Zambia's import composition is considerably less concentrated 
than its export composition. In 1972,42 per cent of her imports by value 
were machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7), 22 per cent were manufactures 
classified by materials (SITC 6), another 9 per cent were other manufactures 
(SITC' 8), and 8 per cent were chemicals (SITC 5). -L4/ Only 7 per cent by 
value were mineral products (SITC 3). These percentages could change from 
year to year but the overall picture was one of a heavy concentration of 
Zambia's imports in ma7hufactures. In 1980, for example, SITC 5-9 accounted 
ýL5 
/ 
for 71 per cent of imports, and SITC 7 alone for 35 per cent. The 
figures for imports in weight terms bring out the same conclusion. In 1974, a 
year of heavy imports, manufactures classified by materials accounted for 29 
per cent by weight of imports (excluding crude oil that came through the 
pipeline) chemicals for 27 per cr-nt and machinery and transport equipment for 
11 per cent. -L6/ As these figures show, the higher value added in machinery 
33/ Republic of Zambia Annual Statement of External Trade 1974 Volume 1, 
Table 6, page 8. 
34/ ibid. Table 1, page 2. 
ý-5/ Monthly Diqest of Statistics. Volume XVII, Nos. 1-3, January/March 1982, 
page 20. 
36/ Annual Statement of External Trade 1974, page 11. 
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and transport equipment means that their contribution to the value of imports 
is greater than that to the weight of imports. 
The Zambian mining industry is heavily reliant on imports for its 
supplies. In 1972, 
. 
1973,1974 and 1975, current imports into the mining 
industry accounted for 8.5,9.2,5.5 and 6.2 per cent respectively of the 
value of total imports, and goods for the m'ining industry's fixed capital 
formation came to 9.8,7.3,4.9 and 5.9 per cent respectively. -1-71 In other 
words, the mining industry's -claim on total imports came to 18.3,16.5,10.4 
and 12.1 per cent respectively. These figures can be compared to the 22.9, 
29.8,33.1 and 35.3 of total imports required for the manufacturing industry. 
The relative fall in the mining industry's claims on imports was accompanied 
in these years by an actual fall in the value of its imports from K73.5 
million in 1972 to K72 million in 1975, whilst the value of total imports rose 
from K402.5 million to K597.6 million. 
The value-of mineral exports is much greater I; han these direct imports 
into the mining industry. However, to maintain production in the miriing 
industry, the total volume of imports that is needed is greater than the 
direct inputs into the industry. A United Nations report on the country, 
which relied upon information supplied by the Zambian Government, estimated 
for 1977, when the mining industry's exports amounted to K685 million, that 
direct impQrts for the mining industry came to about K100 million but that 
another K130 million of goods had to be imported for-industries and firms that 
were providing inputs for the sector and also to satisfy the consumption 
demands of the expatriate community working on the mines. 
18/ 
Approximately 
K230 million of imports, then, was needed to produce the exports of copper. 
. 
27/ Figures in this paragraph are from Annual Statement of External Trade 
1975, Volume 1, Table 5, page 12. 
38/ E/1978/114 op. cit., Annex, page 28. 
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The present writer has not seen_ figures for the weight of imports needed 
for the direct and indirect needs of the mining industry. However, if we 
assume, on the basis of the United Nations' figures, that the indirect needs 
of the industry are 130 per cent of the direct needs and if we use the high 
1972 figure of 18 per cent of total imports for these latter needs, then the 
total requirements of the industry are for 41 per cent of imports. if we had 
used the 1975 figure of 12 per cent, then the total needs of the mining 
industry would have been for nearly 30 per cent of imports. Applying these 
percentages to the total weight of imports in 1972, the year before the border 
closed, would give the import needs by weight of the' direct and indirect needs 
of the copper industry as coming to between 380 and 500 thousand tonnes. This 
tonnage is considerably below the weight of metal exports. Moreover, the 
figures are inflated in so far as they include imports of oil which came 
through the pipeline. If the same calculations are done with the 1977 imports 
that totalled K530 million and, excluding oil and direct trade with Zaire, 
weighed*672 thousand tonnes, then the K230 million of imports for the mining 
industry would have weighed nearly 300 thousand tonnes. 
Clearly, this tonnage of impor-ts was within the capacity of the transport 
system, certainly in 1972 before the border was closed, but also afterwards. 
What was requ ired was that priority be given- to imports necessary for the 
copper indusýtry, and also that there should not be a sudden need to import 
materials to co%ýer domestic production shortfalls. In the end such a 
shortfall in 1978 forced the Zambian Government to re-open the Southern 
border. As it explained at the time, the existing routes were too congested 
to enable the country to receive by planting time the 180,000- tonnes of 
fertilizer it needed or to dispatch the 70,000 tonnes of copper that had piled 
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up at the mines. The southern route was re-opened on October 6th 1978.29-IIn 
early 1979, because of the bad weather, it estimated that 324,000 tonnes of 
maize would be needed 
40/ 
and so partly for this reason the Southern route 
remained open. With the coming of legal independence to Zimbabwe in 1980, 
there was little question of the Zimbabwe route being cut again. 
9.3.4 The aftermath of the closing of the border 
9.3.4.1 The continuing closure of the Benguela Railway 
Even so, 'as Table 9.7 shows,. the combined tonnage of imports and exports 
in 1980 and 1981 was considerably below that of 1970. One reason for this was 
totally out of Zambia's control - the closure of the Benguela railway since 
1975 to anything but traffic from Zaire as a resujt of the civil war in 
Angola. This closure reduced to next to nothing traffic to Zambia along a 
railway which had carried about 1,000,000 tonnes of Zambian Icargo in 1974, 
just after the southern border was closed, and 300,000 tonnes in a more normal 
year, 1970. If the 1974 capacity had been available in 1981, Zambia's imports 
and exports could have amounted to 2.3 million tonnes. 
9.3.4.2 The poor Performance of the Tanzam railwa 
As great a disappointment for Zambia as the closure of the Benguela 
Railway was the poor performance of the'Tanzam Railway from Kapiri Mposhi in 
Zambia to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. This was expected to carry 65 per cent 
of Zambia's trade, or about 1.6 million tonnes both ways per year, the 
remaining 900,000 tonnes going through the Benguela Railway. Its initial 
capacity was estimated at 80,000 tonnes a month (960,000 tonnes a year) for 
exports, equivalent to 50,000 tonnes a month for imports (600,000 tonnes per 
39/ United Nations Security Council Note Verable dated 6th October 1978 frcxn 
the permanent representative of Zambia to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General S/12884,6 October 1978. 
40/ United Nations General Assembly Assistance to Zambia: Report of the 
Secretary-General, 30th August 1979, A/34/407, Annex, page 25 
-- 286 - 
year) . 
Al/ 
The railway was officially opened in October 1975 but as Table 
9.7 shows, it has not yet carried anything like the expected share of Zambia's 
trade in 1981 it only carried 535,000 tonnes in both directions, less than 
one-third of its expected initial capacity. 
The reasons for the poor performance of the Tanzam railway were discussed 
in considerable detail in the United Nations' reports. ' It should be 
remembered that these reports, outlining Zambia's needs for external 
assistance, reflected the international community's sympathy for Zambia as 
bearing the brunt of the confrontation with Rhodesia, and were also written 
with a view towards obtaining international assistance for Zambia. It was 
beyond the terms of reference of their authors, writing in the name of the 
Secretary-General, to be critical of Zambia or not to accept the Government's 
position that the country's prob lems were caused by exogenous factors. 
Critic-ism, even whenonly hinted at, is for that reason all the more telling. 
The United Nations made it clear that the Tanzam railway was -soundly 
constructed by the Chinese engineers: the track was generally 
excellent. -L2/ In 1978, the United Nations showed how an important cause of 
the railway's operating below capacity was that the availability of diesel 
locomotives was. considerably below the expected level of 80 per cent. 
43/ 
This was compounded by a high turnaround time, i. e., the time of the round 
trip leaving Dar-es-Salaam, unloading and reloading at terminals ---throughout 
Zambia and repeating the process in Dar-es-Salaam. The designed level was 
41/ A/34/407, op.! jjýt., Annex, page 15. The next year's report on Assistance 
to Zambia, 19 July 1980, A/35/208, puts the line capacity at 2 million 
tonnes, which would include internal traffic in Zambia and Tanzania 
(Annex page 22). 
42/ E/1978/114, a. cit. Annex page 21. 
43/ ibid., Annex, page 21. 




In 1978, turnaround time was from 35 to 45 days, 
ý-5-/ but this 
was only reduced to 20 days in 1982.. 
1-6/ 
In earlier years, such factors as congestion at Dar-es-Salaam and a lack 
of experience with operating the new equipment could be used to explain away 
the poor performance of the railway. However the persistently high 
turnaround times and poor performance of the railway into 1982 shows that a 
more fundamental cause must be sought. As early as 1978 the United Nations 
had pointed to a serious labour deficiency. It stated that the Tanzam 
railway's most urgent need was seasoned staff to make proper use of the 
infrastructure and equipment. Proper staff was hard to recruit and harder to 
retain because once the railway had trained its mechanics many left for more 
attractive surroundings, and higher wages, on the Copper Belt. . 
17/ 
It should be pointed out that difficulties in obiaining qualified railway 
staff were not new to Zambia. Inside the country, there had been accidents 
caused by drunken railway eng-ineers and even before the Tanzam railroad was 
opened in 1971, 
. 
Zambia had sought the assistance of the Canadian National 
Railways to r un its railways. 
±8-/ 
Zambia was, then, taking a great risk in 
expecting the Tanzam Railway to be operated at full capacity, although the 
extent of the shortfall in its performance could hardly have been anticipated. 
44/ United Nations General Assembly Assistance -to Zambia: Report of the 
Secretary-General, A/37/133,7th September 1982, Annex, page 58. 
45/ E/1978/114,2p. cit., Anne-x, page 19. 
46/ A/37/133,22. cit., Annex, page 22. 
47/ E/1978/114,22. cit., Annex, page 22. 
48/ The Economist, September 4th, 1971. 
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9.3.4.3 Transport difficulties and their effects on production 
It is difficult to translate Zambia's difficulties with her transport 
routes into, losses in copper production. When the border was f irst closed, 
the Government realized that production would fall below target - by 2 per 
cent in 1973 and by 6 per cent in 1974. ýL9/ Copper production was at that 
time expected to expand rapidly; as previously mentioned, the Second National 
Development Plan for the period January 1972 to December 1976 foresaw it 
rising to 900 thousand tonnes in 1976. -2-0/ This figure was on the high side 
but, even so, falls of 2 and 6 per cent below a target of, say, 850,000 would 
not have brought production to the low levels they actually reached. A 
further illustration of this is that Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., 
which, unlike Roan Consolidated Mines, did not have to contend" with the 
effects of a mine disaster, in mid-1974 planned for its production to increase 
to a rate of 500rOOO tonnes per annum by 1975 as compared to 440,000 tonnes 
achieved in the year ending 31st March 1973. -Ll/ 
We would not, then, hold transport problems'alone responsible for t4e 
production* and other difficulties the Zambian copper mining industry faced. 
However, these difficulties exacerbated the transport problem by not providing 
the mines with the revenues, particularly foreign exchange revenues that could 
have been used to help overcome them. 
49/ Statement on behalf of the Secretary-General by Sir Robert Jackson, 
Co-ordinator of United Nations' Assistance for Zambia, 17th July 1973. 
Mimeographed page 5. 
50/ Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Development Planning and National 
Guidance Second National Development Plan Januarx 1972-December 1976, 
December 1971, page 86. 
51/ Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., Chairman's Statement 1974 and 
Annual Report 1974, page 11. 
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9.4 Foreign exchange shortages and their effects 
9.4.1 Currency devaluation 
In January 1973, when Zambia refused to re-open the border with Rhodesia 
the copper market was, on the upswing, the cash price. of electrolytic copper 
stood at E475 per tonne and by the end of the year had reached E960. 'The peak 
was reached in April 1974 after which the price fell quickly. Except for a 
brief revival in 1979 and 1980 the price has remained depressed since 1974 and 
by 1982 very few copper producers in the world were operating at a profit. It 
was calculated that in the f irst half of that year, copper in the 
non-Communist countries was being produced at an average loss of 17 cents per 
pound, -E-2/ whereas. copper was selling at about 80 cents per pound. 
Zambia is heavily dependent upon imports for her development programmes 
and, as previously mentioned, the copper industry itself requires substantial 
expenditures of foreign exchange. on top of the-K230 million estimated in 
1977 as being required for imports-of goods, the United Nations estimated that 
an additional K80 million would be required to allow expatriate personnel to 
transfer savings and service gratuities, and a further K100 million to pay the 
transport costs for exports. -1-3/ A total of almost K410 million' of foreign 
exchange was then needed simply for the copper industry's needs, compared with 
fore. ign exchange earnings by the copper industry of K 685 million in 1977. 
The Zambian Gover nment has resisted allowing the Kwacha to be devalued in 
line with the fall in the price of copper or even with the increases in its 
production costs. This would increase the receipts of the copper industry but 
would add to its costs and, more generally, to those of other industries. For 
52/ Mining Journal, October 15,1982, page 271. 
53/ E/1978/114,22. cit., page 28. 
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this reason, the currency had, until 1984, only been devalued in 1976,1978 
and 1983, and the International Monetary Fund had insisted on those 
devaluations as part of. its assistance packages. The net result has been that 
whereas the average copper pr ice realised in dollar terms fell from $1717 per 
tonne in 1973/74 to $1653 in 1981/82, or by 3.9 per cent, the Kwacha price 
increased from K1444 per tonne to K1522, or by 5.4 per cent. 
2-4/ In the 
intervening period the average cost of sales almost trebled from K659 per 
tonne in the case of Roan Consolidated Mines and K694 in that of Nchanga 
Consolidated Coppek Mines Ltd. to an average of K1900 in 1981/82. 
9.4.2 Foreign exchange shortages and their effects 
Faced with the tightening squeeze between stagnant copper prices and 
rising costs, the Zambian industry attempted to contain costs and, 
_ 
more 
dubiously, to-increase production so as to improve revenue and, therefore, 
foreign exchange receipts. It was not able to increase production and one of 
the reasons given was precisely the foreign exchange shortage and accompanying 
payments arrears. The foreign exchange shortage meant that local suppliers 
were not always able to make available essential inputs - for the mining 
industry, ýL5/ which led to acute shortages of spare parts. Payments arrear .s 
induced foreign suppliers to insi-sýt upon payment in foreign currency before 
shipping goods to Zambia. -2-6/ Furthermore, substantial sums were owed 
54/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Annual Report 1982, pages 26 and 34, 
Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1981, pages 26 and 34. (The 
figures for 1974 are only for Roan. Consolidated Mines). 
55/ Roan Consolidated Mines Annual Report 1978, page 6. 
56/ New Africa, May 1978, page 145. 
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for port charges on Zambian cargoes and clearing agents had to wait for 
payment. 
ý-7/ 
As recently as June 1983, copper shipments from Zambia were 
being held up at Kapiri Mposhi because Zambia had not paid the port authority 
at Dar-es-Salaam. After the Government cleared part of this debt, copper 
shipments were expected to resume. At that time a backlog of copper worth 
about K180 million had built up. 
58/ 
Another consequence of the shortage of spare parts was that vital 
equipment at the mines, had to be partially dismantled to supply components 
needed elsewhere. -ý-91 Moreover, the companies had to build up ýarger 
inventories of stores as the delivery time for imports had lengthened 
considerably - -from six months in 1968 to almost. 2 years in 1978. As a 
result, the costs of maintaining the required inventory for the mining sector 
had increased from -K20-30 million to almost K200 million in the same 
period. 
60/ 
9.4.3 Shortages of skilled labour 
One other consequence of the foreig6 exchange shortage and of the 
consequent unavailability of many domestic imports and of the difficulty in 
repatriating income was that it became more difficult to recruit and retain 
skilled- expatriate personnel. We mentioned-in the previous chapter how the 
ýxpatriat7e labour force declined sharply after Independence and after 
nationalization. This was partly because of Zambianization but al. so partly 
57/ E/1978/114, op. cit., Annex, page 27. 
58/ Mining Journal, June 17th 1983, page 416. 
59/ Financial Times, 10 January 1979, page 3. 
60/ E/1978/114,2R. cit., Annex, page 29. 
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because the country could not recruit expatriate labour of the required 
caliber. The last report of the United Nations, in September 1982, described 
how the fall in production was due to "deteriorating ore grades, shortages of 
skilled manpower, labour unrest, and recurring shortages of spare 
parts. " 
61/ 
However, so great were the problems of the industry by then, and 
so desperate was the need to cut costs that Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines 
was at the same time embarking upon a policy "to enable it to retain long 
serving and highly experienced expatriates and, when necessary, to recruit a 
better quality of expatriate with the result that the Company will be able to 
62/ 
do with fewer expatriates than hitherto. 0 In fact, the Company embarked 
upon a policy of reducing the expatriate complement by. 500, or by roughly 25 
per cent. 
9.5 Summary and conclusion: the consequences of external factors 
From the preceding description, it can be seen that the period 'since 
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independe'nce in November 1965 has, almost 
without respite, been one when the Zambian copper mining industry has had to 
face severe difficulties, many of them caused by the conflict with Rhodesia or 
the collapse of the copper price . Transport difficulties, foreign exchange 
61/ United Nations General Assembly Assistance to Zambia: Report of the 
Secretary-General, A/37/133; 7 September 1982, Annex, page 9. 
ý2/ Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. "Statement by Mr. F. H. Kaunda, 
Chairman and Chief Executive, " to Accompany the Annual Re2ort 1982,8th 
October 1982, page 4. 
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shortages, skilled manpower shortages and unavailability of spare parts have 
drastically affected the operations of the industry. 
Our review of the different problems shows that not one can explain the 
disapppointments in the performance of the industry after nationalization. 
For example, the transport problems were not such as to explain the decline in 
copper production: the capacity was there to ship out the copper and indeed, 
in the pre-nationalization period from 1965 to 1969 some copper was sent out 
of the country by air. Shortages of foreign exchange were often very grave, 
but it 'would be difficult to see why they could explain the steady fall in 
labour productivity: at times of stringency it might be thought that the less 
profitable mines should have been closed down, thereby causing average 
productivity to rise. 
Yet Zambia's problems were not so much caused by a series of clearly 
separable shocks but rather by sporadic problems occurring over a long period 
of time and frequently reinforcing each other - for instance the- transport 
difficulties were considerably aggravated by shortages of foreign exchange. 
It would be difficult to capture and to separate in a regression analysis 
the effect of these shocks. 
ý-3/ 
From time to time, estimates were made by 
the companies of the amount of production that would be lost ýks a result of 
the various difficulties. For instance, in 1979, their chairmen estimated 
that unless foreign currency were made available and foreign e-xperts were 
found and retained, oroduction should fall by 83,000 tonnes below the 656,000 
tonnes estimated to have been produced in 1978. 
A4/ 
(In the event, 
63/ cf. NZIRAMASANGA M. and OBIDEGWU C. "An Econometric Model of the Impact 
of the Copper Market on the Economic Development of Zambia", Wharton 
Econometric Associates Inc., March 1979, page 13. 
64/ Mining Journal, January 12th 1979, page 30 and Financial Times, January 
10th 1979, page 3. 
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production in 1979 was 55,000 tonnes below that in 1978) . The present writer 
has not seen any estimates that actually break-down the shortfall' of 
production into, say, losses caused by transport difficulties, shortages of 
spare parts, lack of expatriate skills and difficulties in working lower grade 
ores. 
Even if such an estimate were made it would not really answer the central 
question which is not whether or by how much these difficulties affected 
production. It is rather whether, given the events that did take place and 
that would have taken place even if the private owners had remained in control 
of their properties, they could have been expected to have faced these 
difficultie; better than did the Government-run concerns and to have operated 
the industry so that it would make a greater contribution to the country. 
ýome of these difficulties were clearly outside the Zambian Government's 
control and could not have been foreseen. For instance, the collapse of the 
Portuguese Empire in Africa and the closing -of- the Benguela Railway could 
certainly not have been foreseen at the time of nationalization. On the other 
hand, many of the factors menEioned could at least have been foreseen. This 
was the case with, for instance, the fall in the price of copper after- 1970, 
although it would be difficult to argue that the extent and duration of the 
past 1974 collapse could have been anticipated. The failure of the Tanzam 
Railway to live up to expectations has--clearly caused Zambid-_ severe 
difficulties but in this case it could not be argued that this could not have 
been anticipated. Zambia's experience in running her own railways was not 
very encouraging and it was very dangerous for the country to put so much 
confidence in an untested railroad. 
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In the matter of the availability of skilled labour, the question is 
complex, but it certainly cannot simply be argued that the Government was 
unlucky that the price of copper fell, thereby making it more difficult to pay 
attractive salaries. We have to ask whether it was more likely that 
expatriate labour would have stayed with the companies before as opposed to 
after nationalization and, - secondly, whether the cancellation of the 
management contracts aggravated or alleviated the problem. Moreover, other 
decisions that Zambia took at about the same time had a direct effect on the 
manpower problem. This was particularly the case with the closing of the 
border with Rhodesia in 1973. As the United Nations pointed out "An invisible 
cost (of Zambia's closure of the border with Rhodesia) - but one of 
incalculable importance has been the diversion, in a chronic condition of 
scarce manpower resources, of so much of the time- of everyone in the 
Government ... away from the nation's internal problems to those which 
demanded immediate action-ass-a result of the emergency situation. "ýL5/ 
Not only was the time of existin*g government officials diverted by the crisis 
but also skilled labour. shortages were caused by the new demands caused by the 
crisis: we saw earlier how the operations of the Tanzam railway were affected 
by the mechanics employed in Zambia leaving for the higher wages and more 
attractive surroundings of the Copperbelt. 
66/ 
The important question about nationalizd-tion is, then, whether the 
Government was correct to assume the responsibilities and risks of owning and, 
later, running the industry in an environment made even more uncertain by 
changing conditions in Rhodesia and the copper market. 
ýý5/' E/5867 op. cit., 27 July 1976, page 7. 
66/ E/1978/114 op. cit., Annex page 22. 
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Chapter 10 
ECONOMETRIC TESTS OF EFFICIENCY 
Throughout our earlier discussion, we have drawn attention to problems 
I 
with the available data and have tried to take these into account when 
examining whether the performance of the industry changed after 
nationalization. In this chapter, we will perform some econometric work on 
the data and test whether there was any statistically significant change in 
the performance of the industry after as opposed to before nationalization. 
10.1 Cobb-DouglasProduction Function Tests 
The first set of tests will deal with the efficiency of the industry as 
measured by how capital and labour were combined to produce an output in terms 
of finished copper or copper ore. For these tests we first used a 
Cobb-Douglas production function of the type. 
AKbIL2 rt 
when Q denotes output, A is a constant term, K the capital stock, L the labour 
force and e 
rt 
a term to take account of technical progress which is assumed 
to be disembodied and a function of time. 
For the purposes of our analysis, output was either the output of copper 
given in Table 5.2, or the tonnage of ore mined, Q2. as given in Table 
5.4, but with the 1981 figure adjusted. We'estimated the capital stock, K, in 
four different ways in the course of our earlier discussion. In Table 6.3 we 
deflated the nominal capital stock, the net fixed assets, by the wholesale 
price index for goods for fixed capital formation from 1966 to 1981 and by the 
wholesale price index for all building materials from 1960 to 1965. We 
combined the figures for RST/RCM and Zamanglo/NCCM to give K1. We also used 
the GDP deflator, adjusted for changes in the terms of trade, and this measure 
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of the capital stock is labeled K 2' The net 
fixed assets of the groups were 
also deflated by the unadjusted GDP deflator and this measure of the capital 
stock is labelled K 3* 
Finally, in Table 6.4, we gave another measure of the capital stock in 
which the increments in net fixed assets' were deflated by the price index for 
investment goods used for KI and added to the 1959 measure of the capital 
stock. This measure is called KC 
These four measures of the capital stock are given in Table-10.1. 
Table 10.1 Measures of the Net Capital stock at constant prices, 1960-1981 
(Km) 
K]. K2 K3 K4 
(1971) (1971) (1971) (1960) 
1960 325.4 341.4 363.3 224.9 
1961 353.9 384.1 414.1 245.0 
1962 373.8 408.0 433.9 259.5 
1963 383.4 414.6 441.2 . 270.1 
1964 379.9 418.9 445.7 280.1 
1965 375.1 400.2 425.8 291.6 
1966 357.0 391.3 351.4 297.9. 
1967 356.3 377.8 341.9 308.6 
1968 356.7 355.4 317.9 309.9 
1969 381.5 405.4 287.0 329.9 
1970 411.8 406.7 353.5 349.6 
1971 439.9 439.9 439.9 388.7 
1972 459.6 476.0 486.6 428.4 
1973 494.0 518.6 464.3 473.1 
1974 493.8 507.5 472.3 513.3 
1975 454.6 521.5 616.4 546.7 
1976 370.7 476.5 588.8 566.3 
1977 315.8 453.9 579.8 582.1 
1978 261.3 433.9 558.6 593.5 
1979 226.4 382.9 441.5 596.7 
1980 210.0 358.6 411.2 611.6 
1981 211.8 364.3 443.9 616.3 
Source: Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
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On a priori grounds we would expect the best measure of the capital stock 
on constant terms to be the one where the nominal figures were deflated by an 
index of the price of investment goods, rather than by more general indices 
like the GDP deflators that exclude the effect of import price changes, 
especially as much of capital equipment was imported. Thus we would expect 
K1 to give better results than K2 or K 3* The method of calculating K4 
was different, and was such that 'the capital stock appears to increase over 
time. 
For the labour force, we used the figures for total labour strength given 
in Table 5.6. We did not then take account of changes in the quality of the 
labour or of the amount of hours worked, as these latter figures were not 
available. 
To take into account the effect of nationalization, we used a Dummy 
var iab 
. 
le Dl, which had the value of 0 from 1960 to 1969 and 1 from 1970 to 
1981. 
The production function was then in the form: 
(b) Q= (Ae 
1b3Kb1Lb2e rt 
0Db 
where, - as e .1 Ae 13 was equal to A. in the years before 
nationalization. In this form, the margin . al productivities of capital and 
labour remained constant, but what was shifted was the whole production 
b3 frontier. If e was greater than 1, it would mean that for the same 
combination of capital and labour, output would have been greater after 
nationalization than before. This fits in with our earlier discussion of 
efficiency: that an industry could be considered to be run more efficiently 
under public rather than private ownership if, using the same inputs, it 
invariably produced a larger output. 
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10.1.1 ReSUltS for the unconsErained production function 
Equation (b) in log linear terms is: 
(c) log Q= log A+ b1 log K +b2 log L + rt + b3D1 Ut 
The last term, up was the error term. They were assumed to have an 
expected value of zero, to. have a common variance, to be independent of the 
dependent variables, and to be mutually independent. Under these assumptions, 
ordinary least squares provides the best linear unbiased estimator. 
Equation (c) was estimated by ordinary least squares, using the two 
output measures and the four capital stock measures, giving eight equations in 
all. Throughout this chapter, equations have been examined for 
autocorrelation using the Theil-Nagar -1/ test. Where there was evidence of 
positive autocorrelation at the 5% level, the equations were re-estimated by 
2/ 
the Cochrane-Orcutt method - assuming a first-order autoregressive 
scheme. Such re-estimated equations have been denoted by an asterik 
Figures given in brackets are the It' statistics. 
Only the two equations using K gave statistically significant 
coefficients for the capital stock, and these two equations are given below: 
Table 10.2 
Results for the Cobb-Douglas production function 
log Q1 8.68 + 0.37 log Kl - 0.42-log L+0.024t - 0.13DI 
(2.50) (6.77) (-1.29) (3.77) (-2.78) 
D. W. =1.82 R2 = 0.75 
(2*) 10cl Q2 14.39 + 0.57 log Kl- 0.74 log L+0.052t - 0.16 Dl 
(3.28) (7.03) (-1.75) (5.58) (-2.53) 
D. W. = 1.95 R2= 0.91 
l/ THEIL H. & NAGAR A. L. "Testing the independence of regression 
disturbances" Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1976, pages 
793-806. 
2/ COCHRANE D. & ORCUTT G. H. "Application of Least Squares Regressions 
to RWlationships containing Autocorrelated Error Terms" Journal of the 
American Statistical Assocation, 1949, pages 32-61. 
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It was argued earlier that K1 was, on a priori grounds, the best 
estimate of the capital stock. It was also understýndable how the 
coefficients for the labour input, although not strictly significant at the 5% 
level, were negative. Over the whole period, the labour force 'rose while the 
output of ore and copper eventually stagnated and then fell. This would 
indicate that the larger labour force was working af a low degree of intensity 
and producing less output. It is also likely that changes in the quality of 
the labour force were important - that although the total numbers employed 
rose,. the average productivity of the labour force fell. 
We next explored whether some other important influences had been 
overlooked. We tried to gauge the effect of the Mufulira disaster by 
introducing another Dummy variable, D 2' w. hich had the value of 
I in 1970 and 
1971. However, this dummy variable will- also pick up another factor present 
in the immediate post-nationalization years, - the management contracts that 
the Zambian Government decided to terminate in 1973. It is possible that the 
continuation in their management role of the former private owners of the 
mines had a*positive effect on efficien-cy, which outweighed the influence of 
the Mufulira diaster, and this would show up by a positive sign on the D2 
variable in the regression equations. 
In Chapter 8.1.1 we saw that the effects of the Mufulira disaster and the 
subsequent need to sand-fill were limited, and certainly could not account for 
any major deterioration in Zambia's overall performance after the middle of 
the decade. Thus a large and negative sign on the dummy DI cannot be solely 
attributable to the Mufulira disaster and its effects. This consideration 
also holds for the cost functions estimated later in the chapter. We also 
introduced in our equations the grade of ore mined as another variable, to 
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represent the physical characteristics of the orebody -a fall in the grade of 
ore could have meant greater difficulties in extracting the ore, which would 
have reduced production. However, this variable proved statistically 
insignificant when included in the equations and it did not improve the 
overall goodness of fit. Thus equations with the ore variable are not shown. 
Again, only K1 as a me asure of the capital stock was used. The results when 
D2 was introduced are given below: 
Table 10.3 
Results for the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
with allowance made for 1970 and 1971 
(3*)log QI=6.87 + 0.41 log Kl 
(1.68) (7.70) 
D. W. = 2.12 
(4*)Iog Q2=11.61 + 0.58 log K1., 
(2.38) (7.84) 
- 0.28 log L+0.028t - 0.19D1 +. 0.046D2 
(-0.72) (4.14) (-3.15) (0.93) 
R2 = 0.75 
-0.49 log L+0.052t - 0.22 DI + 0.066D2 
(-1.05) (6.15) (-2.86) (1.12) 
D. W. = 2.17 R2 = 0-92 
It is noticeable that the significant coefficients were reasonably stable 
with the addition of the D2 var iable. Again the labour coefficients were 
insignificant. The D dummies were negative and significant. The D 12 
dummies were not strictly significant at the 5% level - their positive sign 
perhaps being tentative evidence that the effects of the management contracts 
were beneficial and more than offset the harmful reuslts of the Mufulira 
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di asaster. However it is the case that the sum of the coefficients of DI 
and D2 was negative in both equations, indicating that efficiency was 
impaired by nationalization, but that the degree of impairment was mitigated 
by the retention in their management role of the former private owners of* the 
mines. 
The effect of the change in the ore grade over time was probably picked 
up by the time variable, such that the coefficient of this term reflected 
both technical progress and the falling ore grade. This is consistent with 
the coefficient of the_ time term being lower in the copper output 
equations than in the ore output (Q ) equations. 2 
10.1; 2 The constrained production function 
Further exploration regressed output per head against capital per head. 
This can be looked at as imposing constant returns to scale on a production 
function (i. e. that b1+b2ý1 in equation b). It is a useful test in 
that we would like to know whether capital per worker was used as productively 
after nationalization as before and this regression does provide a test for 
this. If nationalization led to excessive use of labour, with the labour 
force being expanded beyond its strict economic necessity, then we. would 
expect the returns-per unit of capital for each worker to be lower. 
The equation for this new regression was 





= log A+b1 log( E) + rt +b2 DI. +. b 3D2 
LL 
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The last two terms disappeared when DI and D2 were equal to zero. Wh en 
they were both equal to 1, in 1970 and 1971, th en b2 and b3 could be 
combined so that: 
(f) A 
bl rt b2+b3 
LL 
The results for K2K3 and K4 were as disappointing as in the 
previous regressions that tested the unconstrained production function. The 
results for those equations that included the log of the ore grade as a 
variable have not been given, as the coefficients for this variable were never 
statistically significant. 
The results are given below with equations where D2 was omitted being 
shpwn-first: 
Results for the qonstrained production function 
(5*) log Ql/L = -2.61+ 0.36 log Kl/L + 0.0086t - 0.13 Dl 
(-5.96) (3.6 5) (1.041) (-1.82) 
DW = 1.88 R2=0.81 
(6*) 10'9 Q2/L = 1.77 + 0.53 log KI/L 4- 0.032t - 0.13 D1 
(3.43) (4.53) (3.2ý) (-1.69) 
DW = 1.50 R2=0.77 
(7*) log Ql/L = -2.59 + 0.37 locj Kl/L + 0.014t - 0.21 Dl + 0.092 D2 
(-9.04) (5.82) (2.42) (-3.32) (1.93) 
DW = 2.09 R2=0.83 
(8*) lcýq Q2/L = 1.96 + 0.58 log Kl/L + 0.044t - 0.28 Dl + 0.14 D2 
(5.78) (7.57) (5.85) (-3.80) (2.59) 
DW = 2.06 R2=0.82 
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The equations with D2 appear more satisfactory than those without, 
indicating that these equations are better specified. In particular, equation 
(5*) indicates insignificant coefficients for time and for D, , while (6*) 
still exhibits p6sitive autocorrelation, despite being estimated by the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. We will therefore concentrate on equations (7) and 
(8*). 
It will be noted that equation (7) was estimated by ordinary least 
squares and that for both it and equation (8*) the capital/labour coefficients 
were reasonably stable after the addition of the D var iable. The results 2 
were also consistent with those for the unconstrained production function - 
D1 was again significant and negative and of the same order. of magnitude. 
D2 was positive, and, in these equations, significant. Moreover, the sum of 
D1 and D2 remained negative. 
10.2 Tests on the costs of production 
The second part of our testing of the efficiency- of the industry after 
nationalization concerned looking at whether costs changed. Once again, we 
had problems with the data, particularly as the Zambian Anglo American group 
did not. give such detailed cost figures as did the Roan Selection Trust 
group. The former only gave "cost of sales" which is not very helpful, as it 
could have changed through factors completely out of the mining companies, 
control such as transport costs, and royalties and export taxes which we re 
quite large compared to costs free on rail (f. o. r. ) atý the mine. 
Unfortunately, only Roan Selection Trust published these figures before 
nationalization, whereas both groups published them afterwards. We have, 
then, used the Roan Selection Trust figures for the years before 
nationalization and a weighted average of the two groups' figures for the 
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years afterwards. We give in Table 10.5 the relevant figures. It can be seen 
that, during the period 1971 to. 1981, although for individual years the cost 
figures differed, on the whole bo th series showed a similar order of -magnitude 
- only K19 per tonne separated them in 1981 and K2.2 per tonne in 1971. It 
did not, then, appear unreasonable to use the Roan Selection Trust figures to 
represent the years before 1970. Moreover, there was not a dramatic increase 
between 1969 and 1970 which could have called into question all our results. 
Table 10.5 Costs f. o. r. mine at the Zambian Mines, 1961-1981 
RST/RCM zccm Weiqhted averaqe 









1970 339.6 339.6 
1971 412 409.8 410.7 
1972 448 454 452 
1973 464 443 451 
1974 523 531 528 
19,75 619 667 647 
1976 680 731 697 
1977 806 752 772 
1978 809 950 891 
1979 908 984 953 
1980 1213 1143 1171 
1981 1380 1399 1392 
Source: Roan Selection Trust, Roan Consolidated Mines, Nchanga Consolidated 
Copper Mines Ltd. Annual Reports, and Table 5.10. 
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b3 b4Dl b5D2 
where C= costs f. o. r. mine 
A= constant 
B, C, D= different independent variables, as described below 
D, = Dummy variable = 0% 1961 ... 1969) 1: 1970-81. 
D2= Dummy variable = 0: 1961 ... 1969,1972.... 1981; 1: 1970,1971 
Therefore 
(h) log C= log A+b1 log B+. b2 log C+b3 log D+b4D, + 
b5D2+ut 
It will be seen that th_js formulation implies that nationalization 





. rather than simply A. It was, then, as if the 
whole cost curve moved, rather than that the response of costs to movements in 
variables B, C or D changed. 
Many independent variables suggested- themselves, and we used several, in 
different combinations. These were 
LPCF = log of index for prices of goods for fixed capital formation 
LPEL = log of wholesale price index for electricity 
LPMX = log of unit value of manufactured exports from developed market 
economies, converted from dollar to Kwac4a terms 
LPDU = log of wholesale prices of domestically used goods 
LAV log of average earnings in the mining industry 
LPI = log of index of earnings of PI workers 
LPII = log of index of-earnings of PlI workers 
LLPT = log of labour costs per tonne of copper 
LQ1 = log of finished copper production in Zambia. 
LQ2 = log of ore output in Zambia 
LOG1 = log oi ore grade milled in Zambia 
The first letter L indicated that the log was being used. 
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The mid-points in the yearly salary scale for the Pl and P11 workers were 
used whe"r) applicable. It will be noted that wage rates are different from 
average earnings or labour costs per tonne in not taking account of bonuses 
and other payments or the movement of workers into higher grades. 
Several of these variables have been given earlier in the text, and were 
simply used in index form in the regressions. AV (average earnings) were 
given in Table 5.14, first column*, LPT (labour costs per tonne). in Table 
5.13; Q1 (copper output) in Table 5.2; Q2 (ore output) in Table 5.14 and 
OG1 (ore grade) also in Table 5.4 The other variables are given in Table 10.6. 
Table 10.6 Variables used in cost equations 
PCF PEL P14X PDU Pi Pii 
1960 81.7 102.9 
1961 81.9 102.7 
1962 82.1 101.7 
1963 83.4 100.3 
1964 87.5 99.2 
1965 92.7 99.3 
1966 100.0 100.0 
1967 104.7 107.3 
1968 105.2 115.8 
1969 106.4 102.2 
1970 109.0 95.7 
1971 118.2 91.4 
1972 -129.3 93.6 
1973 138.4 88.9 
1974 156.9 85.6 
1975 190.8 84.0 
1976 253.4 86.9 
1977 320.6 83.5 
1978 413.6 79.7 
1979 487.3 79.1 
1980 544.8 77.4 
1981 599.5 78.1 
94.0 81.7 
96.0 81.9 52.5 53.4 
96.0 82.1 61.1 58.5 
96.0 83.4 57.9 55.4 
98.0 87.5 71.8 78.0 
100.0 -92.7 71.7 78.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
102.0 103.8 100.0 100.0 
102.0 100.0 10 
* 
0.0 
106.0 113.6 100.0 100.0 
110.3 116.4 110.8 102.8 
118.3 123.1 110.8 102.8 
126.6 133.9 110.8 102.8 
135.4 141.2 122.3 116.8 
163.7 161.7 122.3 116.8 
183.7 188.6 140.6 131.4 
203.7 221.6 146.1 138.8 
246.0 276.2 154.3 143.3 
285.7 ý30.2 154.3 147.7 
321.7 381.9 176.3 155.0 
356.0 424.2 198.3 161.2 
369.7 475.9 231.1 170.3 
Source: Zambia- Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Unied Nations Monthly 
Bulletin of Statistics (for PMX). 
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The price data for Zambia are very sparse in the early years, before 
1966, and so the figures for all building materials were used froin 1960 to 
1965 when calculating the indices for the prices of goods for fixed capital 
formation (PCF) and of domestically used goods (PDU). However, these years 
were ones of low inflation - consumer prices rose by just over 20 per cent 
between 1960 and 1966, the same rise recorded in the prices of building 
materials. Before 1966, the consumer price index for fuel and light was used 
instead of the wholesale price index for electricity. We give some of our 
results in Table 10.7, equations 9* to 14*. It can be seen that most of the 
regression coefficients are significant. 
Table 10.7 Regression results when costs at mine peK tonne (C) were the 
dependent variable. (1961 - 1981) 
(9*) log C 1.42 + 0.57 LPCF + 0.35 LP1 + 0.17 Dl 
(2.84) (6.62) (2.01) (2.84) 
DW=2.00 R2=0.98 
(10*)log C=1.58 + 0.52 LPCF + 0.37 LP1 + 0.24 DI 0.11 D2 DW=2.05 R2=0.99 
(3.35) (6.05) (2.28) (ý. 10) (-1.39) 
. (11*)log C=1.11 + 0.77 LPDU + 0.21 LP1 + 0.15 Dl DW=1.98 R2=0.98 
(2.48) (7.21) (1.18) (2.25) 
(12*)log C=1.28 + 0.71 LPDU + 0.24 LPI 
(2.98) (6.53) (1.40) 
(13*)Ioci C=0.06 + 0.76 LPMX + 0.46 LPI 
(0.16) (7.84) (3.36) 
(14*)loq C=0.21 + 0.71LPMX + 0.48 LPI 
(0,50) (6.54) (3.43) 
+ 0.20 DI - 0.09D2 DW=2.03 R2=0.99 
(2.79) (-1.24) 
+ 0.12 DI DW=2.03 R2=0.98) 
(1.97) 
0.16 DI -0.07 D2 DW=2.05 R2=(). 99) 
(2.13) (-0.9) 
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The first two equations, 9* and 10*, where the price of goods for fixed 
capital formation (PCF), the same index used to arrive at Klo. and the wage 
rates for PI workers were the independent variables, gave good results. These 
variables can be seen as measuring the price of capital goods and labour 
respectively. The price index of manufactured exports from developed 
countries converted into kwachas (PMX) also gaye good results as seen in 
equations 13* and 14*. The other wage-rate variable used, Plf, was invariably 
statistically insignificant. Costs are more 1 ikely to be determined by 
movements in the wages of lower paid workers than in those of higher paid 
workers, and so this result could have been expected. The inclusion of other 
variables such as the grade of ore or the output of ore or copper which could 
be seen as taking into account scale economies, did not improve the regression 
results, nor were their coefficients significant. The different broad price 
variables - LPCF, LPMX, LPDU - were significant when used alone as equations 
9* to 14* show, but because of multi-collineariiy did not yield such good 
results when combined together or when used with LPEL, the price of electricty. 
Most importantly, the. cost equations results are largely consistent with 
the production function results. The dummy variable, Dl, was significant 
and positive throughout. The variable, D 2' was negative throughout, but 
never strictly significant at the 5% level. The sum of D1 and D2 was- 
always positive. 
10.3 Summary 
In Chapter 5, caution was raised over the short-comings in the data 
series available, and these must be borne in mind in an overall evaluation of 
the econometric work. However it is noticeable that all the econometric work 
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indicates a statistically significant fall in efficiency in the 
post-nationalization period, even after allowances are made for the Mufulira 
disaster. The production function estimates indicate lower output per unit of 
resources used, the order of magnitude being within a few percentage points of 
15 per cent when no allowance was made for the Mufulira diasaster and as much 
as 10 per cent more after 1971 when allowance had been made for 1970 and 1971 
Similarly, the cost equations indicated a statistically significant- rise 
in costs as a result of inefficiencies following nationalization, even when 
the Mufulira disaster had been taken into account. The order of magnitude of 




The nationalization of the Zambian copper mining industry that has been 
the main subject of our study took place at a time when the industry was at 
the crest of a wave - at a time of high and growing production when tax 
revenues were high and when there were plans, which were in the process of 
being implemented, to add substantially to capacity. In this context, the 
thesis looked at the reasons for and the results of the nationalization. 
11.1 The industry's meeting its various responsibilities 
In Chapter 2, we discussed various criteria for determining the 
performance of the industry. We described how the mining industry is really a 
collection of different units - metal marketing departments, geological 
research and evaluation units, etc. - set up to produce and sell copper for 
the benefit of its owners. The private owners claimed that the benefit of the 
owners - the private shareholders - was not the only objective of their 
organizations. Sir Ronald Prain set out other responsibilities that he 
considered the industry had to its employees, to goverhment, to the 
community, to the industry's customers, to the rest of the industry throughout 
the world and to the futur e. 
l/ 
Few would disagree with this list of responsibilities, although there 
might be disagreements about the different importance these responsibili. ties 
should have. We have to ask whether, at the time of nationalization, there 
were obvious defects in these organizations that prevented them from meeting 
PRAIN Sir R. L. "Mining and the Public Interest": Address to the Mining 
and Metallurgical Society of America, New York, April 29th 1958, 
reprinted in Selected Papers Vol 11,1958-1960, London 1961, pages 1 -12. 
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their responsibilities, whether they simply did not try to meet certain 
responsibilities, or attached a completely incorrect importance to them. In 
the light of our. examination of the Zambian copper industry before and after 
nationalization, taking into 'account the arguments advanced in favour of 
nationalization, it would be difficult to say that there were obvious defects 
in the organizations or that they clearly had their priorities wrong. 
In the light of hind-sight, and, as we argued in chapter 9, on the basis 
of what should have been perceived at the time, it can be seen that the 
Goverpment's single-minded determination to increase production and investment 
raised questions about two of the industry's considerations - with respect to 
the world industry as a whole and to the future. If, as we saw Mr. Faber 
claimed, (Chapter 7.2.3) the private companies were worried about expanding 
production because of world over-production leading to a lower copper price, 
it would be difficult *now to argue that they were not acting with justifiable 
caution. 
11.2 The overall performance after nationalization 
In the event, as we saw, production did not increase after 
nationalization and the record on investment is ambiguous. At the cost of a 
considerable loss in Government revenue in the last years of high 
profitability, when it could have recouped large sums in tax revenues, the 
Government did help encourage heavy investment spending. Yet this investment 
boom tapered off in the middle 1970s and by the end of the decade the 
condition of the plant and the productive capacity of the industry would 
appear to have been lower than at the time of nationalization. 
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We saw that the nationalized industry did have some accomplishments to 
its credit. In particular, its record on Zambianization, part of its 
responsibility to its employees, was good, and it was successful in holding 
down wage- costs. Moreover, the technical side of operations was maintained 
well, judging by the accident record (with the exception of the Mufulira 
disaster which cannot be attributed to nationalization) ana the rates of 
recovery at the treatment plant. The productivity record, both in terms of 
ore and copper output per employee, deteriorated after nationalization. We 
saw that productivity was directly related to output, but no attempt was made 
in the early years to adjust the labour force downwards as output fell. 
In chapter 9, we looked at the effects of the fall in the price of cooper 
and of the disruption caused by the undeclared war with Rhodesia on the 
industry and argued that they could account for much of the difficulty that- 
the industry faced. However, we also argued that many of the difficulties 
that arose could have been foreseen. 
The results of our econometric work were consistent with the view that 
efficiency did fall after nationalization and thaýt the costs of production 
rose. These. results held up even after allowance had been made for 1970 and 
1971. 
For the above reasons, it would be difficult now to argue that there were 
obvious deficiencies in the way the induf 
nationalization. Although the process 
nationalization, this is a policy that 
and, we argued, they were probably in a 
the services of a skilled expatriate 
companies. 
; try was run that would be remedied by 
of Zambianization continued after 
the private companies were pursuing 
better position to retain and obtain 
work force than the nationalized 
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11.3 The importance of organizational factors 
This issue of Zambianization illustrates what is a very important 
question that must be asked about nationalization and one that, at the time, 
was hardly put. It is whether, if the organizations that had existed up to 
1969 had been allowed to continue in existence, they would not have met the 
objectives of the government better than did the new companies that were set 
up. This is a real question because, as we saw earlier (7.5), the executives 
of the mining companies were prepared for, and indeed expected, the 
post-Independence Government to assume a large interest in the mining 
companies. As it happened, though, the organizations that existed, Roan 
Selection Trust and Zambian Anglo-American, were radically changed by 
nationalization. Two private enterprise organizations that were very clearly 
guided by commercial considerations and whose management was independent of 
the Government were replaced by two organizations under Government control. 
There was much to be said in favour of leaving the existing organizations 
in place. They had acquired considerable experience in running the industry, 
-had a feeling for the copper market and were independent. moreover, their 
employees had considerable "esprit de corps". Allowing these organizations to 
remain in place would have indicated to the international business community 
that Zambia was not averse to private enterprise. Furthermore, it was 
observed that one of the factors that probably contributed to the poor 
production performance was the lack of management continuity. 
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11.4 The risk-assuminq role of the private companies 
As well as the stability and coherence in objectives and direction that 
the private organizations provided, another of the strongest reasons for 
maintaining them intact was, we believe, that it was easier for private 
enterprise rather than the country of Zambia to adjust to the consequences of 
the fall in the price of copper and the dispute with Rhodesia. 
If, as we saw to be the case, the years after 1969 could have been 
expected to be difficult ones for the copper industry, it was surely in the 
country's interest that foreign private capital rather than the national 
economy should suffer the consequences. As it was, the nationalization of the 
industry meant that Zambia had to go heavily into debt to keep the industry 
operational: if the industry had remained in the hands of the private 
companies it was they who would_have had to borrow whatever sums were 
required, thereby affecting their own asset position but not that of Zambia. 
We described how Zambia has subsequently had to agree to rather severe 
adjustment programmes in order to obtain support from the International 
Monetary Fund. It could, then, be argued that Zambia's quest for "economic 
independence" has led her to actually lose her freedom of movement. Before 
nationalization, her major industry was run by private -companies with foreign 
backing but, as their principal assets - the mines and treatment plant - were 
immovable, the Government had very considerable control over these companies. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see that the Government gained any really greater 
degree of control over the industry by nationalization. By assuming all the 
risks that the private companies once bore, the Government in effect tied the 
country's fate directly to the vagaries of the copper market. When this 
market collapsed, the Government had to accept that its policies be determined 
by its creditors, acting through the International Monetary Fund. 
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11.5 Nationalization coming at a time when the industry was mature 
We also saw that the industry at the time of nationalization was fully 
mature. The big mines had all been opened up and there were no low-cost 
exciting properties waiting to be opened up. As the existing mines had gone 
deeper, grades of ore had fallen and costs had tended to rise because of the 
greater distances that the ore had to travel. The mines and treatment plant 
were in good working order and, before the Mufulira disaster, it was possible 
to visualize a slight increase in the country's production of copper. Yet, it 
could be seen that difficulties did lie ahead and that it would probably be 
impossible to repeat the rates of profit per unit of output that had obtained 
in, -say, the mid-1950s. In these circumstances, it could be argued that the 
best course was to leave in charge those who had acquired considerable 
experience in running the industry, in times of difficulty as well as of 
prosperity. The argument would be that all the resources that the two private 
organizations had at their disposal were needed to keep the industry running 
efficiently and any move that might have weakened the "esprit de corps" that 
existed in them, such as nationalization or the revoking of the management 
contracts, was not in the best interests of the country. 
This argument, that the deposits were becoming more difficult to work and 
that therefore considerable attention should be paid to ensuring their 
efficient operation, was not one that was addressed by the proponents of 
nationalization. It would not be unfair to state that they thought that the 
2/ 
Government would be taking over very profitable organizations- and that it 
could be able to use the profits from ' the industry for the country's 
development 
3/ 
. There was no indication that at some future time the 
2/ cf. POTTER J. G. "The 51 per cent Nationalisation of the Zambian Copper 
Mines" in FABER M. L. O. and POTTER J. G. Towards Economic Independence, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1971, page 96. 
3/ cf. KAUNDA K. Matero Speech, August llth 1969, reprinted ibid. page 133. 
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Government might not obtain any revenue from the industry or that it would 
have to borrow to help it to continue its operations. The Government and its 
advisers can, then, be criticized for being too optimistic in their outlook. 
11.6 Whether nationalization was a result of over-optimism 
Indeed, it might almost seem that the nationalization of the Zambian 
copper mining industry was just one of the over-optimistic acts performed by a 
young and inexperienced government when the future seemed to hold nothing but 
promise for Africa. Independence was being achieved at a time of boom in 
mineral markets and it was thought that the possibility of physical scarcities 
would keep mineral prices high. In light of the oil price increase of 1973/74 
and the warnings of the Club of Rome, published in their Limits to Growth in 
1972,4 few would have imagined that within a few years such an important 
metal as copper would be selling at below its costs of production. 
Certainly, then, a strong case can be made for the argument that what was 
really wrong with the nationalization was the timing - that if the government 
had simply waited until the copper price fell, thereby depressing the price of 
the existing companies' shares, it could have acquired its majority ownership 
at a very low price and with the eager approval of the private owners, thereby 
in no way damaging its image in the international investment community. For 
instance, the Government acquired its 51 per cent ownership in Roan Selection 
Trust's properties for $118 million. In 1977, Roan Consolidated Mines'capital 
was made up of 30.315 million shares. The lowest prices the shares reached in 
that year was 50p ($0.87) and so a 51 per cent interest would have been worth 
$13.45 million. The highest price of 1977,160p, would have meant 51 per cent 
4/ MEADOWS D. H. et al The Limits to Growth New York, Universe Books, 
1972. 
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could have been purchased for $43 millionY The lowest share price of 1975 
was 155p, and the 51 per cent of the company would then have been worth about 
$53 million. 
We only give these figures for the sake of illustration - if Roan 
Selection Trust had not been nationalized, its shares could have been valued 
differently from what those of Roan Consolidated Mines were. Morover, such a 
large purchase as 51 per cent would have affected the prevailing share 
prices. This illustration does, though, bring out clearly that there were 
alternatives to what the Government actually did and that if it had waited it 
could perhaps have bought out the private owners at a very low price. 
11.7 The objectives and reasons for nationalization notclearly thought 
through 
We would argue, - 
though, that more questions can be raised about the 
nationalization than simply whether its timing was opportune or not. . 
We 
argued in Chapter 7.4.2 that the Government's objections to the way the 
companies were being run were never properly documented and that it was not 
clear what changes nationalization would- be expected to make. This would 
suggest that the decision and its consequences were never properly thought 
through by the Government. 
5/ Share prices from Financial Times Mining International Yearbook 1979, 
page 474. 
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The President himself had said a year before the nationalization, in 
1968, that copper was "too big" but apparently changed his mind over this. 6/ 
Moreover, in the first years of Independence there appeared to be little 
serious discussion of what policy should be pursued towards the copper mining 
industry, although the policy that finally emerged in 1969 was apparently not 
the result of any hasty decision, but a logical outcome of the Mulungushi 
Reform of April 1968, whereby the Government acquired a 51 per cent share in 
several large firms, and of the experience of the Chileans in acquiring a 51 
per cent ownership of the Anaconda mines in June 1969. -21 
The Government seemed to think that nationalization would bring about the 
benefits of an increase in production, in tax revenues and in investment, but 
did not really address the possible disadvantages of having the Government 
rather than the companies assume all the risks and, later undertake the 
management of the properties. It seemed to believe it would obtain all the 
benefits of nationalization and that either the possible disadvantages did not 
exist or, in Zambia's case, would be unimportant. There was, though, little 
excuse for taking so optimistic a view. As we saw in Chapter 7.2.1, the Seers 
repqrt had talked of both the Government and the companies suffering from 
nationalization, and had suggested alternative measures. Moreover it had 
expressly warned that if the Government acquired an equity interest in the 
companies in lieu of royalty payments or export taxes, this could be a 
disadvantage in that the industry's contribution to the Government 
-would 
become more volatile. 
6/ MARTIN, A. Minding their own business: Zambia's Struggle Against Western 
Control, London, Hutchinson, 1972, pg. 157-158. 
7/ ibid. Chapters 6 and 7. 
-320- 
11.8 An overall assessment 
Soon after the agreement between Anaconda and Chile referred to above, 
the Chilean Government changed hands and Salvador Allende Gossens came to 
power He set about taking over the mining properties on terms that the 
private share holders did not agree to. This was never a viable option for 
Zambia as, unlike Chile, it did not have the skilled manpower to run the mines 
in the event of the private owners withdrawing all their personnel in the face 
of outright confiscation. 
We saw in our earlier analysis that if a nationalization were in fact a 
confiscation the capture by the state of the economic rent from the mineral 
properties at no cost - then this could be said to be an economic 
justification for nationalization. The other arguments in favour of 
nationalization were more tenuous and revolved- axound such things as whether 
the private owners were paying enough attention to externalities, were 
applying an implicit discount rate that was different from what the country 
would have applied, or were risk averse. our examination of the Zambian case 
has shown that any such arguments against the private owners are difficult to 
sustain. Moreover, the realities of the copper market are forcing the state 
concerns to consider doing what a private owner would almost certainly have 
done - close down some operations and seek to cut the labour force - the 
avoidance of which were reasons given for the desirability of nationalization. 
The objections to nationalization were clearly stated at the time - 
bureaucratic inef f iciency, political rather than economic considerations 
dictating policy, loss of foreign investment interest in Zambia and the state 
assuming the risks of mining. 
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If then, there is to be a conclusion to this thesis, it is to emphasize 
the problems attendant upon the nationalization of a natural resource 
industry. If an industry is reasonably well-run by its private owners, then 
there is a very strong case for leaving it alone. Projections of increases in 
future production and untapped sources of revenue for the state can make 
nationalization appear a very viable option, but the risks involved and the 
intangibles - such as the importance of a well-tried management or a 
recognized esprit de corps in the private concern - can invalidate the most 
optimistic of forecasts. Certainly, to nationalize-an industry when all the 
indications are that the market will soon decline, as happened in Zambia's 
case, would require considerable justification. 
It cannot be said that this conclusion is novel. To complete the 
quotation from Adam Smith given earlier; 
"But though the judgment of sober reason and experience concerning such (M ining) projects has always been extremely unfavourable, that of human 
avidity has commonly been quite otherwise. The same passion which has 
suggested to so many people the absurd idea of the philosopher's stone, 
has suggested to others the equally absurd one of immense rich 
mines. ... " 
8/. 
At the present time of dismally low metal prices, it would be hard not to 
-argue that sober reason would indicate that it- is better that private foreign 
capitalists be led by avidity to put their money into mineral projects rather 
than national governments. 
B/ SMITH A. The Wealth of Nations, London 1977, Bk IV Chapter VII, part 
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